DEC  29 1920 


Crescas      ^''^  °^  Don  Hasda- 


THE  PHILOSOPHY 
OF  DON  HASDAI  CRESCAS 


COLUMBIA    UNIVERSITY    PRESS 
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COLUMBIA  UNIVERSITY  ORIENTAL   STUDIES 
Vol.  XVII 


THE  PHILOSOPHY    "^ 
OF  DON  HASDAI  "CRESCAS 


ihikU 


MEYER  WAXMAN,   Ph.D. 


COLUMBIA   UNIVERSITY   PRESS 


1920 

AH  rights  reserved 


PRINTED    IN    ENGLA^D 
AT    THE    OXFORD    UNIVERSITY    PRESS 


NOTE 

A  PECULIAR  interest  attaches  to  Hasdai  Crescas.  He 
swam  against  the  current  of  the  philosophical  exposition 
of  his  day.  He  was  bold  enough  to  oppose  the  speculative 
reasoning  of  Aristotle,  the  man  who  held  nearly  all  the 
philosophers  in  his  grip  during  so  many  centuries  ;  and, 
above  all,  he  dared  to  critici:^e  the  introduction  of  Aristotelian 
views  into  the  religious  philosophy  of  his  own  people,  even 
though  these  views  were  dressed  in  Jewish  garb  by  the 
master  hand  of  Maimonides.  The  current  passed  him  by ; 
it  could  not  overwhelm  him. 

In  the  following  pages  Dr.  Meyer  Waxman  has  given 
us  a  detailed  and  a  very  interesting  exposition  of  Crescas's 
philosophic  system  ;  and  he  has  added  to  this  a  comparison 
of  Crescas's  views,  not  only  with  those  of  Maimonides,  but 
also  with  those  of  Spinoza.  We  have  thus  lined  up  for  us 
the  three  greatest  minds  that  speculative  Jewish  theology 
produced  during  the  Middle  Ages ;  and  the  means  are 
afforded  us  to  estimate  the  value  of  their  dip  into  the 
Unknown. 

RICHARD   GOTTHEIL. 
March  24,  19 19. 


TO  MY  WIFE 
SARAH  V.  WAXMAN 


PREFATORY   NOTE 

The  bulk  of  this  study  forming  the  body  of  the  book, 
chapters  i  to  vii  inclusive,  appeared  originally  in  the  Jeivish 
Quarterly  Review,  New  Series,  Volumes  VIII,  Nos.  3,  4, 
IX,  Nos.  I,  2,  X,  Nos.  1,  3,  3. 

To  the  editor  and  publishers  of  the  Quarterly  my  thanks 
are  due  for  their  kindness  in  granting  me  the  permission 
to  reprint  the  articles  in  book  form.  The  introductory 
chapter,  dealing  with  the  views  held  by  the  pre-Maimonidean 
philosophers  on  the  problems  discussed  in  Part  I,  was  added 
for  the  purpose  of  supplying  the  reader  with  the  necessary 
historical  background.  For  the  same  reason  it  was  deemed 
advisable  to  include  in  the  introductory  chapter  a  short 
account  of  Aristotle's  theology,  inasmuch  as  it  forms  the 
centre  around  which  Jewish  philosophic  theology  revolves. 

New  York, 

March  21,  1920. 


BIOGRAPHICAL   NOTE 

Hasdai  (or  Chasdai)  Crescas,  the  subject  of  this  study, 
was  born  in  Barcelona,  Spain,  in  the  year  1340.  His  family 
was  one  of  the  noblest  and  wealthiest  among  the  Catalonian 
Jews,  and  supplied  many  a  leader  in  communal  affairs  as 
well  as  in  scholarship  to  Spanish  Jewry.  Hasdai,  despite 
his  great  Talmudic  scholarship,  never  occupied  any  official 
Rabbinical  position ;  his  wealth  made  him  completely 
independent.  Yet  the  fact  that  he  was  a  layman  did  not 
diminish  his  prestige.  His  fame  spread  far  and  wide 
throughout  the  diaspora,  and  his  word  was  law  to  many 
Jewish  communities.  Even  the  gentile  world  thought 
highly  of  him,  for  he  stood  in  some  degree  of  relationship 
to  the  court  of  James  I  of  Aragon,  and  was  often  consulted 
on  matters  of  state. 

Crescas's  life,  however,  was  not  all  bright,  but  had  its 
dark  shadows  as  well.  As  the  result  of  a  conspiracy, 
Crescas  was  accused  before  the  court  and  was  thrown  into 
prison,  together  with  some  of  the  notables  of  Catalonian 
Jewry,  among  whom  were  some  of  his  friends  and  also  his 
teacher.  After  a  long  term  of  imprisonment  he  was 
eventually  released  on  bail.  The  persecution  of  139 1,  which 
swept  through  Spain  like  a  tornado,  leaving  behind  desola- 
tion and  ruin  in  most  of  the  Jewish  communities,  failed  not 
to  include  Crescas  among  its  victims.  In  the  massacre  of 
Barcelona  his  only  son  was  killed.  Thereupon  he  removed 
to  Saragossa,  where  the  rest  of  his  life  was  spent  in  philo- 
sophic study.      He  died  in  1410. 


■^  BIOGRAPHICAL    NOTE 

Besides  his  work  Or  Adonaz,  which  contains  his  philo- 
sophico-theological  speculations,  Crescas  wrote  a  polemical 
treatise  against  Christianity  in  which  the  fundamental 
doctrines  of  the  church  are  analysed.  The  latter  was 
written  in  Spanish  and  later  translated  into  Hebrew.  The 
Or  Adonaz  was  originally  written  in  Hebrew. 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

PAGE 

Prefatory  Note viii 

Biographical  Note         .  - ix 

Introductory  Chapter i 

I.  General  Characteristics  of  Jewish  Philosophy  .         .  i 

II.  Arabic  Philosophy 4 

III.  Historical  Survey  of  the  Treatment  of  the  Problems 

relative  to  the  Existence  of  God  and  His  Attributes 

in  Pre-Maimonidian  Jewish  Philosophy         .         .         7 

IV.  The  Theology  of  Aristotle 18 

PART  I.     GOD 

Note  on  Crescas's  Philosophical  Position  .         .       25 

CHAPTER  I 

Crescas's  Exposition   of  the  Maimonidian  Theories 

AND  their  Criticism 29 

1.  The  Maimonidian  Aristotelian  Proposition               .  29 

2.  Logical  Consequences  of  the  Propositions        .         .  33 

3.  The  Proofs  of  the  Propositions       .  .         -37 

4.  Crescas's  Refutation  of  the  Aristotelian  Arguments  .  40 

5.  The  Refutation  of  the  Proofs  of  Maimonides  .         .  54 

CHi^PTER    II 

Crescas's  Treatment  of  the  Problems  relating  to 

THE  Existence  of  God  and  His  Attributes     .       59 

1.  Crescas's  Proofs  of  the  Existence  of  God.     Relation 

to  Spinoza 59 

2.  Essence  and  Existence 62 

3.  Attributes  and  Unity.   Spinoza's  View  on  the  Subject 
compared  with  that  of  Crescas         ....  64 

xi 


Xll  CONTENTS 

PART  II.     GOD   AND   THE   WORLD 
CHAPTER  III 

PAGE 

The  Problems  of  Omniscience,  Providence,  and 
Freedom  of  the  Will  in  Pre-Maimonidian 
Jewish  Philosophy 83 

CHAPTER    IV 

Maimonides'  View  and  Crescas's  Comments  on  it      .       94 

1.  Maimonides'  Treatment  of  the   Problems  of  Pre- 

science, Providence,  and  Freedom      ...       94 

2.  Crescas  on  Prescience — Spinoza's  View  compared       98 

CHAPTER  V 

Providence,  Potence,  and  Free  Wilt 116 

1.  Providence 116 

2.  Potence— Spinoza  on  Potence         .         .         .         .121 

3.  Crescas   on    Free    Will.      Spinoza    on    Free    Will. 

Views  compared 124 

CHAPTER   VI 

Crescas's  Teleology  and  Ethics          .         .         .         .139 
Spinoza  on  Teleology 139 

CHAPTER   VII 

Divine  Will  and  Creation 151 

Crescas's  Conception — Spinoza's  Remarks  .         .         .151 

Bibliography 


0/ 


Index ^cq 


THE   PHILOSOPHY 
OF  DON  HASDAI  CRESCAS 

INTRODUCTORY  CHAPTER 

I.     General  Characteristics  of  Jewish 
Philosophy. 

Jewish  philosophy  owes  its  birth  to  two  great  factors 
that  stimulated  thought  and  intellectual  pursuits  in  the 
early  mediaeval  world  in  general,  but  more  particularly 
in  the  Arabic  world  of  which  the  Jews  formed  a  part. 
These  two  factors  were  (i)  the  necessity  arising  among 
theologians  to  defend  their  doctrines  of  faith  from  heresies^ 
which  had  their  origin  in  the  writings  of  the  ancients, 
portions  of  which  were  newly  brought  to  light  and  widely 
circulated  during  that  period :  (2)  the  rise  of  learning  at 
the  dawn  of  the  Middle  Ages,  which  came  as  a  reaction 
against  the  ignorance  that  reigned  in  the  preceding  period 
known  as  the  Dark  Ages. 

Of  these  two  factors,  the  latter  preceded  in  point  of 
time,  but  the  former  was  by  far  the  more  important.  It  is 
a  rather  difficult  task,  however,  to  draw  hard  and  fast  lines 
and  fix  the  priority  of  one  factor  over  another,  for  they 
very  often  overlapped.     The  search  for  weapons  of  defence 

1  Cf.  Stockier,  GesMclite  der  Philosophie  dcs  Mittchdlers,  p.  8. 


2  THE    PHILOSOPHY    OF    DON    HASDAI    CRESCAS 

gave  new  impetus  to  the  study  of  ancient  writings.  This, 
in  turn,  brought  to  light  a  multitude  of  new  problems, 
which  again  opened  up  new  fields  for  speculation.  The 
apologetic  tendency,  however  (though  it  never  disappeared 
from  mediaeval  speculation),  changed  its  form  somewhat 
and  expressed  itself  in  a  desire  to  rationalize  religion — to 
found  the  principles  of  belief  on  a  speculative  basis.  The 
famous  maxim  of  Anselm, '  Credo  ut  intelligam  '  is  the  formal 
expression  of  that  striving.^  The  purpose  was  not,  as  some 
think,  to  determine  the  nature  of  reason,  and  thus  limit  the 
field  of  philosophy,  but,  on  the  contrary,  to  set  before 
the  theologian  a  speculative  end."  This  desire  is  manifest 
throughout  mediaeval  philosophic  speculation,  wherever  it 
made  its  appearance,  whether  in  the  East  or  the  West, 
and  especially  so  in  Jewish  philosophy,  where  it  assumed 
the  leading  motive,  the  apologetic  tendency  being  relegated 
to  the  background. 

The  character  of  Jewish  philosophy  is  thus  already 
determined  by  the  conditions  of  its  birth  as  well  as  by  the 
general  trend  of  thought  characteristic  of  that  era.  It 
retains  conspicuously  all  the  peculiarities  of  the  age.  It  is 
receptive  in  content  as  well  as  in  form.  Authority  pre- 
dominates ;  personality  and  individual  opinion  fall  to  the 
background  before  a  general  abstract  tone.  The  harmo- 
nistic  or  synthetic  tendency  to  reconcile  the  conflicting 
opinions  of  various  authorities  holds  a  prominent  place. 
Above  all,  it  is  theological  and  metaphysical. 

As  a  result  of  its  character,  the  problems  with  which 
Jewish  philosophy  concerns  itself  are  limited.  God  occupies 
the  central  place  around  which  the  discussion  turns.     His 

'^  Baeumker  in  Allgenieine  Geschichte  der  Philosophie,  p.  297. 

3    Ibid. 


INTRODUCTORY    CHAPTER  3 

existence,  the  proofs  of  His  essence,  unity,  and  attributes 
are  extensively  discussed  and  commented  upon.  Next  in 
importance  to  God  is  man,  but  this  worthy  object  of 
thought  is  only  viewed  relatively,  in  the  light  of  his  relation 
to  the  Supreme  Being.  This  situation  gives  rise  to  a 
discussion  of  human  actions  and  involves  the  question  of 
free  will  and  determinism,  Providence,  and  the  problem 
of  immortality.  The  latter  includes  the  definition  of  the 
nature  and  essence  of  the  soul,  and  presupposes  a  study 
of  psychology  in  so  far  as  it  affects  the  nature  and  the 
position  of  the  soul  in  the  hierarchy  of  spiritual  beings, 
and  its  participation  in  the  activity  of  the  intelligibles. 
A  deeper  insight  into  consciousness  was  unknown  in  that 
age.  Logic  occupied  a  worthy  place  as  an  instrumental 
means  by  which  proofs  were  established  and  theories 
tested.  The  theory  of  knowledge  was  of  little  consequence 
in  those  days  ;  everything  was  revelation.  Man  was  created 
for  the  purpose  of  knowing.  On  the  other  hand,  certain 
metaphysico-physical  problems,  such  as  time  and  space 
attracted  great  attention.  Their  importance  lay  in  the 
fact  that  they  were  involved  in  the  discussion  of  the  proofs 
of  the  existence  of  God  as  well  as  in  the  question,  all- 
important  for  theological  purposes,  of  creatio  ex  iiihilo. 
Inasmuch  as  in  the  treatment  of  these  problems  Jewish 
thinkers  were  greatly  influenced  by  Arabic  philosophy, 
and  borrowed  most  of  their  material  frorti  it  (in  fact, 
Jewish  philosophy  can  be  said  to  be  a  child  of  the  latter), 
a  short  survey  of  Arabic  philosophy  will  help  to  make 
clear  the  degree  of  relationship  between  them  and,  at 
the  same  time,  bring  out  the  exact  character  of  Jewish 
philosophy. 


B  a 


4  THE    PHILOSOPHY    OF    DON    HASDAI    CRESCAS 

II.    Arabic  Philosophy. 

Arabic  philosophy  owes  its  birth  to  a  combination  of 
circumstances  which  made  possible  the  continuation  of 
Greek  speculation  in  a  modified  form  in  the  East  after 
its  exile  from  the  West,*  As  Greek  was  hardly  intelligible 
at  this  period  in  that  part  of  the  East,  translations  into 
Syriac,  the  vernacular,  became  a  necessity.  When  the 
Arabs  later  conquered  the  country,  learning  received  a 
fresh  impetus.  New  series  of  translations  were  undertaken 
from  Syriac  into  Arabic,  as  well  as  from  Greek  into 
Arabic.^  The  works  translated  were  of  a  curious  blend 
and  included  portions  of  Plato's  Dialogues  (especially 
Timaeus),"  many  of  Aristotle's  genuine  works  and  many 
Pseudo-Aristotelian,  Commentaries  of  Alexander  of  Aphro- 
disias,  of  Themistius,  Porphyry's  Isagoge,  a  few  excerpts 
from  the  pre-Platonic  philosophers,  mostly  of  a  pseudo 
character,  and,  finally,  some  of  the  Stoic  works.  The 
character  of  the  works  translated  became  an  important 
factor  in  the  development  of  Arabic  philosophy.  The 
whole  field  of  this  philosophy  was  permeated  with  the 
spirit  of  Neo-Platonism,  and  even  Aristotle's  works  were 
viewed  through  the  same  glasses.  Because  of  this  factor, 
the  strain  of  Neo-Platonism  was  never  removed  from. 
Arabic  philosophy,  and  that,  too,  in  its  most  Aristotelian 
period.  As  a  result  of  this,  the  centre  of  gravity  in  philo- 
sophic discussion  shifted  from  purely  Aristotelian  problems 
to  those  which  occupy  an  important  place  in  the  Neo- 
Platonic  school  such  as  the   NOUS,  the  world-soul,  &c.,. 

*  In  the  time  of  Justinian,  529  a.d. 

^  De  Boer,  History  of  Philosophy  in  Islam,  pp.  15-17. 

*  Stein,  C.  G.  Ph.,  p.  323  and  note  31. 


INTRODUCTORY    CHAPTER  5 

which  are  rather  of  secondary  consideration  in   Aristotle 
proper^ 

Three  tendencies  are  to  be  distinguished  in  the  course 
of  development  of  Arabic  thought:  (a)  the  Calamitic, 
including  its  various  forms  such  as  the  Mutakallimin,  the 
Mutazilites,  and  the  Asherites  ;  (/;)  the  Neo-Platonic ;  and 
(c)  the  Aristotelian.  The  first  is  characterized  by  its  pre- 
dominant theological  stamp  and  by  its  curious  physical 
conceptions.  Oddly  enough,  these  theologians  turned  to 
Democritus  rather  than  to  Aristotle.  They  taught  that 
things  are  composed  of  invisible  atoms  moving  in  the  void 
and  time  is  similarly  composed  of  indivisible  'nows'. 
They  combined  this  physical  view  with  a  queer  theology. 
The  atom  is  formless  and  attains  perfection  by  receiving 
accidents  which  are  momentarily  created  by  God,  and 
which  alternately  perish  and  are  recreated.  Some  of  the 
radical  sects  denied  that  there  is  continual  creation,  and 
declared  the  existence  of  stability  in  nature.  The  atomic 
theory  was  also  applied  to  the  soul.  The  soul  was  con- 
ceived to  be  a  composition  of  fine  atoms  endowed  with 
special  accidents.  They  also  held  a  peculiar  view  of 
reality.  The  senses  are  not  reliable,  and  whatever  is 
thinkable  or  even  imaginable  is  possible,  even  if  it  be  not 
in  agreement  with  sensible  reality.'^  The  greatest  objection 
to  Aristotle  was  his  contention  as  regards  the  eternity 
of  the  world,  and  because  of  this  they  turned  to  Democritus. 
The  problem  of  the  creation  of  the  world  occupied  the 
most  important  place  in  their  philosophic  system  and  even 
became  a  means  for  proving  the  existence  of  God. 
.  The  second  current  of  thought,  the  Neo-Platonic,  found 

'  Stein,  ibid. 

*  Maimonides,  Guide  of  the  Perplexed,  vol.  i,  ch.  73. 


6  THE    PHILOSOPHY    OF    DON    HASDAI    CRESCAS 

its  exponents  in  the  Society  of  the  Brothers,  who  flourished 
in  the  Tenth  Century  and  left  behind  a  cyclopedia  in 
which  their  ideas  are  preserved.  This  line  of  thought,  as 
its  origin  testifies,  is  mystical  in  character.  The  theory 
of  emanation,  the  development  of  the  soul  through  lower 
forms  into  the  human,  its  return  to  its  source  after  purifica- 
tion by  means  of  the  knowledge  of  truth,  are  some  of  its 
teachings.^ 

The  third  tendency  in  Arabic  philosophy,  the  Aristo- 
telian, is  the  most  important.  Its  chief  exponents,  Al-Kindi 
(870),  Al-Farabi,  Ibn  Sina  (1037),  and  Ibn  Roshd  (1198), 
have  attained  renown.  However,  even  here,  Neo-Platonism 
is  not  banished;  Al-Farabi  still  teaches  it;  the  NOUS 
TTOiriTLKos — another  name  for  the  world-soul — is  all-im- 
portant. Another  doctrine  of  great  value  was  the  Averroistic 
'  unitas  intellectus ',  which  taught  that  there  is  no  individual 
intellect  but  rather  a  universal  one,  the  active  reason,  and 
it  is  individual  only  in  so  far  as  any  one  personal  mind 
participates  in  the  general.  The  question  of  the  eternity 
of  the  world  was  another  difficult  and  keenly  perplexing 
problem  which  Averroes  was  finally  compelled  to  admit 
and  as  a  result,  to  limit  creation  to  the  forms.^° 

All  these  movements,  currents,  and  undercurrents  of 
thought  agitating  the  Arabic  world  have  their  counterpart 
in  Jewish  philosophy,  which  may  also  be  divided  into  three 
similar  periods  in  which  the  above-mentioned  tendencies 
prevailed,  viz.  {a)  the  Mutakallimin,  of  which  many  Karaite 
writers  and  principally  the  Rabbinist  Saadia  (940)  are  the 
exponents  ;  {b)  the  Neo-Platonic,  represented  by  Ibn  Gabirol 
and    partly   by  Bahya ;    and   {c)   the   Aristotelian,  whose 

®  Goldziher  in  Allgemeine  Geschichte  der  Philosophie,  p.  53. 
10  Goldziher,  58-64. 


INTRODUCTORY    CHAPTER  7 

spokesmen  are  Abraham  Ibn  Daud,  Maimonides,  and 
Gersonides.  Crescas  stands  apart  from  all  these  and 
resembles  more  closely  the  Arabic  philosopher  Al-Gazali, 
who,  in  his  book  Destvjictio  Philosophortim^  likewise  attacked 
the  philosophic  doctrines  of  his  age  and  attempted  to  show 
their  fallibility.  These  divisions,  however,  are  to  be 
regarded  as  rough  landmarks  rather  than  as  fixed  boun- 
daries. Jewish  philosophy  is  not  entirely  a  shadow  of 
Arabic  philosophy.  It  can  lay  claim  to  individuality  and 
initiative.  Its  exponents  never  followed  blindly  any  one 
Arabic  school,  but  rather  chose  various  theories  from  each 
school,  especially  those  that  stood  a  rigid  test  of  criticism. 

III.  Historical  Survey  of  the  Treatment  of  the 
Problems  relative  to  the  Existence  of  God 
AND  His  Attributes  by  the  Chief  Jewish 
Philosophers. 

Saadia  (892-942),  the  first  Rabbinic  philosopher,  followed 
the  indirect  method  of  the  Mutakallimin  in  his  philosophic 
proofs  of  the  existence  of  God.  To  them,  the  question  of 
creatio  ex  nihilo  was  an  all-important  one,  and  to  it  they 
devoted  all  their  energies.  The  existence  of  God  was 
a  necessary  corollary  to  this  question  ;  for,  granted  that  the 
world  is  created,  the  existence  of  a  creator  must  be  posited. 
Saadia,  however,  followed  the  Mutakallimin  more  in  method 
than  in  content.  Of  his  eight  proofs  only  a  few  agree  with 
those  of  the  Mutakallimin  as  quoted  by  Maimonides. 
The  proofs  for  the  existence  of  God  are  arranged  by  Saadia 
in  the  following  order  : 

I.  The  world  is  finite — a  fact,  demonstrated  according 
to  the  knowledge  of  his  times.     This  is  also  one  of  the 


8      THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  DON  HASDAI  CRESCAS 

fundamental  principles  of  Aristotle.  Again,  a  finite  body 
must  necessarily  possess  a  finite  moving  power  (this  is 
likewise  one  of  Aristotle's  propositions  and  was  used 
repeatedly  in  his  proofs  of  the  existence  of  God).  Like 
every  finite  thing,  the  world,  therefore,  must  have  a  beginning, 
and  hence  was  created.  The  corollary  of  the  existence 
of  a  creator  is  more  implied  than  expressed.  The  proof, 
however,  is  not  absolutely  convincing  ;  for,  one  may  argue, 
granted  that  the  world  has  a  beginning,  it  still  may  not 
have  a  creator.  It  may  have  arisen  by  chance.  Saadia 
himself  argues  later  against  the  theory  of  chance. 

II.  The  world-matter  is  composite  and,  as  every 
composed  thing,  it  is  possible  of  existence ;  for  the  elements 
per  sc  have  no  natural  tendency  to  stay  apart  or  to  be 
united.  If  such  a  tendency  existed,  either  the  elements 
would  stay  apart  for  ever  or  would  never  decompose.  The 
case,  however,  is  not  so.  It  follows,  therefore,  that  there 
must  be  some  external  source  affecting  their  composition  ; 
and  as  cause  follows  cause,  there  is  of  necessity  some  final 
creator.  This  last  agrees  with  the  third  proof  used  by  the 
Mutakallimm  as  quoted  by  Maimonides  {Guide  of  the 
Perplexed,  I,  74).  It  is  also  similar  to  the  cosmological 
proof  formulated  by  Leibnitz,  although  somewhat  differently 
expressed. 

III.  We  observe  in  the  world  of  things  that  accidents 
are  continually  generated  and  destroyed.  But  accidents 
are  inseparably  inherent  in  substance  ;  it,  therefore,  follows 
that  if  accidents  have  a  beginning  matter  must  have  as 
well,  and  hence  must  have  a  creator.  This  proof  agrees 
entirely  with  the  fourth  of  the  Mutakillimin  cited  by 
Maimonides,  and  is  directly  connected  with  the  Calamitic 


INTRODUCTORY    CHAPTER  9 

theory  of  matter  which  assumes  ^^  that  the  atom  becomes 
matter  only  through  its  accidents.  But  this  is  untenable 
according  to  the  Aristotelian  notion  of  primal  matter,  which 
is  said  to  be  a  substance  devoid  of  accidents  and  is  known 
as  ether. 

.  IV.  Time  must  be  finite.  For,  assuming  that  time  is 
infinite  and,  as  is  usual,  is  conveniently  divided  into  past, 
present,  and  future,  the  present  '  now '  which  has  no  magni- 
tude may,  for  the  sake  of  argument,  be  taken  as  a  starting- 
point.  If  we  then  try  in  our  imagination  to  reach  upward 
from  that  point,  the  human  reason  is  unable  to  grasp  the 
fact  that  time  is  infinite.  This  being  the  case,  how  could 
existence  ever  reach  us,  since  an  infinity  never  ends  ?  We, 
however,  do  exist.  It  follows,  therefore,  that  time  is 
finite ;  and  accordingly  the  world  which  is  in  time  had 
a  beginning  and  a  creator.  This  proof  is  Calamitic  in 
form,  especially  the  emphasis  laid  upon  unthinkability  of 
the  infinite  with  a  view  to  its  unreality. — Aristotle  produces 
a  similar  argument  as  regards  the  infinite. — The  dictum 
that  whatever  is  unthinkable  is  also  non-existent  was 
a  fundamental  principle  with  this  school.  The  proof  itself, 
however,  survived  long  in  philosophic  literature,  and  is 
repeated  by  Kant  in  his  thesis  of  the  first  antinomy,  where 
almost  the  exact  argument  is  reproduced  with  the  omission 
of  the  part  played  by  unthinkability. 

Saadia  brings  forth  three  more  proofs  of  a  direct 
character :  (i)  Things  could  not  create  themselves.  It  is 
evident  that  the  state  of  being  is  more  perfect  than  that 
of  becoming.  But  we  see  that  if  in  the  state  of  being 
a  thing  happens  to  be  imperfect   it   cannot  become  more 

1*  See  above,  section  2. 


lO  THE    PHILOSOPHY    OF    DON    HASDAI    CRESCAS 

perfect  by  its  own  means,  but  needs  the  help  of  an  external 
agent;  how  then  could  it  become  at  all  by  itself?^-  A 
similar  argument  is  quoted  by  Albertus  Magnus.  (2)  It  is 
impossible  for  things  to  create  themselves  on  account  of 
the  peculiar  nature  of  time.  Time  is  only  conventionally 
divided  into  three  parts ;  while  in  reality  there  are  only 
two  ;  for,  the  present  has  no  duration.  The  question  there- 
upon arises  when  could  things  create  themselves  ?  In  the 
time  previous  to  their  origin  they  were  not  in  existence ; 
then  how  could  a  non-existing  thing  create  itself?  And 
to  say  that  they  created  themselves  after  their  coming  into 
existence  is  highly  absurd.  To  speak  of  their  creating 
themselves  at  the  particular  moment  of  coming  into  exis- 
tence is  meaningless,  for  that  moment  of  time  cannot  be 
isolated  since  it  is  a  '  now '  and  therefore  has  no  duration. 
(3)  If  we  endow  things  with  the  ability  to  create  them- 
selves, we  must  also  concede  them  the  power  of  not  entering 
into  existence,  for  otherwise  things  would  always  exist. 
We  posit  then  two  contraries  at  one  and  the  same  time. 
In  order  to  fortify  himself  against  every  form  of  attack, 
Saadia  reproduces  the  famous  Aristotelian  proposition 
which  demonstrates  the  impossibility  of  an  infinite  causal 
series.^^  He  employs  it,  however,  to  disprove  the  eternity 
of  matter  and  not  to  prove  that  there  is  a  final  moving 
cause,  as  the  philosophers  do.  By  this  he  wishes  to  imply 
that  material  causes  could  not  go  on  infinitely  but  must 
have  had  a  beginning. 

After  the  proofs  for  the  existence  of  God  had    been 

12  Fiirst's  interpretation  of  this  passage  has  been  used.  It  is  true  that 
the  passage  lends  itself  to  a  more  strict  interpretation,  but  for  philosophical 
clearness  of  thought  a  full  interpretation  seems  more  advisable. 

13  Metaphysics,  a  2. 


INTRODUCTORY    CHAPTER  II 

satisfactorily  disposed  of,  Saadia  proceeds  to  prove  that 
there  is  only  one  God.     He  brings  forward  the  following 
arguments  :  (i)  Since  it  was  proved  that  God  is  the  cause 
of  all  being,  it  follows  that  he  is  incorporeal  ;    for  every 
form  of  being  is  composite,  and  a  composite  thing  cannot 
be  an  ultimate  cause,  since  it  needs  some  other  external 
cause  to  effect  its  composition.      Were  there  more  gods 
than  one,  the   conception  of  God   would    fall    under   the 
category  of  number,  and   whatever  is  in  the  category  of 
number  is  corporeal.      It  is  evident,  therefore,   that  God 
is  one.^'*     (a)  There  cannot  be  two  gods  ;  for,  if  there  were 
two,  we    must  assume  that  in    the   act   of  creation   they 
cannot  act  independently  but  need  mutual  help.     In  such 
case  they  are  determined   and  one    is   the   cause   of  the 
other — an  assumption  directly  in  contradiction  to  the  con- 
ception of  God  as  the  sole  ultimate  cause.     On  the  other 
hand,  should  we  assume  their  absolute  independence,  the 
act  of  creation  is  hardly  conceivable ;  for  a  conflict  would 
of  necessity  ensue.^'^     The  strength  of  this  proof  is  best 
comprehended  on  comparing  it  with  the  fifth  proof  of  the 
Mutakallimin  as  quoted  by  Maimonides,^*' where  the  reason- 
ing is  improved  in  logical  strength  by  the  supply  of  a  link  in 
the  chain  of  argument,  viz.  '  If,  on  assuming  that  the  two 
gods  are  independent,  we  must  also  assume  that  each  one  is 
potent  enough  to  create  the  world,  then  the  other  is  entirely 
superfluous.'     (3)  The  third  proof  is  very  logical,  and  is 
the  strongest.     How  shall  we  conceive  these  two  gods? 
Are   they  'exactly   alike   in    substance   without   the  least 
difference?     If  so,  they  are  one  and  not  two.     Wherefore, 

"  Cf.  Maimonides,  Guide.  Proposition  i6  quoted  from  Aristotle. 
15  Cf.  infra,  Chapter  I,  and  the  objection  of  Crescas  to  such  proof. 
'6  G.  P.,  Ch.  75.     Cf.  D.  Kaufmann,  Attribiitenlehre. 


12  THE    PHILOSOPHY    OF    DON    HASDAI    CRESCAS 

we  must  assume  that  they  are  different,  but  not  entirely 
different ;  they  must  be  similar  at  least  in  as  far  as  both  are 
gods.  Each  one  of  them  will  accordingly  have  points  of 
difference  and  points  of  similarity,  and  will,  as  a  result, 
be  composite — a  fact  contrary  to  the  conception  of  God. 

The  fact  that  to  Saadia  the  creation  of  the  world  is  an 
all-important  principle  affected  his  theory  of  attributes. 
He  derives  them  solely  from  the  concept  creator.  They 
are  very  few  in  number,  living,  potent,  and  wise.  Willing 
is  left  out,  for  it  is  not  strictly  inherent  in  the  concept 
creator.  It  implies  the  notion  of  striving  to  an  end  and  so 
necessarily  involves  a  limitation.^'  Besides,  potent  really 
includes  willing.^^  These  attributes  do  not  imply  any 
change  in  his  essence,  they  denote  really  one  thing.  The 
attributes  are  not  separated  from  his  being  but  exist 
through  his  being.  In  God,  existence  and  essence  are 
one.  God  is  beyond  any  categories,  even  that  of  quality. 
The  emotional  qualities  often  ascribed  to  Him,  such  as 
loving  or  hating,  are  to  be  understood  in  a  rather  figurative 
way.  God  commanded  certain  precepts  and  those  who 
follow  them  are  said  to  be  loved,  on  the  contrary  those 
who  disobey  them  are  described  as  being  hated.^^  When 
speaking  of  God  as  being  an  agent,  we  must  conceive  it  in 
a  different  sense  than  the  agency  of  man,  for  contrary  to 
man  He  is  not  moved  while  acting  and  is  always  active.^" 
The  many  adjectives  of  God  which  are  often  mentioned  in 
the  Bible,  whether  emotional  or  active,  are  all  relative, 
describing    His    relation    in    reference   to    His    creatures. 

^''  Cf.  Spinoza.     Appendix  to  v.  i,  Ethics. 

"  Kaufmann,  Attributenlehre,  p.  27,  N.  54. 

^^  Emimoth  ve  Deoih,  ed.  Kitower,  Jnscfof,  1885,  p.  50  a. 

20  Ibid  ,  p.  51a. 


INTRODUCTORY    CHAPTER  I3 

Saadia  really  laid  the  philosophic  basis  of  the  theory  of 
attributes.  His  followers  improved  upon  the  form  of  the 
theory,  but  hardly  added  anything  to  the  contents. 

Bahya,  the  next  representative  Jewish  philosopher  after 
Saadia,  is  a  little  less  complicated  in  his  proofs,  but  bears 
such  a  resemblance  to  Saadia,  that  to  quote  his  proofs  in 
full  would  be  mere  repetition.  He,  like  Saadia,  employs 
the  indirect  method  in  establishing  the  existence  of  God, 
namely,  by  proving  that  this  world  has  a  creator.  Bahya 
posits  three  principles  :  (i)  A  thing  does  not  create  itself. 
(2)  The  series  of  beings  is  finite,  and  as  such  had  a  begin- 
ning. (3)  Every  composite  thing  is  generated.  He  proves 
the  first  in  exactly  the  same  way  as  Saadia  dld,^^  showing 
the  impossibility  of  locating  the  moment  of  self-creation, 
but  fails  to  mention  the  division  of  time  which  really  forms 
the  basis  of  the  proof.  The  second  is  proved  through  the 
demonstration  of  the  finitude  of  time  employed  by  Saadia, 
and  supported  by  the  famous  Aristotelian  argument  against 
the  infinite  of  'the  part  and  the  whole '.'^-  The  third  is 
proved  by  observation.  These  physical  proofs  are  fortified 
by  a  beautiful  exposition  of  the  argument  from  design. 

It  is  rather  curious  that  the  argument  from  design, 
which  is  frequently  mentioned  in  Rabbinic  literature  (cf. 
Bereshit  Rabba,  Chapter  39)  and  even  hinted  at  in  the  Bible 
(cf.  Ps.  8)  should  be  so  little  employed  in  Jewish  philosophy. 
It  is  only  in  Bahya  and  Halevi  that  we  find  it  mentioned. 
It  is  probably  because  these  two  pay  more  attention  to  the 
ethical  side  of  religion  than  to  the  dogmatic  theological. 

Bahya's  proofs  of  unity  are  interesting.  Some  of  them 
are  reproductions  of  the  proofs  offered  by  Saadia,  but  some 

^^  Cf.  above,  p.  10. 
"  Cf.  ch.  I,  p.  38. 


14  THE    PHILOSOPHY    OF    DON    HASDAI    CRESCAS 

are  original.  He  adduces  seven  proofs  of  which  the  third, 
fourth,  and  seventh  agree  with  the  second,  third,  and  fourth 
of  Saadia.  The  others  are  stated  in  the  following  manner : 
(i)  In  observing  the  world  of  things,  we  notice  an  ascending 
scale  of  causes.  Their  number  is  always  less  than  that 
of  the  things  caused,^"  and  the  higher  we  ascend  in  the 
scale  of  being,  the  fewer  the  causes  become.  It  follows, 
then,  that  on  reaching  the  top  of  the  ladder,  there  must  be 
only  one  cause.  (2)  Design  testifies  not  only  to  a  creator 
but  also  to  one,  for  the  world  is  so  beautifully  harmonious 
that  we  must  involuntarily  conclude  that  it  is  the  plan  of 
one  creator.  (3)  One  is  the  fundamental  basis  of  number 
and  measure.  Before  there  is  plurality  there  must  be 
unity,  for  plural  means  only  so  many  times  one.  It  is 
evident,  therefore,  that  there  must  be  only  one  ultimate 
cause,  for  if  we  agree  that  there  is  more  than  one  creator, 
there  must  by  necessity  be  one  preceding,  and  then  he  is 
the  God.  (4)  Plurality  must  have  accidents,  for  it  is  sub- 
sumed under  the  category  of  quantity,  and  this  is  contrary 
to  the  conception  of  God.  This  last  proof  is  analogous  to 
Saadia's  first  proof,  but  expressed  in  a  different  form. 

In  the  theory  of  attributes,  Bahya  diverges  greatly  from 
Saadia  in  naming  such  attributes  as  are  entirely  omitted 
by  the  former.  The  difference  arises  through  the  variance 
of  the  method  of  derivation.  Bahya  divides  the  attributes 
into  two  classes,  essential  and  active.  Saadia  also  uses  the 
same  names  indirectly  for  various  classes  of  attributes,  but 
the  name  essential  has  a  different  meaning  with  Saadia. 
Saadia  viewed  the  attributes  sub  specie  creationis,  since  they 
are  all   derived  from  the  notion  creator.     Bahya,  on   the 

-^  e.  g.  the  genera  are  less  than  the  species,  the  categories  less  than  the 
genera. 


INTRODUCTORY    CHAPTER  15 

other  hand,  views  them  sub  specie  specidationis^  and  they 
are,  therefore,  according  to  him,  existent,  one,  and  eternal, 
such  as  have  been  proven  to  belong  to  God  by  philosophical 
demonstration.  That  these  attributes  are  sublime,  pure, 
and  abstract  in  character,  and  approach  the  highest  philo- 
sophic conception  of  God,  is  self-evident.  The  term  essen- 
tial, by  which  Bahya  describes  the  foregoing  attributes, 
signifies  that  these  attributes  are  to  be  predicated  of  God 
independently  of  the  fact  that  he  is  the  creator  of  the 
world.  These  attributes,  though  in  relation  to  God  are 
named  essential,  yet,  as  far  as  the  human  mind  is  con- 
cerned, express  only  a  negative  meaning.  The  second 
class,  the  active,  describe  the  relations  of  God  to  the  world 
and  men  through  actions.  They  are  of  course  figurative  in 
sense,  and  resorted  to  only  by  force  of  necessity.^^ 

Jehuda  Halevi  (1140)  is  more  of  an  ethical  philosopher 
than  a  metaphysical  one.  His  book,  the  Kuzari,  is  so 
religiously  inspired  that  it  can  hardly  be  expected  of  its 
author  to  endeavour  to  prove  the  existence  of  God,  when 
such  a  thing  is  self-evident.  The  fact  that  all  humanity 
believes  in  the  existence  of  God  is  sufiRcient  for  him.  This 
kind  of  proof  is  indirectly  inferred  from  the  whole  tenor  of 
the  book,  and  especially  from  the  fact  that  in  his  arguments 
about  the  truth  of  the  Jewish  tradition  he  lays  great 
emphasis  upon  the  conscnsiis  omnumtP  He  makes  also 
occasional  and  indirect  mention  of  the  argument  from 
design.^*^ 

His  theory  of  attributes,  however,  is  quite  interesting 

2^  Passages  used  in  exposition  of  Bahya's  doctrine  are  found  in  Hobot 
ha-Lehbabot,  ed.  Wilna  Tractat,  i,  pp.  66-92. 

"^^  The  same  proof  was  extensively  used  among  the  Christian  Philosophers. 
2^  Kuzari,  ed.  Isaac  Metz,  II,  p.  27. 


l6  THE    PHILOSOPHY    OF    DON    HASDAI    CRESCAS 

for  its  method  of  division.     Halevi  divides  the  attributes 
into  three  kinds  :  active,  relative,  and  negative.    The  active 
are  derived  through  the  description  of  God's  actions,  and 
include  the  emotional.     The  relative  are  such    that   men 
bestow  upon  Him,  as  praised,  holy,  sublime,   &c.     They 
are,  therefore,  entirely  subjective,  and  are  related  to  the 
human  state   of   mind.      The  most    important    attributes, 
the  essential  as  Bahya  would  call  them,  are  the  negative. 
They  are  living,  one,  and  first  and  last.     These   connote 
nothing  else  but  the  denial  of  the  opposite.     In  reality,  we 
hardly  conceive  the  kind  of  life  we  attribute  to  God,  and 
it  is  surely  absolutely  different  from  our  conception  of  life, 
but  we  express  it  in  the  positive  form  in  order  to  ward  off 
the  popular  conception  that  he  who  is  not  alive  is  dead. 
The  same  is  to  be  said  about  the  rest.     It  is  to  be  noticed 
that  although  Bahya  mentions  that  his  essential  attributes 
have  a  negative  meaning,  he  does  not  name  them  negative ; 
and,  on  the  contrary,  his  naming  shows  that   they  really 
have  positive  contents.     Halevi  was  the  first  philosopher 
who  introduced  the  term  negative  (in  Rabbinic),  and  used 
it  in  accordance  with  its  logical  meaning.     He  also  names 
will  an  attribute,  a  thing  which  his  predecessors  avoided 
and  which  philosophy  always  shrank  from.     He  uses  as  his 
defence  the  argument  from  design  which  shows  that  not 
only  is  there  a  creator  but  also  a  wilful  one.^' 

Abraham  Ibn  Daud  (died  1160),  the  last  of  the  Jewish 
philosophers  of  the  Pre-Maimonidian  period,  shows  himself 
a  follower  of  Aristotle,  and  accordingly  his  arguments  and 
proofs  are  more  philosophic  in  contents  as  well  as  in  form. 
Of  the  proofs  for  the  existence  of  God,  he  adduces  two, 
which  are  really  one  under  two  forms.     The   first  is  the 

27  Kusari.  ed.  Isaac  Metz,  II,  p.  27. 


INTRODUCTORY    CHAPTER  I7 

famous  Aristotelian  used  over  and  over,  and  even  mentioned 
by  Saadia  and  Bahya,  but  never  as  yet  produced  in  its 
pure  philosophic  form  till  Ibn  Daud.  It  runs  as  follows: 
There  is  no  infinite  body,  there  is  also  no  infinite  power  in 
a  finite  body,  but  the  first  sphere  moves  eternally ;  there 
must,  therefore,  be  a  prime  mover.  This  prime  mover  is 
incorporeal,  for  since  it  does  not  move  itself  it  is  not  in 
time.  (The  premisses,  as  well  as  the  conclusions,  of  this 
proof  will  be  discussed  in  full  later.)  If  it  is  not  in  time, 
it  is  infinite ;  again,  since  it  is  infinite  it  is  not  body,  for 
body  is  finite.^^  The  second  proof  is  analogous  to  one 
mentioned  by  Saadia,  but  it  is  expressed  in  better  logical 
form,  and  therefore  more  convincing.  The  world  of  things 
presents  to  us  continual  possibility.  There  must  be  one 
thing  necessary  of  existence,  for  the  possible  of  existence 
requires  a  cause,  and  so  we  would  have  an  infinite  causal 
regressus,  but  that  is  impossible.  Out  of  the  fundamental 
conception  of  God  being  necessary  of  existence,  Ibn  Daud 
deduces  the  unity  of  God.  The  fact  that  God  is  necessary 
of  existence  implies  that  He  is  absolutely  simple,  for  every 
composite  thing  is  possible.  This,  however,  proves  sim- 
plicity. As  for  the  numerical  unity,  he  adduces  the  famous 
Saadianic-Bahyan  arguments  of  the  impossibility  of  the 
existence  of  two  Gods.  Unity,  according  to  him,  belongs 
to  the  essence  of  God,  and  has  therefore  a  negative  ring. 

His  theory  of  attributes  shows  rather  a  concession  to 
popular  demand  than  to  philosophy.  He  enumerates  the 
largest  number  of  attributes  ever  stated  by  a  Jewish 
philosopher.  There  are  eight  attributes  according  to  him  ; 
they  are,  one,  existent,  true,  eternal,  living,  knowing, 
willing,  and  potent.     He  could  not  help  but  realize  that 

28  Cf.  with  this  conclusion  that  of  Aristotle  in  Metaphysics,  book  K.  x. 
W.  C 


l8  THE    PHILOSOPHY    OF    DON    HASDAI    CRESCAS 

there  are  several  superfluities  in  his  h'st.  Let  us  take  the 
attribute,  living ;  since  we  continue  counting  knowing, 
willing,  it  is  already  evident  that  God  is  living.  But,  says 
Ibn  Daud  in  his  defence,  when  speaking  of  attributes,  we 
should  not  leave  too  much  to  logical  reasoning,  but  rather 
be  popular.  Truthful  is  an  interesting  attribute.  Ibn  Daud 
is  the  only  one  that  employs  it.  It  is  according  to  him 
connected  with  existent.  What  do  we  mean  by  truth  and 
error,  except  the  real  and  the  unreal,  says  Ibn  Daud.^^ 
God  is  always  real,  therefore  he  is  the  source  of  truth. 
Yet  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  Ibn  Daud  is  not  very  accurate 
in  his  enumeration  of  the  attributes,  he  is  as  zealous  in  his 
interpretation  of  them  as  any  other  philosopher  to  remove 
even  a  probable  shadow  of  corporeality  from  God.  He, 
therefore,  insists  that  whatever  the  attributes  express  per  se, 
to  us  they  have  only  a  negative  meaning.^*' 

IV.  The  Theology  of  Aristotle. 
In  order  to  elucidate  the  philosophical  ground  of  the 
theology  of  the  Jewish  philosophers,  the  Pre-Maimonidean, 
as  well  as  Maimonides,  and  the  Post-Maimonidean,  includ- 
ing Crescas,  a  brief  outline  of  Aristotle's  theological  view 
is  necessary.  Aristotle  proves  the  existence  of  a  first 
cause  in  several  ways ;  though  they  may  be  ultimately 
reduced  to  one,  yet  differ  in  form.  In  the  Metaphysics^ 
Aristotle  proves  the  existence  of  God  in  the  following 
manner :  There  must  exist  an  eternal  immovable  substance. 
It  must  be  eternal,  for  since  substance  is  the  first  of  existing 
things,  it  must  be  indestructible,  in  order  that  things  should 
not  all  be  destructible.     Again,  movement  is  eternal,  for 

^^  Cf.  p.  W.  Montague  in  his  essay  'Truth  and  Error',  Neio  Realism. 
so  Eimuna  Romah,  Exalted  Faith,  ed.  Wilna,  p.  51-6. 


INTRODUCTORY    CHAPTER  I9 

time  is,  and  movement  is  connected  with  it.  That  which  is 
causing  movement  must  be  something  necessary  of  existence, 
for  it  is  constantly  active,  and  if  the  cause  were  not  necessary 
of  existence,  movement  would  not  be  eternal.  The  first 
heaven  is  eternally  moved,  but  everything  which  is  moved 
must  have  a  mover.  There  is,  therefore,  an  eternal  mover. 
This  mover  is  unmoved,  for  a  thing  that  moves  and  is 
moved  is  only  a  secondary,  never  a  first  cause  ;  and  since 
there  must  be  a  first  cause  for  there  is  no  infinite  causal 
regressus,  the  first  mover  is  immovable."^  In  the  Physics^"^ 
the  same  proof  from  motion  is  produced  but  more  emphasis 
is  laid  on  the  non-existence  of  an  infinite,  and  the  impossi- 
bility of  an  infinite  causal  regressus.  The  metaphysical 
argument  that  there  must  be  one  necessary  cause  in  this 
world,  for  all  possible  is  only  potential,  but  not  constantly 
active, — its  ground  is  really  the  supposition  that  there 
cannot  be  any  infinite  causal  series, — was  very  often  used 
by  early  scholastic  philosophers  as  well  as  by  Pre- 
Maimonidean  Jewish  philosophers  in  various  modified 
forms,  though  the  basal  proposition  was  frequently  omitted. 
Again,  in  the  Fragments,^^  Aristotle  proves  the  existence 
of  God  by  the  arrangement  of  the  series  of  beings  in  the 
world  order.  We  note  that  there  is  a  variety  of  beings, 
and  that  this  variety  is  arranged  in  an  ascending  scale, 
there  must  be  then  one  being  who  is  the  highest  in  that 
ascending  series,  or,  to  express  it  differently,  the  last  link  in 
that  chain.  This  proof  was  also  utilized  by  various  Christian 
and  Jewish  philosophers.^* 

As  regards  the  attributes  of  that  first  cause,  or  God, 

31  Metaphysics,  XII,  C.  6-7. 

32  Physics,  VIII,  C.  8-10.  33  Fragments,  15. 
3*  Cf.  above,  section  III,  in  the  exposition  of  Bahya's  views. 

C  2 


20  THE    PHILOSOPHY    OF    DON    HASDAI    CRESCAS 

they  follow  mostly  from  the  nature  of  the  proofs.  God 
exists,  and  his  existence  is  necessary,  as  has  been  shown, 
and  not  only  necessary  but  eternal.  All  this  follows 
directly  from  the  conception  of  a  first  mover.  Further, 
since  God  is  necessary.  He  is  also  excellent  or  good  ;  "^  for 
the  necessary,  without  which  things  cannot  be,  is  also  good 
by  its  own  definition.^''  Life  is  also  an  attribute  of  God, 
for  according  to  the  Aristotelian  conception  the  highest 
activity  is  thought,  and  the  actuality  of  thought  is  life,  and 
since  God  possesses  the  highest  activity,  it  follows  that  He 
possesses  life.  Moreover,  that  life  is  a  beatific  one.  This 
follows  from  the  same  conception,  since  the  best  enjoyments 
that  we  humans  have  in  life  are  those  of  mental  activities  ; 
God,  whose  activity  eo  ipso  is  thought,  must  necessarily  be 
happy.  God  is  also  without  any  magnitude,  for  He  cannot 
be  a  finite  magnitude,  since  He  produces  motion  in  infinite 
time,  and  no  finite  body  can  possess  an  infinite  power.^'^ 
Again,  He  cannot  be  of  infinite  magnitude,  since  there  are 
no  such  magnitudes.  He  must,  therefore,  be  without  an}' 
parts  and  indivisible.  There  is  only  one  first  cause,  for 
there  is  only  one  heaven.  Would  there  be  many,  there 
would  be  several  movers  who  would  be  one  in  principle, 
and  several  in  number.  This  supposition  would  imply  the 
materiality  of  the  Gods^  for  that  which  imparts  individuality 
to  a  member  of  a  species  is  the  matter  since  the  form  is 
one;  but  we  proved  that  the  first  cause  is  incorporeal  and 
therefore  one."^ 

The  foregoing  proved  the  existence  of  a  God  and 
endeavoured  to  describe,  though  abstractly.  His  nature  and 
essence.     The  question  still  remains,  and  a  very  important 

38  Metaphysics,  XH,  7.  36  m^l. 

"  Ibid.,  XII,  7  ;  Physics,  VIII.  38  /^^-^.^  xil,  C.  8. 


INTRODUCTORY    CHAPTER  21 

one,  what  is  the  relation  of  this  God  to  the  world  of  which 
He  is  the  first  cause  and  principle?  This  is  a  very  difficult 
problem,  and  was  left  rather  unexplained  by  Aristotle. 
The  essential  activity  of  God  is  thought,  but  what  is  the 
nature  of  His  thought  ?  To  this  Aristotle  answers  explicitly, 
that  since  the  thoughts  must  be  of  the  best  kind,  the  object 
of  His  thinking  is  He  himself  ^^  Such  an  answer  made  the 
question  more  difficult,  for  if  all  that  He  does  is  to  think  of 
Himself,  how  is  He  to  be  considered  a  first  cause  of  the 
world  ?  True,  the  first  of  Aristotle  must  be  understood  not 
as  first  in  time,  since  movement  is  eternal,  and,  therefore, 
contemporaneous  with  the  mover,  but  a  kind  of  logical 
priority ;  *'^  but  still  how  is  the  causality  effected  ?  Aristotle 
explains  that  He  moves  the  spheres  by  desire.  There  is 
a  kind  of  Divine  love  which  prompts  the  beings  to  seek 
Him.  However,  it  does  not  remove  the  difficulty,  for  this 
desire  is  located  in  the  world  and  not  in  Him  ;  and  the 
question  how  this  world  with  its  multiple  changes  and 
striking  order  came  about,  and  how  and  why  that  desire 
exists,  is  still  an  open  one.  The  God  of  Aristotle  is  not  an 
efficient  cause,  and  exercises  no  influence  upon  the  world  of 
which  He  is  supposed  to  be  the  principle.  It  is  true, 
Aristotle  sees  a  unity  in  nature,  and  even  quotes  the  line 
from  Homer,  '  The  rule  of  many  is  not  good,  one  is  the 
ruler  '.^^  But  how  is  his  '  One ',  as  conceived  by  him,  the 
ruler?  The  later  philosophers,  especially  the  disciples  of 
the  Alexandrian  school,  saw  in  Aristotle's  God  an  efficient 
cause  and  attributed  to  him  providence.^-     A  number  of 

39  Ibid.,  XII,  9. 

*'^  Cf,  Caird,  Evolution  of  Theology  in  Greek  Thought,  V,  II,  p.  15. 

"  Metaphysics,  XII,  10. 

^2  Quoted  by  Jules  Simon  in  Etude  sur  la  Theodich  de  Platon  et 
d^Aristoie,  p.  go. 


22  THE    PHILOSOPHY    OF    DON    HASDAI    CRESCAS 

mediaeval  theologians  assumed  the  same  view,  among 
them  Thomas  Aquinas.^^  They  tried  to  overcome  the 
difficulty  by  positing  that  the  thoughts  of  God  include 
a  kind  of  ideal  principles  or  intelligibles  which  are  realized 
in  the  world.  Thomas  Aquinas  says,  '  Since  God  is  the 
cause  of  things  the  effects  are  contained  in  Him,  and  thus  it 
follows  that  God  in  knowing  Himself  knows  the  world."** 
To  this  Jules  Simon'*'*  rightly  objects  that  St.  Thomas 
confounds  the  conception  of  a  cause  with  a  logical  priority, 
for  God,  as  understood  by  Aristotle,  is  only  the  latter  and 
not  a  preceding  cause.  A  similar  conclusion  to  that  of 
Thomas  is  reached  also  by  Caird  in  his  quoted  work. 
However,  the  whole  conception  of  the  realization  of  ideal 
principles  is  entirely  extraneous  to  the  Aristotelian  philoso- 
phy and  it  is  rather  Platonic. 

It  is  evident  that  such  a  theology,  no  matter  how 
scientific  it  might  have  been,  could  hardly  be  accepted  by 
men  to  whom  religion  was  not  a  mere  matter  of  speculation, 
but  of  tradition  and  dogma,  to  whom  God  was  not  only 
a  logical  principle  but  an  active  force  in  life.  It  had  to  be 
modified  by  them  and  opposed  in  part.  It  elucidated  the 
fact  why  most  of  the  Pre-Maimonidean  Jewish  philosophers 
insisted  so  strenuously  on  the  creation  of  the  world,  and 
why  they  endeavoured  to  prove  it  before  the  existence  of 
God.  They  felt  that  unless  God  is  proved  to  be  an  active 
creative  force.  His  existence  is  valueless  for  religious  pur- 
poses. It  is  only  in  Maimonides,  who  followed  Aristotle 
closely,  that  creation  loses  its  force.  It  also  illustrates  to 
a  certain  degree  the  opposition  of  Crescas  to  Maimonides. 

*^  l.c  ,  p.  lOO. 

^*  'Patet    quod  Deus  cognoscendo   se   ipsum   omnia  cognoscit  opera', 
p.  462. 


PART  I 

GOD 


NOTE    ON    CRESCAS'S    PHILOSOPHICAL 
POSITION 

With  Hasdai  Crescas,  the  list  of  Jewish  mediaeval 
thinkers,  worthy  of  the  name,  closes  ;  but  his  importance 
lies  rather  in  his  own  originality  than  in  his  chronological 
position.  He  is  among  the  few  Jewish  philosophers  who 
exhibited  originality  of  thought,  critical  acumen,  and  logical 
sequence,  combined  with  a  profound  religious  feeling.  It  is 
rather  the  irony  of  fate  that  this  philosopher,  who  surpasses 
in  depth  and  power  of  analysis  even  Maimonides,  should 
have  received  rather  slight  attention  at  the  hands  of  the 
historians  of  Jewish  thought.  The  books  and  articles 
dealing  with  Crescas  are  few  in  number.  The  book  by 
M.  Joel,  Chasdai  Crescas,  is  perhaps  the  largest  and  best 
of  them;  but,  with  all  its  merits,  it  fails  to  present  a  com- 
prehensive view  of  Crescas's  thought.  It  is  therefore  the 
hope  of  the  present  writer  that  the  attempt  in  the  following 
pages  to  present  a  systematic  treatment  of  the  philosophical 
conceptions  of  Crescas  will  be  welcomed  by  students  of  the 
history  of  Jewish  thought  in  particular,  and  of  philosophy 
in  general. 

The  method  adopted  in  treating  the  subject  is  the 
problematic  one ;  chiefly  because  it  is  the  most  elucidating 
in  dealing  with  a  subject  of  a  philosophico-theological 
character  such  as  ours,  and  also  because  the  work  of 
Crescas,  Or  Adonai,  'The  Light  of  God,'  lends  itself  to 
such  treatment,  since  it  is  primarily  a  book  on  dogmatics 


26  CRESCAS'S    PHILOSOPHICAL    POSITION 

and  follows  the  usual  division  into  dogmas.  As  the  main 
interest  of  this  study  lies  in  the  philosophic  aspect  of 
Crescas's  thinking,  only  such  problems  have  been  included 
as  have  a  philosophic  bearing,  while  all  purely  theological 
questions  have  been  excluded.  For  this  reason,  all  detailed 
discussion  concerning  creatio  ex  nihilo,  wherein  Crescas 
opposes  Gersonides  with  great  critical  ability,  are  omitted. 
Broadly  speaking,  the  study  is  divided  into  two  parts  corre- 
sponding to  the  two  central  ideas  around  which  the  problems 
group  themselves,  viz.  {a)  God,  {b)  God  and  the  world — 
the  problems  themselves  being  treated  in  the  various 
chapters  and  subdivisions. 

The  theses  laid  down  in  this  study  are  the  following : 
§  I.  Crescas  holds  a  prominent  place  as  a  critical 
examiner  of  some  of  the  important  Aristotelian  conceptions 
such  as  space,  time,  and  the  infinite.  His  criticism  is 
decidedly  modern  in  spirit,  and  some  of  his  anticipations 
and  theories  were  later  fully  corroborated  by  the  founders 
of  modern  philosophy  and  cosmology.  These  anticipations, 
together  with  his  revolt  against  Aristotelianism  in  an  age 
when  it  was  all-dominating,  prove  the  high  character  of  his 
work.  Moreover,  his  thoughts  on  this  subject  were  not 
entirely  restricted  to  a  small  circle  of  readers  of  Hebrew, 
but  also  found  their  way  to  the  external  world.  It  follows, 
therefore,  that  the  seeds  sown  by  Crescas  are  not  only 
valuable  in  themselves,  but  have  borne  fruit,  though  how 
this  was  accomplished  is  not  known.  It  is  extremely 
difficult  to  trace  the  path  over  which  thought  travels. 

§  2.  The  study  intends  to  point  out  the  mental  proximity 
between  Crescas  and  that  great  Jewish  thinker  Spinoza. 
An  attempt  has  been  made  to  draw  a  sketch  of  Crescas's 
positive  philosophy,  which  has  been  compared  at  each  step 


CRESCASS    PHILOSOPHICAL   POSITION  27 

with  that  of  Spinoza's  system.  Great  care  was  observed 
in  avoiding  final  decisions  in  regard  to  the  influence  of  the 
former  upon  the  latter.  Unfortunately,  the  term  influence 
is  often  misunderstood  to  mean  either  a  direct  borrowing 
or  at  least  a  kind  of  imitation.  If  influence  is  to  be 
interpreted  in  a  broad  sense,  and  is  to  imply  the  existence 
of  a  number  of  points  of  contact,  and  the  supply  of  a  certain 
motive  power  or  impulse  in  a  definite  direction  by  one 
system  upon  another,  such  an  influence  of  Crescas  upon 
Spinoza  probably  exists.  The  word  probably  is  used 
advisedly,  for  the  evidence  at  hand  only  justifies  us  in 
using  the  term  influence  with  this  qualification. 

Crescas,  however,  is  only  an  indirect  critic  of  Aristotle 
through  his  attack  on  Maimonides'  proof  of  the  existence 
of  God  and  theory  of  attributes  which  embody  the 
Aristotelian  principles.  Hence  it  is  that  in  order  to 
elucidate  Crescas's  contribution  to  Jewish  and  general 
philosophy  we  have  to  turn  to  Maimonides  first. 
Maimonides  collected  twenty-six  propositions,  which  are 
found  scattered  through  the  Physics,  Metaphysics,  and 
De  Caelo,  and  on  these  as  a  basis  he  reared  his  philo- 
sophical theology.  Crescas  reproduces  these  propositions 
in  full,  and  even  quotes  at  length  their  proofs  which  were 
omitted  by  Maimonides,  and  then  launches  his  criticism 
not  only  against  Maimonides  but  against  Aristotle  himself. 
It  was  rather  a  bold  attempt  for  those  times  (end  of  the 
fourteenth  century)  to  dare  to  criticize  Aristotle,  but  he 
pursued  it  with  unflinching  persistency.  It  is  necessary, 
in  order  to  have  a  full  comprehension  of  Don  Hasdai's 
philosophy,  to  follow  him  in  all  the  intricate  mazes  of 
Aristotelian  physics.  We  will,  therefore,  quote  the  pro- 
positions verbatim. 


CHAPTER   I 

Maimonides'  Proofs  of  the  Existence  of  God. 
Criticism  and  Objection  of  Crescas. 

I.  Infinite  magnitude  does  not  exist.^  This  proposition 
is  a  fourfold  one,  and  the  most  important  of  all.  It  will  be 
discussed  in  its  four  aspects,  together  with  the  proofs  and 
Crescas's  objections.  II.  The  simultaneous  existence  of  an 
infinite  number  of  bodies  of  finite  magnitude  is  impossible.^ 
This  proposition  is  simply  a  corollary  of  the  first,  for  if  the 
existence  of  such  a  number  of  bodies  would  be  possible, 
the  sum  of  all  would  give  us  an  infinite  magnitude,  and  this 
has  been  proved  unreal.  III.  There  is  no  infinite  causal 
regressus,  that  is,  the  series  of  causes  that  lead  up  to  the 
present  world  of  things  is  not  infinite,  but  must  have  had 
a  beginning.^  IV.  Change  is  found  in  four  categories,  that 
of  substance,  quantity,  quality,  and  that  of  place  ;  corre- 
sponding respectively  to  the  categories,  we  have  generation 
and  corruption  {yev^cns  Kal  (f)6opd),  growth  and  decay, 
qualitative  change,  and  locomotion  or  spatial.*  V.  Motion 
is  a  change  from  the  potential  to  the  actual.^   VI.  Movement 

1  IpK'  'h  r\'h^r\  pS  ins  '■\\V^  l^yi  niS'VOti',  Moreh  Nebukim,  Wilna, 
1904.  II,  first  hakdamah;  Guide  of  the  Perplexed,  Eng.tr.  by  Friedlander, 
Part  II,  I  ;  Physics,  111,5,  7,  ed.  Prantl,  Greek  and  German,  Leipzig,  1854; 
Metaph.,  XI,  10. 

2  Guide,  ibid.,  p.  2;  Physics,  ibid. 

'<;:h^n  nnoi  ;^b:y  ^x-n  nnDi  ;yc^  b::*  inno  b^D  nm  bv  nrn  b:^^^ 
-iNUD  npir  p  DJ  nr  ^n^^:3n  nb  ba  p  ^y^an,  Guide,  ibid.-,  Metaph.,  ii. 

*  Guide,  ibid.;  Physics,  III,  i  ;  Metaph.  Xll,  2. 
'  Physics,  III,  I ;  Metaph.  XI,  9. 


30  CRESCASS    EXPOSITION    OF   THE 

is  of  four  kinds,  essential,  accidental,  forced,  and  partial.*^ 
Essential  movement  means  the  movement  of  a  body 
according  to  its  nature  and  essence.  Accidental  pertains 
to  the  movement  of  an  accident,  such  as  the  movement 
of  blackness  in  a  body  from  one  place  to  another,  blackness 
being  only  an  accident.  By  the  partial  is  meant  the  move- 
ment of  a  part  of  a  body  when  the  whole  is  moved,  but 
with  reference  to  that  part,  such  as  the  movement  of  a  nail 
in  a  ship,  which  is  moved  by  the  movement  of  the  ship  as 
a  whole.  Partial  movement,  as  different  from  accidental, 
refers  to  such  things  as  are  bodies  for  themselves,  but  are 
attached  by  artificial  means  to  another  body.  Forced 
movement  includes  all  kinds  of  movement  which  are 
unnatural.  According  to  Aristotle,  each  of  the  elements 
has  a  natural  place  whither  it  tends.  A  movement  in  that 
direction  is  natural ;  thus  the  natural  movement  of  fire 
is  upwards  and  of  earth  downwards ;  but  a  movement 
in  the  opposite  direction  is  unnatural.  The  movement 
of  a  stone  upwards  is  contrary  to  nature,  and  can  be 
accomplished  only  by  the  force  exerted  by  the  thrower. 
VII.  Whatever  changes  is  divisible,  and  whatever  is  not 
divisible  does  not  move  and  is  no  body7  Aristotle  proves 
this  by  explaining  that  every  change  is  an  intermediary 
state  between  two  opposites,®  or  between  a  terminus  a  quo 
and  a  terminus  ad  quern  ;  therefore,  a  body  in  the  state 
of  change  must  necessarily  be  divisible,  and  since  movement 
is  a  kind  of  change,  it  follows  that  whatever  is  moved  is 
divisible,  and  also  the  converse.     VIII.  Whatever  moves 

«  p^na  \r\ry\  mann  jnsDi  m^'oi  fno  Dvya  jno  niyi^nn.    :"io 

3    /a   pbn,  Moreh,  II,  3;  Physics,  VIII,  4. 

■^  To  S*  (XiTa^aWov  ix-nav  dvdynT]  ZiaipiTov  (hat,  Physics,  VI,  4. 
8  Metaph.  1069  b. 


MAIMONIDIAN    THEORIES   AND    THEIR    CRITICISM         31 

accidentally  will  ultimately  rest  of  necessity.^  This  is  based 
on  Aristotle's  conception  of  the  accidental  which  identifies 
it  with  the  possible.  Whatever  is  possible  must  of  necessity 
become  actual  in  infinite  time.  Every  possible  has  two 
phases,  e.  g.  possible  of  existence,  it  is  possible  for  it  to 
exist,  and  possible  not  to  exist.  Both  of  these  two  possi- 
bilities must  be  realized  in  an  infinite  time,  for  if  not,  the 
thing  is  either  necessarily  existing  or  necessarily  non- 
existing.  Likewise,  the  possible  of  movement  when  it  does 
move  will  ultimately  rest,  for  the  opposite  must  necessarily 
be  realized.  IX.  A  body  moving  another  body  is  itself 
moved  at  the  same  time.^"  This,  however,  does  not  include 
such  things  as  move  others  by  being  an  end  to  which  things 
strive.  It  was  on  account  of  this  fact  that  Aristotle  made 
the  unmoved  mover  the  end  of  existence,  for  otherwise 
he  could  not  be  a  first  cause.  The  mediaeval  philosophers, 
however,  had  some  difficulty  with  this  proposition.  The 
magnet  attracting  iron  and  moving  it  towards  itself  seemed 
to  form  an  exception  to  the  rule  laid  down  in  the  proposi- 
tion.^^ Various  answers  were  given  but  are  too  absurd  to 
reproduce.  X.  Whatever  pertains  to  body,  either  the  body 
is  the  stay  of  it,  e.  g.  accidents,  or  it  is  the  stay  of  the  body, 
as  form.^-  XI.  Some  things  that  have  their  stay  in  the 
body  are  divided  when  the  body  is  divided,  as  accidents 
are.  Some  things  that  are  the  stay  of  the  body,  e.  g.  soul, 
are  not  divided. ^^      XII.   Every  force  pertaining  to  body  is 

»  Physics,  V,  3.  10  /^,v/.,  VIII,  5. 

yyUn"-    xbl    ibvX    1^3•k:'D^•L^'3 ,  OrAdonai,  ed.  Vienna,  p.  9  b. 

n"'y3Dn,  Moyeh,  II,  5  ;  Physics,  VIII.  10. 
13  Ibid. 


32 


CRESCAS'S    EXPOSITION   OF   THE 


finite,  since  body  is  finite.^^  XIII.  All  kinds  of  changes 
are  not  continuous,  except  spatial  motion,  and  of  it  only  the 
circular.^^  XIV.  Spatial  motion  is  the  first  of  movements 
both  in  nature  and  in  time.^^  XV.  Time  is  an  accident  of 
motion,  and  both  are  so  related  that  they  exist  simultane- 
ously. There  is  no  movement  but  in  time,  and  whatever 
has  no  movement  is  not  in  time."  XVI.  Whatever  is  not 
a  body  does  not  fall  under  the  category  of  number.^*^ 
XVII.  Whatever  is  moved  has  a  mover,  either  as  an 
external  force  or  as  an  internal  tendency  which  is  the  cause 
of  the  movement."  XVIII.  Whatever  is  being  realized 
in  passing  from  the  potential  to  the  actual,  the  cause  of 
the  realization  is  external  by  necessity.^*^  It  could  not  be 
inherent  in  the  thing  itself,  for  in  that  case  the  thing  would 
never  be  possible,  but  always  existing.  XIX.  Whatever 
has  a  cause  for  its  existence  is  possible  of  existence. 
XX.  The  converse,  what  is  necessary  of  existence  has  no 
cause.  XXI.  Whatever  is  composite,  the  composition  is 
its  cause  of  existence,  and  therefore  possible,  as  evidenced 
from  above.  XXII.  Body  is  composed  of  matter  and  form 
by  necessity,  and  is  the  bearer  of  some  accidents  by 
necessity.  XXIII.  Whatever  is  possible,  even  if  the 
possibility  is  internal,  and  the  thing  does  not  need  any 
external  force  for  realization,  yet  it  is  possible  that  it 
should  not  exist.^i   XXIV.  Whatever  is  potential  is  material. 

14  7i,v.  "  Physics,  VIII,  8. 

16  Ibid.,  VIII,  7.  "  Ibid.,  IV,  12. 

18  p3D  in   ^3C'V   N^   ?T15   13''Nt^'  nn   ba,    Hterally,   in  whatever  is  not 
a  body  enumeration  cannot  be  conceived,  Metaph.,  XII,  8. 

"  -ID131  inhr  is^^i?o  ^y^an  ^s*  nan  jo  N^i^::'  no  b  >3,  Moreh, 

II,  9;  Physics,  VII,  i. 

20  Metaph.  XII,  2. 

21  In  the  translation  of  this  proposition  I  have  followed  Hasdai  Crescas's 


MAIMONIDIAN   THEORIES   AND   THEIR    CRITICISM         33 

XXV.  The  elements  of  a  composite  body  are  matter  and 
form,  and  therefore  a  body  is  in  need  of  an  agent  to  unite 
them.     XXVI.  Time  and  motion  are  eternal.-'- 


The  Logical  Consequences  of  the  Propositions. 

In  basing  his  proofs  of  the  existence  of  God  and  the 
theory  of  attributes,  Maimonides  does  not  start  from  the  first 
proposition,  but  on  the  contrary  from  the  twenty-fifth. 
This  proposition,  which  is  in  turn  based  on  the  twenty-second 
which  states  that  a  body  is  composite  by  necessity,  and  on 
the  fifth  which  defines  the  nature  of  motion  as  the  process 
of  realization,  says  :  Every  composite  body  in  order  to 
become  needs  a  mover.  Since  all  bodies  in  the  perceptible 
world  are  composite,  it  is  necessary  to  look  for  their  causes 
or  movers.  This  series  of  causes  cannot  go  on  to  infinity, 
as  has  been  demonstrated  in  the  third  proposition.  Again, 
in  regard  to  movements,  we  found  in  proposition  IV  that 
there  are  four  kinds,  and  of  these  locomotion  is  the  earliest, 
as  shown  in  proposition  XIV,  and  the  circular  the  most 
perfect.  The  movement  of  the  first  sphere  is  then  the 
cause  of  all  movement  in  this  world.  However,  by  the  same 
force  of  reasoning  we  are  compelled  to  search  for  the  mover 
of  this  sphere.  We  have  seen  in  proposition  XVII  that 
a  body  may  be  moved  either  by  an  external  cause  or  an 

interpretation  in  'n  "|")S,  12  b,  where  he  says  :  flNT  "nX^32  u!?  nST'C  ntDI 

Nin  Ninn  nncaxni  -\2i  nsn  nih'l:'  no  b^  .-ioin::'  no  ''23  n^ipnn 
"h'HD  irovyn  nn-^'aNnc  i:c?3  im  naa  N'ln  nnc'DNnc'  nn  lovya 
nn*c'3Nn  ^^-|''^y  icdni  p^  nic>''i  n:ntJ'''L"  lovyn  n^'as  n\n^t;'  noxn 

22  P/iysics,  VIII,  I. 

W.  D 


34  CRESCAS'S    EXPOSITION    OF   THE 

internal  one.  The  cause  of  movement  of  the  first  sphere 
cannot  be  inherent  in  itself,  since  by  proposition  XXVI  we 
know  that  movement  is  eternal,  and  thus  it  is  infinite; 
the  moving  force  of  the  first  sphere  then  would  have  to  be 
infinite,  but  this  is  impossible.  It  was  shown  in  proposition  I 
that  no  infinite  body  exists  ;  the  first  sphere  then  is  a  finite 
body.  But  as  such  it  cannot  have  any  infinite  force,  for 
it  was  proved  in  proposition  XII  that  no  finite  body  can 
have  an  infinite  force  inherent  in  it.  It  follows  that  the 
cause  of  movement  of  the  first  sphere  is  an  external  one.^^ 
We  have,  then,  established  the  proof  of  the  existence  of 
a  prime  mover.  It  must  be  the  prime,  for  otherwise  we 
shall  have  an  infinite  causal  series. 

The  nature  and  character  of  the  mover  can  also  be 
deduced  from  the  same  propositions.  The  external  prime 
mover  cannot  be  corporeal,  for  then,  according  to  the  ninth 
proposition,  it  would  be  moved  while  moving,  and  neces- 
sarily it  would  require  another  body  as  its  mover,  and  thus 
ad  infi^iitum,  but  this  is  impossible  (prop.  III).  Again, 
since  it  is  incorporeal  it  is  also  unmoved,  for  movements 
are  either  essential  to  bodies  or  accidental,  and  the  prime 
mover  not  being  a  body  does  not  move  either  essentially 
or  accidentally.  Further,  since  it  is  unmoved  it  is  also  in- 
divisible and  unchangeable,  for,  according  to  proposition  VII, 
whatever  is  not  divisible  does  not  move  and  is  not  a  body, 
the  converse  of  it  being  equally  true.  From  the  force  of 
the  same  conclusions  follows  also  the  unity  of  the  prime 

"  hhir\  nyi^n^  niic'xnn  naon  r^^r^'m  nynn  nr  ^^  nnsnn  n^nn^ 

npii?nn  innr^nC'  im  hh^r^  P  ha:  V-\  ■  The  word  ha:  here  means 
not  only  external  but  incorporeal.  But  for  the  sake  of  clearness  of  thought 
we  prefer  to  treat  of  the  incorporeality  in  the  next  paragraph.  Morch,  II, 
13  b  ;  Guide,  p.  16. 


MAIMONIDIAN   THEORIES   AND   THEIR   CRITICISM         35 

mover.  There  is  only  one,  for  in  accordance  with  proposi- 
tion XVI,  whatever  is  neither  a  body  nor  a  force  inherent 
in  a  body  does  not  fall  under  the  category  of  number.  We 
have  then  established  the  existence  of  God,  His  incor- 
poreality,  indivisibility,  immutability,  and  unity. ^* 

Maimonides  quotes  also  several  other  proofs  borrowed 
from  Aristotle's  works,  one  from  the  Metaphysics.  It  is 
the  one  mentioned  above.  There  must  be  an  unmoved 
mover,  for  since  we  find  a  moved  mover,  and  we  also  find 
a  thing  moved  and  not  moving,  it  follows  that  there  must 
be  an  unmoved  mover ;  as  it  is  proved  that  when  we  find 
a  thing  composed  of  two  elements,  and  then  we  find  one 
element  alone,  it  follows  that  the  other  element  must  also 
be  found  alone.  The  nature  of  the  first  cause  is  deduced 
from  the  fact  that  it  is  unmoved,  in  the  same  way  as 
above.^'  In  his  third  proof,  Maimonides  follows  closely  the 
Aristotelian  found  va  Metaphysics,  book  XII,  ch.  vi.  There 
must  be  one  substance  necessary  of  existence,  otherwise 
the  world  of  things  would  be  destructible.^^  The  third 
proposition  is  again  utilized,  for  there  cannot  be  an  infinite 
regressus  of  possibles.  Since  it  is  necessary  of  existence 
through  itself  it  is  incorporeal,  for  according  to  proposition 
XXI,  the  composition  of  a  body  is  the  cause  of  its  existence. 
The  rest  of  the  qualities  follow  necessarily.  Maimonides 
quotes  also  a  fourth  proof  which  adds  nothing  new,  but 
repeats  the  same  argument  in  a  different  form.    Maimonides 

"  Moreh,  II,  p.  13  b  ;   Guide,  II,  p.  16. 

25  Moreh,  II,  p.  14  a  ;  Guide,  II,  pp.  17  sq. 

=«  IDS  nncDJ  n^in  niN^*w  ^^^  nns  |vyn  nrn  mann  Tnn*  3"x 
niN^vm  n^ino  Nin  bx  ^b  n  -iddh  nnc'Dx  ps  nosj  xh  mm 

niX''i*Dn   ID'SX   v6,  Moreh,  II,  15  a. 

D    3 


36  CRESCAS'S    EXPOSITION    OF   THE 

produces  two  more  proofs  for  the  oneness  of  God.  Of 
these  two,  one  is  mentioned  by  Saadia  and  Bahia.  Suppose 
there  were  two  Gods,  there  would  have  to  be  at  least  one 
point  of  difference  between  them  and  some  points  of 
similarity  in  as  far  as  both  are  Gods.  This  would  involve 
the  existence  of  two  elements  in  the  nature  of  the  Gods, 
and  thus  they  would  be  composite.  The  second  proof  is 
from  the  harmony  and  uniformity  of  the  sum  total  of 
existence.  This  bears  evidence  to  the  oneness  of  God. 
If  there  were  two  Gods,  there  ought  to  be  either  a  division 
of  labour  or  collaboration,  for  the  interdependence  testifies 
to  one  plan.  But  the  first  is  impossible,  for  then  God 
would  not  be  all-potent,  and,  consequently,  there  would  be 
a  cause  restraining  the  Divine  power ;  but  this  is  contrary 
to  the  concept  of  God.  This  argument  is  also  brought 
by  Saadia,  but  Maimonides  gives  it  a  more  Aristotelian 
form.^^ 

In  comparing  Maimonides'  proofs  with  the  proofs  of 
those  who  went  before  him,  we  see  that,  while  he  did  not 
contribute  much  originality  to  the  problem,  he  at  the  same 
time  systematized  and  arranged  the  proofs  in  complete 
logical  order,  which  made  them  convincing.  Most  of  the 
antecedent  philosophers  either  omitted  some  links  in  the 
logical  chain,  such  as  the  impossibility  of  an  infinite  causal 
regressus,  or  hinted  at  it  without  making  their  thoughts 
clear.  Maimonides,  as  a  careful  builder,  included  everything. 
In  regard  to  Aristotle,  he  exhibits  himself  a  faithful 
follower,  without  accepting  the  conclusion  at  which  he 
arrives. 

"  Moreh,  II,  16  a-b  ;   Guide,  p.  23. 


maimonidian  theories  and  their  criticism      37 

Proofs  of  the  Aristotelian  Propositions. 

Aristotle  proves  that  the  infinite  does  not  exist  either 
as  a  separate  independent  thing,  or  as  a  sensible  thing,  or 
as  a  movable.  The  infinite,  says  Aristotle,  may  be  of 
several  kinds,  either  such  that  it  is  not  in  its  nature  to  be 
measured  or  passed  through,  as  the  voice  is  invisible,^^  or  such 
one  that  cannot  be  passed  through  on  account  of  its  extent.'^^ 
It  is  the  last  kind  of  infinite  that  the  discussion  turns  on, 
for  the  first  kind  of  infinite  cannot  be  a  principle  nor  an 
element.  There  cannot  be  a  separate  independent  infinite 
as  a  thing  by  itself,  for  it  must  be  either  divisible  or  in- 
divisible. If  it  is  indivisible,  it  cannot  be  infinite  except  in 
the  same  way  as  the  voice  is  indivisible,  which  is  a  quality 
that  does  not  belong  to  it  by  nature ;  but  we  speak  of  an 
impassable  infinite,  which  implies  extent,  and  thus  it  is 
coupled  with  magnitude.  But  if  it  is  divisible,  it  is  a 
quantity  and  cannot  exist  by  itself.  Again,  if  it  is  divisible 
and  exists  as  a  substance,  every  part  of  it  will  be  infinite, 
and  this  is  absurd,  for  there  cannot  be  many  infinities  in 
one.  It  must,  therefore,  be  indivisible,  but  it  is  magnitude, 
and  magnitude  does  not  exist  by  itself.  It  must,  therefore, 
be  an  accident,  but  then  it  is  not  a  principle,  nor  a 
separate.^^ 

There  cannot  be  an  infinite  body :  first,  it  is  impossible 
by  the  mere  definition  of  a  body  which  describes  it  to  be 
a  thing  that  has  superficies  bounded  by  planes,  and  this 

28  Physics,  III,  5  ;  Mctaph.,  book  K,  cli.  x. 

2^  Spinoza,  in  his  Epistola  XII,  Opera,  ed.  Van  Vloten  and  Land,  Hague, 
1882,  makes  a  similar  distinction,  calling  the  first  infinite,  the  second 
indefinite. 

30  Physics,  III,  5  ;  Mctaph.,  book  K,  ch.  x. 


38  CRESCAS'S   EXPOSITION   OF  THE 

already  implies  finitude.  There  are,  however,  more  con- 
crete arguments.  An  infinite  body  could  be  neither  simple 
nor  composite,  for  if  the  elements  are  finite,  one  at  least 
must  be  infinite,  and  then  the  others  will  be  destroyed 
since  the  infinite  element  must  surely  have  most  potency. 
If  all  the  elements  were  infinite,  the  infinite  body  would 
be  composed  of  many  infinities,  which  is  absurd.  Simple 
it  cannot  be,  for  it  is  not  of  the  four  elements,  since  they 
are  all  finite  and  there  are  no  other  elements  beside  them. 
Again,  how  could  anything  be  created,  for  becoming 
implies  change  from  one  contrary  to  another,  and  infinite 
has  no  contraries.  It  is  evident,  therefore,  that  there 
cannot  be  a  simple  infinite  body. 

Further,  if  there  is  an  infinite  body,  it  must  have  weight, 
whether  light  or  heavy,  but  this  is  impossible,  for  the  light 
moves  upwards  and  the  heavy  downwards,  but  the  infinite 
has  neither  an  '  up  '  nor  a  '  down  '.  Again,  since  every  body 
is  in  place,  infinite  body  must  have  infinite  place,  but  there 
is  not  any  infinite  place,  since  there  are  six  kinds  of  place, 
the  up  and  the  down,  &c.  Finally,  since  body  must  be  in 
place,  and  the  latter  by  definition  is  the  limit  of  the  sur- 
rounding body,  body  must  be  finite.^^ 

It  is  also  impossible  that  there  should  exist  a  moving 
infinite,  whether  moving  in  rectilinear  fashion  or  circular. 
Every  body  has  a  definite  place,  and  the  place  of  the  part 
and  the  whole  is  the  same.  Consequently,  an  infinite  body 
cannot  move  rectilinearly,  as  it  is  composed  either  of  like 
parts  or  unlike  parts.  If  of  like  parts,  no  part  can  move, 
for  the  place  of  the  part  is  the  place  of  the  whole  and  it  is 
infinite.  If  of  unlike  parts,  the  parts  must  be  either  finite 
or  infinite  ;  if  finite,  then  at  least  one  is  infinite  in  magnitude, 

SI  Physics,  III,  5  ;   Metaph.,  book  K,  ch.  x. 


MAIMONIDIAN   THEORIES   AND   THEIR   CRITICISM         39 

and  this  is  impossible."^  If  they  are  infinite  in  number, 
then  there  are  an  infinite  number  of  places,  but  this  is 
impossible.^^  Again,  an  infinite  body  must  have  infinite 
weight,  and  because  of  it  its  moving  is  unthinkable.  The 
heavier  a  body  is  the  less  the  time  in  which  it  moves.  It 
follows  that  an  infinite  body  must  either  move  in  no  time 
or  the  '  now ',  which  is  the  same,  or  that  if  we  posit  for  it 
some  time  we  will  find  a  finite  body  moving  in  the  same 
time.  The  relation  of  time  and  weight  is  a  reverse  one. 
Now  if  we  posit  some  time  for  the  infinite,  it  is  possible 
to  find  a  finite  body  of  whatever  weight  moving  in  the 
same  time.  We  have  then  a  finite  and  infinite  body  moving 
in  the  same  ratio  of  time :  this  is  contrary  to  the  principles 
of  motion.  Still  more,  if  we  multiply  the  body  of  finite 
weight,  it  will  move  in  less  time  than  the  body  of  infinite 
weight,  but  such  a  supposition  is  absurd. 

Likewise,  the  circular  movement  of  an  infinite  body  is  im- 
possible, for  if  the  circle  is  infinite,  the  radii  are  also  infinite 
and  the  distance  infinite  ;  the  circle  then  would  never  be 
completed  and  the  distance  never  measured  through. 
Again,  the  time  of  the  revolution  of  a  circle  is  finite,  but 
the  distance  in  this  case  is  infinite ;  how  then  can  infinite 
distance  be  traversed  in  finite  time?"'*  Finally,  it  is 
impossible  for  the  infinite  to  be  either  an  active  agent 
or  a  patient.  The  relation  between  two  bodies,  one 
affecting  and  the  other  affected,  is  the  following :  Two 
bodies  equally  large  will  both  be  affected  in  an  equal  time ; 
if  one  is  smaller,  it  is  affected  in  less  time.  The  relation 
also  varies  according  to  the  power  of  the  agent,  and  the 

^^2  Cp.  above,  this  section. 

33  De  Coelo,  ed.  Prantl,  I,  ch.  7  ;  Physics,  III,  5 ;  Metapli.,  book  K,  ch.  x. 

^  De  Coelo,  I,  ch.  5. 


40  CRESCAS'S    EXPOSITION    OF   THE 

affection  must  be  accomplished  in  a  certain  limited  time. 
It  follows,  therefore,  that  the  infinite  can  neither  affect  nor 
be  affected,  for  since  we  must  posit  for  it  a  certain  time' 
as  it  cannot  be  affected  nor  affect  in  no  time,  we  can  always 
find  a  certain  finite  body  that  is  either  affected  or  affects 
in  a  similar  amount  of  time.  Moreover,  if  the  finite  body 
is  increased  in  size,  it  will  be  affected  or  affect  in  a  longer 
or  a  shorter  time  respectively  than  the  infinite  body.  But 
this  is  contrary  to  the  principle  of  action  and  passion.'''^ 

These,  in  short,  are  the  arguments  of  Aristotle  against 
the  infinite,  which  are  very  accurately  reproduced  by 
Crescas.  He  shows  an  extensive  acquaintance  with 
Aristotle's  works  hardly  displayed  before  by  any  Jewish 
philosopher.  He  now  launches  his  criticism  against  each 
of  the  arguments,  examining  it  in  detail. 


Crescas's  Refutations  of  Aristotelian 
Arguments. 
Crescas,  in  attacking  Aristotle,  follows  the  latter's 
arguments  in  logical  order.  First,  Aristotle  argues  that 
there  is  no  separate  infinite  as  a  thing  in  itself,  for  if  it 
does  exist  and  is  divisible,  its  parts  would  have  to  be 
infinite  (cp.  above).  This,  replies  Crescas,  does  not  neces- 
sarily follow.  Since  the  infinite  we  are  speaking  of  is 
a  separable,  not  a  corporeal  one,  why  should  it  be  divisible 
or  its  parts  infinite?  Is  the  mathematical  line  divisible, 
and  are  its  parts  points?  Why  can  there  not  be  an 
indivisible    infinite?''"^      But  the   main  force   of  the   Aris- 

s^  Ibid.,  p.  273. 

mjB'  n^nn^  vh  a":  nrS  hn:  -ny:r  ms^^iDn  los'  n"3  ^nb  hu 


MAIMONIDIAN    THEORIES    AND    THEIR    CRITICISM  4I 

totelian  argument  against  the  existence  of  a  separate 
infinite,  as  Crescas  rightly  observes,  consists  in  the  im- 
possibility of  the  existence  of  a  separate  magnitude  not 
connected  with  a  body  (cp.  above).  A  magnitude  cannot 
exist  separately,  for  then  space  would  have  to  exist 
separately  of  the  body,  but  according  to  the  Aristotelian 
conception  of  space  it  is  impossible.  Outside  of  the  world 
nothing  exists;  there  is  no  vacuum  stretching  beyond  its 
boundaries,  and,  since  whatever  is  in  the  world  is  body, 
it  follows  that  if  we  do  conceive  any  magnitude,  we  must 
conceive  it  in  bodily  form  ;  hence  there  is  no  separate 
magnitude,  and,  consequently,  no  separate  infinite. 

But,  says  Crescas,  this  line  of  reasoning  is  a  petitio 
principii^  as  the  conclusion  is  still  to  be  established  ;  for 
should  we  prove  the  existence  of  a  vacuum  there  is  a 
possibility  for  an  infinite  to  exist.  Crescas  then  proceeds 
to  refute  Aristotle's  contention  of  the  non-existence  of  the 
infinite,  attacking  the  basic  principle.  There  is  no  vacuum, 
argues  Aristotle,  for  if  there  were,  movement  in  it  would 
be  impossible.  Movement  in  space  is  caused  by  the 
difference  in  the  natural  inclination  of  things  to  strive 
towards  certain  points,  some  tending  upwards,  some  down- 
wards ;  the  vacuum  has  no  such  places.  A  body  in  it 
would  either  never  move,  for  why  should  it  move  in  one 
direction   rather  than   in    the    other,  or  never  stop,  since 

■•■nD^n  ipn  nr  a^nn"'  ^bv  idd  bv  P"'^*"'  n"ann,   Or  Adonai,  p.  14  a. 

Spinoza,  in  his  Epistola  XII,  in  discussing  the  infinite,  produces  the  same 
argument  :  '  Quare  omnis  ilia  farrago  argumentorum  quibus  substantiam 
extensam  finitam  esse,  philosophi  vulgo  moliuntur  sua  sponte  ruit.  Omnia 
ilia  substantia  corpoream  ex  partibus  conflatam  supponunt  ad  eundem  etiam 
modum  alii  qui  postquam  sibi  persuaserunt,  lineam  punctis  componi  multa 
invenire  potuerunt  argumenta  quibus  ostenderunt  lineam  non  esse  in 
infinitam  divisibilem.'     Opera,  II,  p.  42. 


42  CRESCAS  S   EXPOSITION    OF   THE 

there  is  no  tendency  to  a  certain  place."^  Again,  not  only 
could  there  not  be  natural  motion,  but  not  even  violent 
motion.  Projectiles  thrown  by  a  person  or  instrument 
continue  their  motion  after  the  motor  ceased  to  have 
contact  with  them,  because  the  particles  of  the  air  are 
moved,  and  they  impart  the  motion  continually  to  the 
projectile.  But  in  a  vacuum  the  motion  cannot  be  con- 
veyed ;  the  projectile  must  therefore  stop  of  necessity. 

Further,  the  rate  of  motion  varies  according  to  the 
power  of  the  motor  and  according  to  the  media  and  their 
power  of  resistance.  The  thinner  the  medium,  the  more 
accelerated  is  the  motion.  If  a  vacuum  exists,  motion 
in  it  would  have  to  take  place  in  no  time.  Two  bodies, 
A  and  B,  move  in  different  media,  C  and  D.  If  the  motors 
are  equal,  the  rate  of  time  and  motion  of  ^  and  B  will  vary 
according  to  C  and  D.  But  if  Z>  is  a  vacuum,  there  is  no 
ratio,  for  what  comparison  could  there  be  between  the 
motion  of  B  which  is  not  offered  any  resistance  whatever, 
and  that  of  A  which  has  to  overcome  it  in  a  degree  ? 
The  movement  of  B,  therefore,  will  be  in  no  time.  But 
movement  must  be  in  time  ;  a  vacuum,  therefore,  does  not 
exist.  Finally,  if  a  vacuum  exists,  it  is  possible  for  two 
bodies  to  occupy  one  place.  When  anything  is  thrown 
into  water,  an  amount  of  water  equal  to  the  body  is  dis- 
placed, and  a  similar  process  takes  place  in  air.  What  then 
will  happen  to  a  body  in  a  vacuum  ?  If  the  vacuum  merely 
recedes  then  it  is  nothing ;  it  is  just  this  that  we  endeavoured 
to  prove.  But  if  the  vacuum  is  something,  it  must  per- 
meate the  body  i^'^  why  then  should  not  any  body  permeate 

^''  Physics,  IV,  7. 

8'^  Physics,  IV,  8.  See  also  Simplicius's  commentary  to  that  chapter, 
translated  by  Thomas  Taylor  in  his  translation  of  the  Physics  of  Aristotle. 
London,  1806,  p.  228. 


MAIMONIDIAN   THEORIES   AND   THEIR    CRITICISM         43 

another  body?  The  reason  that  body  does  not  permeate 
body  is  not  because  of  its  substance  or  colour  but  because 
of  its  distance  or  intervals.  Now  if  the  intervals  of  the 
vacuum  may  permeate  a  body,  why  not  any  other 
intervals  ? 

These  arguments  Crescas  attempts  to  disprove  in  the 
following  manner.  It  does  not  follow,  says  he,  that  the 
existence  of  a  vacuum  should  prevent  motion.  It  is  true 
that  a  vacuum  does  not  possess  any  differences  of  a  spatial 
nature  such  as  upwards  and  downwards,  but  still,  as  long 
as  the  points  of  natural  tendency  exist  and  the  elements 
possess  that  tendency,  they  will  go  on  moving  though  the 
medium  of  movement  is  a  vacuum.  As  for  violent  motion, 
it  seems  that  the  moment  a  body  is  set  in  motion,  it 
acquires  by  virtue  of  its  elements  and  their  tendency 
towards  their  natural  place  a  propensity  to  move  without 
any  assistance  on  the  part  of  the  medium.  Further,  argues 
Crescas,  granted  that  rectilinear  motion  cannot  be  in  a 
vacuum,  still  what  is  there  to  prevent  the  existence  of  an 
extra-mundane  vacuum,  wherein  a  body  can  move  in 
a  circular  fashion,  a  movement  which  does  not  necessitate 
the  possession  of  the  termini  a  quo  and  ad  quanP  In 
regard  to  the  second  argument  of  Aristotle,  Crescas  con- 
tends that  it  is  based  on  a  false  premise.  The  argument 
assumes  that  the  ratio  of  the  motion  of  one  body  to 
the  motion  of  the  other  is  as  medium  to  medium,  when 

fiponrs  ipim  is*  unp  n3D^  v^nc'  nr^i  i^dcd'  no  yno  ^n^  ^yiun 
mN-'^'m  nmnanni  n^ynon  nyi:nn  mN''^'?3  y:D  n^  nrh  .mrono  ix 
,^\'h  pn  nip-in  niN^^;^  myj»n  nsiron  nra  n^in^  x^c  c-''di  nipnn 
3>nn^  N^  v^Ncr  hdi  ijc'C'  hdid  yau  -h  pN-^*  nipin  n\n  dnc'  r\rh 
nna  d::*:^  n"'auD  nyi3n  niyion.  Or  Adouai,^^.l.^h. 


44  CRESCAS'S    EXPOSITION    OF   THE 

media  are  different   in    density,  but  this  is   untrue.     We, 
asserts   Crescas,    must   grant    to    every   moving    body   an 
original   motion  which  was  imparted  to  it  by  the  motor 
varying    according    to    the    strength    of  the    motor.     The 
medium  only  retards  the  motion  by  its  resistance,  but  it 
cannot  accelerate  it.     The  formula,  therefore,  ought  to  be : 
the  ratio  of  retardation  of  one  body  to  the  retardation  of 
another  body  varies  as  the  media.     In  a  vacuum,  therefore, 
resistance  is  reduced  to  zero,  but  the  original   motion  is 
preserved,  and  the  body  is  still  moved  in  a  certain  time. 
Finally,  the   argument   of  the    impenetrability  of  matter 
(cp.  above)  is  objected  to  by  Crescas.     Aristotle's  dictum 
that  body  cannot  penetrate  body  on  account  of  its  distances 
and  dimensions  cannot  be  true,  for  a  body  is  impenetrable 
not  on  account  of  its  possessing  mere  distances,  but  because 
of  the  matter  filling  those  distances.    Immaterial  distances, 
such  as  the  interval  which  is  called  a  vacuum,  may  permeate 
a  body.     It  is  evident,  therefore,  that  a  vacuum  may  exist. 
Further  evidence   of   its   existence   is    the  fact  that  it   is 
quantitatively  conceived,  as,  for  instance,  if  the  air  in   a 
vessel  is  partly  pumped  out,  we  say  that  the  vacuum  is 
large  or  small  according  to  the  amount  of  air  pumped  out. 
It  is  then  necessarily  a  magnitude,  and   though  granting 
that   there   is    not    an   infinite   body,   the   existence    of  a 
separable   infinite    magnitude    is    still    more    necessitated. 
Beyond  the  v/orld  there  is  no  body,  the  vacuum  cannot 
be  limited  by  body,  but  it  surely  cannot  be  limited  by 
a  vacuum  ;  it  must  be  infinite."^*^ 

While  these  objections  hardly  have  any  value  in  the 
light  of  modern  science,  yet  according  to  the  spirit  of 
the  times  they  are  valid,  and  greatly  testify  to  the  critical 

*°  Or  Adoiiai,  ibid.,  15  a. 


MAIMONIDIAN   THEORIES   AND   THEIR    CRITICISM         45 

ability  and  analytic  acumen  of  Crescas.  They  surely  form 
a  step  in  the  formation  of  the  right  scientific  cosmogony. 
The  conceptions  of  the  infinity  of  the  world  and  of  the 
existence  of  infinite  space  were  necessary  conditions  in 
the  generation  of  the  Copernican  system  and  the  new 
cosmological  view.  Surely,  Crescas  as  well  as  Aristotle 
was  ignorant  of  the  real  laws  of  motion.  It  is  remarkable 
that  Aristotle,  who  had  a  notion  of  the  law  of  inertia  as 
seen  from  his  arguments  against  the  existence  of  a  vacuum, 
namely,  that  if  a  vacuum  exists  perpetual  motion  were 
possible,  for  in  vacuo  a  body  may  move  on  for  ever,  and 
who  also  recognized  the  resistance  of  air  as  evidenced  from 
his  second  argument  against  the  existence  of  a  vacuum, 
should  not  have  discovered  the  law  of  inertia  and  have 
considered  the  particles  of  air  as  helping  motion  rather 
than  impeding  it,  yet  in  Crescas's  refutation  we  perceive 
a  glimpse  of  the  law  of  gravitation.  It  is  not  known 
whether  Crescas  ever  exerted  any  influence  upon  Giordano 
Bruno  or  not,  though  another  Italian,  Franz  Pico,  quotes 
his  anti-Aristotelian  arguments  in  full,^^  but  whatever  be 
the  case,  it  is  interesting  to  observe  the  similar  pulsations 
of  mental  activity  in  different  ages,  periods,  and  lands. 

Crescas  next  proceeds  to  refute  Aristotle's  arguments 
against  the  existence  of  an  infinite  body.  The  latter's 
general  argument  from  the  definition  (cp.  above)  of  body 
as  a  thing  that  has  limited  superficies,  says  Crescas,  is  only 
2i  petitio  principal''-  It  is  just  this  limitation  that  we  seek 
to  establish.  The  one  who  asserts  the  existence  of  an 
infinite  body  denies  the  assumed  definition.  But,  says  he 
further,  his    other  arguments  are  also  not  proved.     The 

<i  M.  Joel  in  his  Chasdai  Crescas,  note  iv,  Anhang. 

•»2  In  Crescas's  words  it  is  termed  C'mn   bv   HDiyO. 


46  CRESCAS'S    EXPOSITION    OF   THE 

infinite,  says  Aristotle,  cannot  be  a  composite,  for  if  it  is, 
the  elements  would  have  to  be  infinite,  and  this  is  impossible. 
Crescas  rejoins,  The  impossibility  of  the  existence  of  infinite 
elements  is  not  established ;  the  reason,  according  to 
Aristotle,  for  the  non-existence  is  that  the  infinite  cannot 
be  conceived ;  but,  asks  Crescas,  must  they  be  conceived 
in  order  to  exist  ?*^  The  elements  qua  elements  may  have 
existence  though  not  exactly  known.  This  objection  marks 
a  departure  from  the  dominant  Aristotelian  system  which 
ascribed  existence  only  to  such  things  that  were  supported 
by  the  evidence  of  the  senses  and  logical  reasoning.  Such 
a  conception  could  hardly  be  grasped  by  an  Aristotelian. 
That  a  thing  in  itself,  to  use  the  Kantian  terminology,  may 
exist  without  being  either  perceived  or  logically  analysed 
or  described,  was  an  impossibility  to  them.^^ 

Further,  says  Crescas,  the  objection  that  if  the  infinite 
is  composite,  one  element  at  least  must  be  infinite  and  then 
it  would  destroy  the  rest,  can  be  answered  in  this  way, 
that  the  infinite  may  be  devoid  of  qualities  just  as  the 
heavenly  spheres  are.  However,  here  Crescas  seems  not 
to  understand  Aristotle.  Aristotle,  in  Metaphysics,  book  K, 
ch.  X,  states  distinctly  that  one  element  must  not  fall  short 
in  potency,  and  whatever  is  in  potency  must  sometimes  be 
realized,  so  that  finally  it  will  destroy  the  other  element.'*^ 
Crescas  probably  thought  that  it  meant  the  infinite  element 
would  have  stronger  actual  qualities.  Again,  Aristotle's 
argument    for    the   impossibility    of    the    existence    of  an 

"  nn  niyiT'  jdnh^  m^nnn  \r\^  n?03  nibnnnn  m^niD   px  n^ni 

IDVya  INDO,  Or  Adonai,  p.  15. 

**  Or  Adonai,  p.  15  a. 

■'^  Cp.  Brandis,  in  his  Handbiich  der  Geschichte  dcr  Griccbisdi-Rdniischen 
Philosophic,  II,  p.  727;  Physics,  IV,  5. 


MAIMONIDIAN   THEORIES   AND   THEIR   CRITICISM         47 

infinite  body  on  account  of  its  weight  and  its  tending  to 
its  natural  places  (cp.  above)  is  not  unimpeachable.  Why, 
asks  Crescas,  must  it  have  weight  ?  Is  it  not  because  all 
sensible  bodies  in  the  sublunar  sphere  have  it  ?  But  suppose 
the  infinite  is  different,  is  not  the  matter  of  the  heavenly 
spheres,  according  to  Aristotle,  devoid  of  weight  ?^'^  This 
is  another  indictment  against  the  following  of  the  chain 
of  evidence  of  the  senses  and  logical  reasoning. 

Finally,  Crescas  directs  his  main  attack  against  the 
arguments  from  the  nature  of  space.  Aristotle  defines 
space  as  the  limit  of  the  containing  body,*'^  and  conse- 
quently by  its  very  definition  and  nature  it  must  be  finite 
and  inherently  connected  with  body.  Where  there  is  no 
body  there  is  no  space,  and,  therefore,  the  world  as  a  whole 
is  not  in  space  though  its  parts  are.  This  theory,  says 
Crescas,  is  untenable.  The  whole  conceptual  structure  of 
Aristotle  of  natural  places,  of  upwards  and  downwards, 
and  the  tendency  of  various  elements  thereto,  is  built  on 
false  premises.  How,  asks  he,  can  we  assert  that  air  has 
a  natural  place,  the  '  up ',  near  the  fiery  sphere  ?  What 
happens  then  to  the  middle  layers  of  air?  Are  they  in  their 
natural  place  ?  but  it  was  asserted  that  their  natural  place 
is  the  '  up '.  If  they  are  not  in  their  natural  place,  we  have 
then  a  phenomenon  of  variance  of  places,  the  place  of  the 
part   differing   from   the    place    of    the    whole.*^      Again, 

«  "iDD  n'h?  ab)  1213  'h  pNC'  idsi  n"an  nz'n  nrrixn  ohsi 
iDDns'  nyn^  n^^D^rocrn  D^o'^n  ir:N''ti',  Or  Adonat,  p.  15  a. 

<T  P/iysks,  IV,  3. 

*«  nnnypn  pi'^p^n  nn^j-n  s*in  'mno  ''th  d"iv  T'Inh  Dip?:;^'  nn 
i^iNH  |o  ^]!'^i2iin  pbm  n^DH)  .jvdii  nu-^y  niy  ^b  ^^'Cf  n^b  ^an 
n>nn^  ^ynon  v^p?::3  irxu'  dn*  /ynon  ^roipm  Nint:'  dn  n^^:  ab 
iT'^sna  Nini  b^  ■i:;'n*  ^ynt^n  mpo^  Fj^nn^  p^n^  nc's*  "•ynun  icipct:' 

niJjn,  Ok  Acionai,  p.  isf. 


48  CRESCAS'S    EXPOSITION    OF   THE 

the  place  of  the  element  of  earth  is  the  '  down '.  But 
the  absolute  down  is  only  a  point,*'^  and  a  point  is  not  in 
place.^°  Crescas,  therefore,  proposes  a  dilTerent  definition 
of  place.  It  is,  as  we  should  say,  a  receptacle  of  things, 
qualityless,  immovable,  and  indescribable.  It  is  infinite, 
for  by  its  very  nature  it  cannot  be  finite.^^  In  the  world 
of  things  it  is  occupied,  but  beyond  the  world  it  exists  as 
empty  space.  The  fact  that  place  is  immovable  answers 
Aristotle's  arguments  against  defining  place  as  an  interval. 
Such  a  definition,  says  Aristotle,  would  compel  us  to  admit 
the  existence  of  a  place  to  place,  for  if  we  move  a  vessel 
full  of  water,  the  interval  of  the  vessel  is  transferred  into 
another  interval,  and  so  on.  But  if  we  assume  with  Crescas 
that  place  is  immovable,  the  difficulty  disappears,  for  the 
vessel  simply  passes  from  one  part  of  the  universal  vacuum 
to  another.  As  for  the  water  in  the  vessel,  it  is  moved 
accidentally  by  the  movement  of  the  vessel.  Aristotle 
explains  the  movement  of  the  water  in  the  same  way.'^- 

The  refutation  of  Aristotle's  assertion  of  the  impossi- 
bility for  an  infinite  body  to  move  either  in  a  rectilinear 
or  circular  fashion  runs  in  the  following  manner :  Aristotle's 
first  argument  that  the  infinite  cannot  move  rectilinearly, 
for  this  movement  requires  an  '  up '  and  a  '  down  ',  and  is 
therefore  a  limited  movement,  can  be  obviated  by  replying 
that  though  kinds  of  places  may  be  conceptually  limited 
in  genus,  yet  they  are  not  so  in  species.     In  other  words, 

*9  DeCoelo.  ^°  Or  Adoiiai,  p.  15  b. 

5'  nmr\  •'JT'-iG''  nc'N*  dk':^  rw-cr^  ''ijan  Nin  wc'h  ^noxn  mpon-c, 
Or  Adonai,  p.  14  b;  again,  pa  "w^  '•pnin  xiH  -\'2rh  -n?rN*n  Diponc' 

5]''p?0n  ni  v3n  ,  ibid.,  p.  15  b.  Cp.  above  Crescas's  arguments  about  the 
vacuum. 

52  Simplicius  ad  locum,  quoted  by  Thomas  Taylor,  The  Philosophy  of 
Aristotle. 


MAIMONIDIAN   THEORIES   AND   THEIR    CRITICISM         49 

there  is  no  absolute  point  where  we  may  say  that  this  is 
the  '  up  ',  but  there  may  be  a  series  of  '  ups  '  ad  infinitum  ; 
the  term  '  up'  being  only  our  subjective  designation.  His 
second  argument  (cp.  above)  that  if  there  exists  an  infinite 
body  it  would  have  infinite  weight,  and  then  would  move 
in  the  '  now '  is  irrelevant,  says  Crescas.  Since  movement 
of  a  body  must  be  in  time,  we  shall  have  to  posit  a  certain 
minimum  for  an  infinite  body.  It  is  true  that  a  finite  body 
may  be  found  that  will  move  in  the  same  time.  But  what 
of  it?  The  law  of  relations  of  movement  to  movement, 
according  to  the  weight,  extends  only  down  to  a  certain 
point.^^  Of  course,  Crescas  shows  here  a  poor  conception 
of  law,  but  a  more  accurate  conception  could  hardly  be 
expected  in  his  time. 

Crescas  also  attempts  to  disprove  the  Aristotelian 
arguments  against  the  possibility  of  an  infinite  body  moving 
in  a  circular  fashion.  Aristotle  says  that  there  can  be  no 
circular  movement,  because  the  distance  between  two  radii 
would  be  infinite,  and  it  is  impossible  to  traverse  an  infinite 
distance.  To  this  Crescas  rejoins  that,  though  the  lines 
may  be  infinite,  yet  the  distance  between  them  may  be 
finite.  The  arguments,  however,  are  too  obscure  and 
abstruse  to  reproduce  here,  and  as  they  aft"ect  the  subject 
very  little  we  may  omit  them.  He  seems  to  imply  that 
there  is  a  possibility  of  an  infinite  body  moving  in  an 
incomplete  circle,  so  that  parts  of  it  may  move  a  finite 
distance.  But  how  he  could  at  all  conceive  of  the  move- 
ment of  an  infinite  body  is  difficult  to  see,  for  granted  that 
there  is  an  infinite  space,  the  infinite  body  occupies  it  all 
by  virtue  of  its  own  definition.  And  what  meaning  has 
movement,  unless  we  assume  the    modern   conception  of 

^*  Or  Acionai,  p.  16  a. 
W.  E 


50  CRESCASS   EXPOSITION    OF   THE 

a  growing  infinite,  but  this  is  hardly  what  Crescas  means. 
However,  Crescas  wrote  many  things  for  the  sake  of 
argument,  simply  to  show  that  what  Aristotle  said  can  be 
refuted,  just  as  Aristotle  himself  multiplied  unnecessary 
arguments.  What  is  important  for  us  is  the  establishment 
of  the  theory  of  infinite  space,  and  the  possibility  of  an 
infinitude  of  magnitudes.  This  leads,  as  Crescas  well  saw,^'* 
to  the  possibility  of  the  existence  of  other  worlds  besides 
this  one,  a  conjecture  which  was  later  well  established. 
Especially  important  is  his  remark  against  Aristotle's 
arguments,  that  if  there  were  many  worlds  the  elements 
would  move  from  one  to  the  other.  Why  should  they? 
asks  Crescas.  Is  it  not  possible  that  the  elements  we 
know  exist  only  in  this  world,  and  the  other  worlds  have 
different  elements  and  different  tendencies?  We  notice 
here  the  beginning  of  the  fall  of  the  Aristotelian  cosmology, 
based  on  the  evidence  of  senses  only,  an  event  which  was 
delayed  for  some  time  but  accomplished  in  full  by  such 
masters  as  Copernicus,  Giordano  Bruno,  and  Galileo. 

The  second  proposition,  that  it  is  impossible  for  an 
infinite  number  of  finite  magnitudes  to  exist,  stands  and 
falls  with  the  first.  The  criticism  of  the  third  proposition, 
the  impossibility  of  an  infinite  causal  regressus,  is  interesting. 
Crescas  does  not  refute  it  entirely,  it  being  necessary  for 
his  proof  of  the  existence  of  God,  as  will  be  shown.  He 
does  give  it  a  different  interpretation.  Why,  asks  Crescas, 
can  there  not  be  an  infinite  number  of  effects  which  are  at 
the  same  time  causes  to  each  other?  It  is  true  that  we 
must  posit  one  prior  cause,  but  that  should  not  prevent 

nis^i'DB^  -ixno  Nin  nb)vb  pn  n^bn  ^j?n  'rbn  '^bv  is  ^ipn  ivm 

-IC'SN   D''an    CDb)]:,  Or  Adonal,  p.  17  a. 


MAIMONIDIAN   THEORIES   AND   THEIR   CRITICISM         51 

the  posterior  causes  from  being  infinite.  Aristotle's 
argument  that  every  intermediate  term  must  be  preceded 
by  a  first,^^  would  be  well  applicable  if  the  causal  series 
were  a  timely  one,  namely,  that  each  event  in  the  series 
must  precede  the  other  in  time.  But  the  relation  of  cause 
and  effect  is  really  one  of  logical  priority.  Aristotle  himself 
argues  for  the  eternity  of  the  world,  and  is  therefore  forced 
to  admit  that  the  first  cause  is  only  prior  in  a  logical  sense 
and  not  in  time,  as  the  first  sphere  is  also  eternal.  Why 
can  we  not  say  that  out  of  the  first  cause  there  emanated 
an  infinite  number  of  effects  which  exist  simultaneously, 
instead  of  one  effect  as  Aristotle  wants  us  to  believe? 
And  since  an  infinite  number  of  effects  is  possible,  what 
prevents  us  from  assuming  that  the  effects  are  also  causes 
to  one  another,  since  causal  priority  does  not  posit  temporal 
precedence  ?^*^  Of  course,  in  spite  of  Crescas's  criticism, 
the  necessity  of  a  first  cause,  first  in  necessity,  is  well 
established  ;  but  the  form  is  changed,  and  has  an  important 
bearing  upon  the  whole  conception  of  infinity.  The  manner 
in  which  Crescas  utilized  this  proposition  for  the  proof  of 
the  existence  of  God,  so  very  different  from  the  customary 
peripatetic  way,  was  commended  by  Spinoza.^''  Aristotle 
was  not  entirely  ignorant  of  the  weakness  of  his  assertion, 
and  in  Metaphysics,  book  XII,  ch.  vi,  he  mentions  a  similar 
interpretation  to  that  of  Crescas,  but  in  his  main  discussions 
in  Metaphysics  his  language  shows  the  contrary. 

The   eighth   proposition   stating  that  whatever  moves 
accidentally  will  eventually  rest  of  necessity,  which  forms 

•■■5  Metaphysics,  I  a  or  II. 

nnx  Dinyn  hv  omx^^^D  nn^^  im^  D^anv  i:nc  n'!^n  ^id3  dic'  mo 
niN'^von  nc'Ds  0^2::',?.  17b. 

■■^  Opera,  V,  1 1  ;  Epistola  XII. 

E  a 


52  CRESCASS    EXPOSITION    OF   THE 

a  link  in  the  proof  of  the  existence  of  God,  is  severely 
scrutinized  by  Crescas.  Is  it  not  possible,  asks  he,  that 
accidents  exist  as  long  as  the  substance  itself;  now  if  the 
substance  is  eternally  moved,  why  not  the  accidents  ?  Do 
not  the  lower  spheres  move  eternally,  because  of  the 
essential  movement  of  the  first  sphere,  though  their  own 
movement  is  accidental  ?  The  crucial  point  of  the 
Aristotelian  argument  is,  that  since  a  mover  while  moving 
another  body  is  moved  itself,  a  power  in  a  body  while 
it  moves  the  body  is  also  moved  accidentally,  and  con- 
sequently it  will  have  to  rest  of  necessity.  Crescas  says, 
It  does  not  follow  necessarily,  for  as  long  as  the  body  can 
be  moved  eternally,  why  should  the  movement  of  the  force 
ever  have  to  stop  since  it  is  connected  with  the  essential 
movement  of  the  body?^^ 

His  criticism  of  the  tenth  proposition  is  interesting 
though  of  little  importance  for  the  subject.  It  relates  to 
the  famous  Aristotelian  theory  that  form  is  the  stay  of  body. 
Crescas,  after  quoting  Ibn  Roshd,who  asserts  that  body  by 
evidence  of  sense  is  really  one  but  logic  forces  us  to  admit 
composition  because  of  its  corruptibility,  asks,  Why  can 
we  not  conceive  matter  as  having  a  certain  form  by  itself, 
the  corporeality,  for  instance,  consisting  in  a  kind  of  general 
quality  such  as  occupying  space  ?  Of  course,  when  we 
contemplate  a  particular  piece  of  matter  we  find  it  to  have 
a  particular  form,  but  this  is  only  the  individual  form,  and 
while  essential  yet  is  not  the  stay  of  the  body,  for  the 
material  form  is  always  in  existence  and  is  really  the  bearer 
of  the  individual  form.^^  This  remark,  though  short,  is 
very  suggestive.  It  reminds  us  of  the  Cartesian  principle 
that  all  matter  is  extension. 

68  OrJdonat,  i8  a.  ^^  Ib:d.,  i8b. 


MAIMONIDIAN   THEORIES   AND   THEIR   CRITICISM         53 

Crescas,  in  his  refutations,  attacks  also  the  twelfth 
proposition,  which  is  of  great  importance  in  the  Maimoni- 
dian  proof  of  the  existence  of  God.  The  proposition  asserts 
that  every  force  in  a  finite  body  is  finite.  It  is  based  on 
the  assumed  relation  of  motion  to  force.  The  rate  and  time 
of  a  moved  body  varies  inversely  to  the  force  moving  it. 
The  greater  the  force,  the  less  the  time.  If  there  exists 
an  infinite  force  in  a  finite  body,  that  body  will  either  be 
moved  in  the  '  now '  or  a  finite  force  will  be  equal  in 
moving  power  to  an  infinite.  (Cp.  above,  Aristotle's  proof 
of  the  impossibility  of  an  actual  infinite.)  Crescas  first 
refers  to  his  refutation  of  the  above-mentioned  argument  in 
regard  to  the  infinite  moving  in  '  now ',  where  he  contends 
that  since  movement  must  be  in  time  there  is  a  minimum 
which  is  necessary  even  for  an  infinite.  The  law  of  the 
relation  of  time  to  force  will  be  valid  only  above  that 
minimum.^'"  In  addition,  says  Crescas,  granted  that  the 
relation  holds  true  as  regards  the  strength  or  celerity  of 
the  motion,  still  since  there  can  be  an  infinite  movement 
in  time,  why  cannot  the  force  of  a  finite  body,  having  a 
definite  and  limited  rate  of  motion,  move  a  body  infinitely, 
when  there  is  no  cause  for  its  ceasing,  and  no  resistance 
impeding  it  ?  Especially  such  bodies  as  the  heavenly 
spheres  which  are  of  an  ethereal  substance,  and  consequently 
offer  no  resistance,  could  be  moved  eternally  even  by  a 
finite  force.  This  critical  remark  displays  a  quite  advanced 
conception  of  motion  and  resistance,  more  penetrating  than 
that  of  Aristotle,  who  related  the  continuity  of  motion 
to  the  force  and  employed  the  assumed  relation  as  a 
cardinal  proof  of  the  existence  of  a  first  mover. 

«» ]})rn  ^K'n:^  ;dt  bv  finiyn  jdd  nt  nan  f^x  nan  on^tr  n^b 

ynon   ^^;X,  OrAdoimi.  p.  18  b. 


54  CRESCAS'S    EXPOSITION    OF   THE 

Finally,  the  Aristotelian  conception  of  time  is  attacked. 
(This  forms  proposition  XV.)     Time,  says  the  Stagyrite, 
is  an  accident  of  motion,  and  cannot  be  conceived  without 
it.     This  statement  comprises  four  premisses,     i.  Time  is 
an  accident  joined  to  movement;  2.  either  is  not  found 
without  the  other;    3.  and  is  not  conceived  without  the 
other;  4.  and,  finally,  whatever  has  no  movement  is  not 
in  time.     But,  rejoins  Crescas,  is  not  time  a  measure  of 
rest  as  well  ?     Do  we  not  measure  the  state  of  rest  of  a 
body  in  time,  whether  it  is  long  or  short  ?     The  first  two 
premisses  then  fall.     The  third,  however,  may  be  justified 
if  we  define  rest  as  the  privation  of  motion.    The  conception 
of  time  is  joined  to  motion  and  not  conceived  without  it, 
though  not  always  found  together  with  motion.     Crescas, 
therefore,  proposes  a  new  definition  of  time.     Time  is  the 
concept  of  continuity  of  a  certain  state  of  a  body,  whether 
it   is    movement   or   rest.      It    is   true    that    time    is    an 
accident,    but    an    accident     relating    to    the    soul     and 
not    to    anything    dseS''^     This    conception     of    time    is 
quite   a   modern    one,  and    reminds   one   of  the   Kantian 
concept. 


The  Proofs  of  Maimonides  Refuted. 

After  attacking  the  individual  links  which  make  up 
the  Maimonidian  proofs  of  the  existence  of  God,  Crescas 
proceeds  to  demonstrate  the  results  of  the  refutations 
bearing  on  the  proofs.  The  first  proof  of  Maimonides 
(cp.  above)  makes  essential  use  of  the  first  proposition  in 

"  IN  nyijnn  nipmnn  myc'  xin'^r  nvSi^  pra  i^jn  -^lin  nth 
niny  tic^  pari'  nmxn ,  Or  Adonai,  19  a. 


MAIMONIDIAN   THEORIES   AND   THEIR   CRITICISM         55 

connexion  with  the  twelfth,  for  if  there  exists  an  infinite 
body  it  has  infinite  force,  and  so  it  can  be  self-moved,  and 
there  is  no  need  of  a  first  mover.  Again,  propositions  II 
and  III  are  necessary,  for  if  there  is  an  infinite  causal 
regressus  there  is  no  first  cause.  In  the  same  way,  several 
more  propositions  are  needed.  Since  these  propositions 
were  refuted  by  Crescas  (though  proposition  III,  which  is 
really  the  basic  one,  was  not  refuted,  but  given  an 
entirely  different  interpretation),  it  follows  that  the  proof 
as  a  whole  is  refuted.  But,  adds  Crescas,  even  granting 
the  truth  of  all  these  propositions,  yet  Maimonides  has 
not  established  his  case.  The  twelfth  proposition  stating 
that  a  finite  body  must  have  a  finite  force,  which  is 
a  cardinal  point  in  the  proof,  does  not  establish  the 
impossibility  of  a  force  in  a  finite  body  moving  in  an 
infinite  time  where  there  is  no  resistance ;  though  we  may 
grant  that  the  strength  of  the  force  is  finite  (cp.  above). 
This  objection  alone  is  sufficient  to  overthrow  the  whole 
structure  of  the  proof.  There  is  no  necessity  for  a  first 
unmoved  mover,  for  the  sphere  can  be  moved  by  its  own 
force  infinitely. 

Again,  Maimonides  has  not  established  the  unity  of 
God.  He  proves  it  by  the  sixteenth  proposition,  which 
asserts  that  whatever  is  neither  a  body  nor  a  force  in  a  body 
cannot  be  conceived  under  number  unless  it  is  a  cause, 
and  since  there  can  be  only  one  cause  of  that  character 
to  this  world,  the  oneness  of  this  cause  follows.  But,  says 
Crescas,  this  argument  would  be  sufficient  if  we  assume 
that  there  is  only  one  world.  But  since  it  was  demonstrated 
(cp.  above)  that  the  existence  of  several  worlds  is  possible, 
it  is  also  possible  that  there  should  be  several  Gods,  each 
one  being  a  different  cause  of  a  different  world  in  a  different 


56  CRESCAS'S    EXPOSITION    OF   THE 

relation,  and  as  such  the  Gods  may  be  counted.  Thus, 
the  numerical  unity  is  not  proved. ^^ 

The  second  proof  of  Maimonides  is  based  on  Aristotle's 
assertion  that  if  we  find  a  thing  composed  of  two  elements, 
and  then  one  element  alone,  it  follows  that  the  other 
element  must  also  exist  by  itself  (cp.  above  for  the  con- 
clusion). The  conclusion  is  attacked  by  Crescas,  who  says 
that  logically  it  follows  only  that  the  separate  existence 
of  the  other  element  is  possible,  but  not  that  it  is  absolutely 
necessary.  He  supports  his  contention  by  an  illustration 
drawn  from  physiology  as  it  was  understood  in  his  time. 
We  know  that  all  living  beings  are  also  vegetative  as  far  as 
growth  is  concerned.  We  find,  though,  vegetation  without 
life,  but  we  never  find  living  beings  not  having  the  vegeta- 
tive quality.  (It  i^  absurd,  of  course,  from  the  modern 
point  of  view,  that  vegetation  is  a  living  organism.)  We 
see,  therefore,  that  it  is  not  absolutely  necessary  for  the 
two  elements  that  compose  a  thing  to  exist  separately, 
especially  if  one  may  act  as  a  perfecting  agent.  The  force 
of  the  Maimonidian  argument  is  then  broken.^^ 

The  third  argument  of  Maimonides,  based  on  the 
assertion  that  all  being  cannot  be  perishable,  since  time 
and  movement  are  eternal,  is  answered  by  Crescas  in  the 
following  manner :  The  imperishability  of  all  being  does 
not  follow  from  the  eternity  of  time  and  movement,  for 
if  we  supposed  that  they  would  all  perish  at  once,  the 
argument  would  be  valid  ;  but  why  can  there  not  be  a 
continual  series  of  perishable  beings,  one  following  another  ? 
The  premiss,  therefore,  has  not  been  established.^*  He 
advances  also  another  argument  against  the  proof,  but  it 

^2  Or  Adonai,  20  a.  This  subject  will  be  discussed  again  in  this  chapter 
and  in  chapter  II. 

«3  Ibid.,  20b.  «<  Ibid. 


MAIMONIDIAN    THEORIES   AND   THEIR    CRITICISM         57 

really  has  little  force.    In  general,  his  refutation  of  the  third 
proof  is  more  for  the  sake  of  argumentation  and  logical 
casuistry  than  for  the  sake  of  serious  discussion.     Crescas 
himself,  as  will  be  evidenced  in  the  second  chapter,  proves 
the   existence   of  God    through  a  similar   chain    of  argu- 
mentation, though  with  a  different  interpretation.     Finally, 
the    last    arguments    of    Maimonides    are    assailed.      The 
arguments  centre  about  unity.     Crescas  has  already  shown 
that  Maimonides  did  not  succeed  in  proving  the  oneness 
of  the  first  cause.      He  now  elaborates  the  subject,  and 
analyses   the    other   arguments    of    Maimonides.      These 
arguments  have  often  been  quoted  in  Jewish  as  well  as  in 
scholastic  philosophy,  and  run  as  follows  (cp.  Introduction): 
The  existence  of  two  Gods  is  impossible  for  several  reasons: 
I.  If  there  were  two,  there  would  be  a  difference  between 
them   as  well  as  a  similarity ;    they  would,  therefore,  be 
composite.     2.  The  harmony  of  the  world  and  the  inter- 
dependence of  beings  testify  to  the  existence  of  one  God. 
3.  If  there  were  two  Gods,  we  should  have  to  conclude  that 
either  one  God  created  a  part  of  the  world  and  the  other 
another,  or  that   one  worked   for  a   certain  time  and  the 
other  for  another  period,  or  that  they  co-operated.     All 
these  results  are  absurd.      It  would    follow  that  God   is 
a  composite,  is  in  time  and  possible,  which  consequences 
are  untenable  (cp.  Introduction,  as  well  as  above  in  the 
exposition    of   the    Maimonidian    theory    for   elucidation). 
But,  rejoins  Crescas,  the  conclusion,  namely,  the  oneness 
of  God,  is  not  warranted.      First,  the  Gods  must  not  be 
composite,  for  the  difference  between   them   need   not  be 
material ;    it  may  be  only  a  causal  one  ^^      Second,  since 
«6  nn  'n  invn  iN3nn  nh  n:r\  nvnoN  niDipnn  n"'Jj;^o  'in  dni 
nnsb  nbv  'n  rivna  is^nn"'  -]2yz',  Or  Adottm,  p.  2oh. 


58   CRESCAS'S  EXPOSITION  OF  THE  MAIMONIDIAN  THEORIES 

we  may  posit  several  worlds,  we  may  also  posit  several 
Gods,  each  one  having  his  world. *"^  This  answers  also 
the  other  arguments  ;  for  besides  that  the  interdependence 
of  this  world  of  things  does  not  prove  anything,  as  there 
may  be  a  pre-established  harmony  of  plan  between  the  Gods, 
it  vanishes  entirely  with  the  assumption  of  the  existence 
of  several  worlds,  as  it  is  evident.  There  are  also  other 
arguments  quoted  by  Saadia  and  Bahia  that  are  not  affected 
by  this  assumption,  but  these  arguments  will  be  discussed 
in  the  second  chapter  together  with  the  Spinozistic  view 
on  the  subject. 

We  have  reached  a  boundary  line  in  Crescas's  philosophy, 
namely,  the  end  of  his  critical  exposition  of  the  proofs 
of  the  existence  of  God.  The  point  of  view  of  Crescas 
has  been  mentioned  before.  It  will  suffice  to  remark  in 
passing  that  his  endeavour  is  to  show  the  invalidity  of 
many  philosophic  arguments  concerning  theological  dogmas, 
so  that  necessarily  we  have  to  rely  upon  tradition.  How- 
ever, what  has  happened  to  many  others  has  happened 
to  him,  that  while  their  aim  has  not  been  reached,  the  very 
negative  side  is  valuable.  He  displayed  in  his  criticisms 
a  keen  sense  of  philosophic  acumen  and  originality,  and 
were  this  book  more  widely  known,  its  influence  on  general 
thought  would  undoubtedly  be  greater.  His  anticipations 
of  modern  conceptions  have  already  been  noticed.  Yet 
Crescas  has  value,  not  only  in  his  negative  criticisms  but 
also  in  his  positive  conceptions.  It  will  be  evident  in  the 
future  chapters.     We  thus  pass  on  to  the  second  chapter. 

^^  Ibid.,  p.  21  a. 


CHAPTER   II 

Crescas's  Treatment  of  the  Problems  relating  to 
THE  Existence  of  God  and  His  Attributes. 

The  existence  of  God  is  proved  by  Crescas  in  a  very 
simple  manner.  The  proof  runs  in  the  following  way : 
Whether  there  is  a  finite  or  an  infinite  number  of  efifects, 
or  whether  an  infinite  series  of  causes  is  given,  but  as  long 
as  the  series  is  infinite  and  all  things  are  caused,  we  do 
not  find  in  nature  a  thing  that  is  absolutely  necessary  of 
existence.  But  to  conclude  thus  is  impossible,  for  if  all 
beings  are  possible  there  must  be  some  power  that  calls 
forth  existence,  so  as  to  overbalance  privation.  It  follows 
that  there  is  a  being  necessary  of  existence.*^^  In  this  proof 
the  force  of  the  argument,  as  Spinoza  well  remarks,  is  not 
in  the  impossibility  of  an  infinite  act  or  an  infinite  causal 
regressus,  but  the  stress  is  laid  on  the  absurdity  of  positing 
a  world  of  possibles.*'^ 

<='  rhv  nvno  tobcn  px  n"an  is  n"2  D^^i^yi  ni^y  vn^c>  dx  njni 
nj^nin  niN^i'on  ntras'  vn  n^i'i^y  ob  vn  nstr  no^  nbb^b  nns 
D^a^  n^yni  mnyn  hv  onis^^'n    yns'*    ynatt^  D^snv  oni  DtDvy 

n"'  ban  Nini  nniS"'VD  nyiDr^n,  OrAdonai,  Tr.  I,  sect.  3,  ch.  2,  p.  22  a. 
68  It  will  be  best  to  quote  Spinoza's  own  words  on  the  subject :  '  Verum 
hie  obiter  adhuc  notari  velim  quod  peripatetici  recentiores  ut  quidem  puto, 
male  intellexerint  demonstrationem  veterura  qua  ostendere  nitebantur  dei 
existentiam.  Nam  ut  ipsam  apud  ludaeum  quendam  Rab  Ghasdai  vocatim 
reperio,  sic  sonat,  si  dantur  progressus  causarum  in  infinitum,  erunt  omnia 
quae  sunt,  etiam  causata.     Atque  nulli  quod  causatum  est  competit,  vi  suae 


6o      CRESCAS'S   TREATMENT   OF   THE    PROBLEMS   RELATING 

Here  may  be  considered  the  proper  place  to  say  a  few 
words  about  the  relation  of  Crescas  to  Spinoza.  That  the 
latter  knew  writings  of  the  former  and  studied  them,  we 
know  from  the  passage  quoted,  where  Spinoza  mentions 
Crescas  by  name,  and  very  accurately  explains  the  latter's 
proof  of  the  existence  of  God.  The  question  is  whether 
Crescas  really  exerted  any  marked  influence  upon  the 
formation  of  Spinoza's  system.  Joel  endeavoured  in  several 
of  his  writings  to  establish  that  Spinoza  was  under  the 
influence  of  Crescas,  and  attempted  to  trace  the  influence 
in  some  of  Spinoza's  important  theories.  It  will  be  neces- 
sary for  us  to  discuss  these  points  of  similarity  as  they 
come  along.  Kuno  Fischer  (in  his  Gcschichte  der  neiieren 
Philosophie,V,  II,  Spinoza)  attempts  to  refute  all  arguments 
put  forth  in  favour  of  influence,  and  concludes  that  there 
is  nothing  in  common  between  them.*'' 

Fischer's  arguments,  however,  do  not  seem  conclusive. 
I  wish  to  call  attention  to  the  first  point  in  Spinoza's 
system,  namely,  the  existence  of  substance  or  God.  The 
way  Spinoza,  in  his  Ethics,  conceives  the  existence  of 
a  first  cause  is  strikingly  similar  to  that  of  Crescas.  It  is 
true  that  in  the  TractatJis  Brevis,  his  first  philosophical 
essay,  Spinoza  proves  that  God  must  exist,  in  the  famous 
Cartesian  way  through  the  conception  of  the  idea  of  God. 
But  in  the  Ethics  the  basic  conception  of  the  whole  system  is 
that,  in  looking  upon  nature,  we  must  come  to  the  conclusion 

naturae  necessarie  existere,  ergo  nihil  est  in  natura  ad  cuius  essentiam 
pertinet  necessario  existere.  Sed  hoc  est  absurdum  ;  ergo  et  illud.  Quare 
vis  argumenti  non  in  ea  sita  est,  quod  impossibile  sit  dari  actu  infinitum  aut 
progressus  causarum  in  infinitum  ;  sed  tantum  in  ea  quod  supponatur  res 
quae  sua  natura  non  necessario  existunt  non  determinari  ad  existendum 
a  re  sua  natura  necessario  existent'.  Epistola  XII,  ed.  Van  Vloten,  II,  45. 
"^  Gcschichte  der  nenercn  Philosophic,  II,  pp.  265-73. 


TO   THE   EXISTENCE   OF   GOD    AND    HIS   ATTRIBUTES      6l 

that  there  must  be  a  cause  which  is  necessary  of  existence 
by  itself.  '  This  conception  ',  says  Kuno  Fischer,  '  which  is 
put  at  the  beginning  of  his  philosophy,  supports  the  whole 
system.'  '^o  Taking  his  first  definition,  '  By  that  which  is 
self-caused,  I  mean  that  of  which  the  essence  involves 
existence ',  and  his  axiom,  '  That  which  exists,  exists  either 
in  itself  or  in  something  else':  again,  axiom  three,  '  If  no 
definite  cause  be  granted,  it  is  impossible  that  an  effect  can 
follow',  as  well  as  his  proofs  of  proposition  XI,  we  see 
clearly  the  underlying  thought  that  in  the  world  of  things 
where  there  is  a  multitude  of  effects  there  must  be  some- 
thing which  is  a  causa  siii.  Placing  the  words  of  Crescas, 
'  Whether  there  be  causes  and  effects  finite  or  infinite,  there 
is  one  thing  clear,  that  there  must  be  one  cause  for  all,  for 
if  all  are  effects  there  would  not  be  anything  which  is  its 
own  cause  of  existence;'  besides  this  conception,  one 
cannot  help  feeling  the  similarity  between  the  initial  points 
of  these  two  philosophers,  and  the  influence  of  the  earlier 
upon  the  latter  is  not  improbable.  The  fact  that  Crescas 
and  Spinoza  are  two  opposite  poles,  the  one  religious  to 
the  extreme,  the  other  irreligious,  should  not  deter  us. 
In  spite  of  the  fact  mentioned,  God  is  the  very  centre  of 
things  to  both  ,  and  though,  according  to  the  latter,  God 
acts  in  a  mathematical  way  with  absolute  mechanical 
necessity,  and,  according  to  the  former,  in  a  personal  way, 
yet  the  basic  quality  of  God  in  both  systems  is  the  same, 
namely,  absolute  limitlessness ;  consequently,  the  philo- 
sophers concur  in  a  goodly  number  of  questions. 

For   this   divergence  in   regard    to    religion    really  has 
nothing  to  do  with  the  first  conception  of  the  existence 
of  God.     The  conception  itself  is  independent  of  religion, 
7"  Ibid.,  p.  358. 


62   CRESCAS'S  TREATMENT  OF  THE  PROBLEMS  RELATING 

and  might  as  well  be  taken  by  Spinoza  as  the  basis  of  his 
system.  Fischer,  as  if  feeling  that  in  quoting  Spinoza's 
letter  where  Crescas's  proof  is  cited  in  such  a  way  as  to 
resemble  Spinoza's  own,  he  weakens  his  case,  attempts  to 
strengthen  his  arguments  by  alluding  to  the  manner  in 
which  Spinoza  speaks  of  Crescas.  He  names  him  '  quendam 
Rab  Ghasdai '.  Fischer  infers  that  this  proves  sufficiently 
that  Spinoza  hardly  knew  Crescas  and  his  teachings,  and 
winds  up  by  saying,  '  Descartes  was  not  a  "  quendam  "  to 
Spinoza.'  '^^  Such  an  argument  is  hardly  conclusive. 
Spinoza  wrote  to  Lewis  Meyer,  who  surely  hardly  knew 
of  Crescas,  and  to  whom  he  was  a  '  certain  '.  But  if  Fischer 
were  acquainted  with  the  difficulty  of  Crescas's  style  and 
its  remarkable  brevity,  he  would  know  that  Spinoza  could 
hardly  give  such  a  lucid  and  penetrating  summary  of 
Crescas's  proof  by  mere  hearsay  without  having  studied  his 
works  carefully.  Again,  his  additional  remark  (in  Ep.  XII, 
quoted  above),  '  non  in  ea  sita  est  quod  impossibile  sit  dari 
actu  infinitum ',  shows  that  he  read  Crescas's  whole  refuta- 
tion of  the  Aristotelian  doctrine.  The  fact  that  Spinoza 
calls  him  a  peripatetic,  while  Crescas  combated  the 
Aristotelian  doctrines,  is  not  sufficient  evidence  of  his 
ignorance  of  Crescas's  work.  There  was  still  left  in  Crescas 
enough  of  the  philosophy  of  his  time  to  entitle  him  to  that 
name. 


Essence  and  Existence. 

It  was  an  old  debatable  question  with  the  mediaeval 
philosophers,  whether  existence  is  identical  with  the  essence 
of  a  thing  or  is  something  separate.     Ibn  Sina  taught  that 

■'i  Geschichte  der  neueren  Philosophic^  II,  p.  273. 


TO   THE    EXISTENCE   OF   GOD   AND    HIS    ATTRIBUTES      63 

existence  is  an  accident  of  essence.''^  Ibn  Roshd,  on  the 
other  hand,  claimed  that  existence  can  be  nothing  else 
but  identical  with  essence.  According  to  Ibn  Roshd  and 
his  followers  then,  in  regard  to  God,  since  His  essence  is 
absolutely  different  from  the  essence  of  the  rest  of  beings, 
it  follows  that  His  existence  will  also  be  different  in  kind, 
and  in  positing  existence  to  both  God  and  other  beings 
we  do  so  in  an  absolutely  homonymous  way,  not  denoting 
any  common  relation  but  the  name.^-^  But  also  the  followers 
of  Ibn  Sina  agree  to  this  conception,  for  they  concede 
necessarily  that  with  God  existence  is  not  an  accident, 
but  identical  with  essence.  And  since  with  other  beings 
it  is  only  accidental,  it  follows  that  the  name  existence  in 
applying  it  to  God  and  to  man  is  employed  in  an  absolute 
homonymous  way. 

Crescas  does  not  agree  with  either  view.  In  criticizing 
Ibn  Roshd's  view,  he  points  out  the  logical  difficulty 
involved  in  its  assumption.  If  existence  is  identical  with 
essence,  what  then  does  it  add  as  a  predicate  ?  In  stating 
that  God  exists,  the  predicate  does  not  add  anything ; 
it  amounts  to  saying,  God  is  God  :  the  same  is  true  of  any 
other  proposition  of  the  same  kind.  Again,  if,  as  Ibn  Sina 
says,  existence  is  only  an  accident,  it  needs  then  a  subject ; 
but  the  subject  must  also  exist,  hence  another  subject  must 
precede  it,  and  so  on  to  infinity.  Again,  since  existence 
is  the  real  form  and  stay  of  th;  subject,  for  without  it  it 
would  be  not-being,  how  could  we  call  it  accident  ?  This 
view  must  necessarily  be  abandoned.  But  the  other  view 
is  untenable  also.     It  must,  therefore,  be  concluded  that 

72  iyp'C-\p   •t:'n''D   pyi  f"3   pis   ^""^"O,  Morek,  LVII  (see  also  Crescas's 
Commentary) ;  Guide,  p.  204. 

73  Or  Adonat,  p.  21  b. 


64   CRESCAS  S  TREATMENT  OF  THE  PROBLEMS  RELATING 

existence,  while  not  identical  with  essence,  is  essential  to 
a  being.^^  In  this  way,  existence  can  be  predicated  of 
everything,  of  the  essence  as  well  as  of  accidents,  though 
there  will  be  a  difference  of  degree.  The  general  conception, 
however,  must  be  understood  in  a  negative  way.  The  thing 
we  predicate  existence  of  is  to  be  understood  not  non- 
existing.  As  a  result,  when  we  speak  of  the  existence  of 
God,  and  the  existence  of  other  beings,  it  must  not  be 
absolutely  homonymous,  but  there  may  be  a  certain  relation, 
namely,  that  the  negation — for  existing  equals  not  non- 
existing — has  a  difference  of  degree.  The  not  non-existence 
of  God  is  due  to  himself,  while  of  the  other  beings  to  their 
cause.''^  What  Crescas  wants  to  prove  by  his  naming 
existence  essential  is  that  it  is  one  of  the  expressions  of 
essence,  implying  that  there  are  more. 

Spinoza  seems  to  believe  that  existence  and  essence 
are  different  in  the  case  of  other  beings,  for  essence  depends 
on  natural  law,  but  existence  on  the  order  of  the  causal 
series.  In  God,  however,  existence  is  not  distinguished 
from  essence,  for  by  definition,  existence  belongs  to  his 
nature.'^ 


Attributes  and  Unity. 

Maimonides'  theory  of  Attributes,  which  is  criticized  by 
Crescas,  resembles  in  its  entirety  the  other  theories  of  the 
preceding  Jewish  philosophers,  with  a  strong  emphasis  on 
the  negativity  of  their  conception.  A  thing  can  be  described, 
says  he,  in  four  wa}s  ;  either  according  to  its  definition  or 

^*  mipn  piiDniD  -isannc  id3  ninon  Dvy  ijj\'<c'  n^nn^  n^^'X^i 

■^5  /did.  "8  Cogitata  Metaphysica,  Part  I,  chs.  2,  3. 


TO   THE   EXISTENCE   OF   GOD   AND    HIS   ATTRIBUTES      65 

a  part  thereof,  or  by  one  of  its  essential  qualities,  or  by 
relation  to  some  other  things,  either  to  time,  place,  or  another 
body.'^'^  In  regard  to  God,  attributes  describing  in  any  of 
the  above-mentioned  ways  are  inapplicable,  for  since  we 
posit  Him  simple,  and  one,  and  above  all  categories,  it  is 
evident  that  He  cannot  be  defined,  nor  can  we  speak  of 
a  part  of  Him  nor  of  any  essential  quality  in  Him.  As  for 
relation,  there  is  no  relation  between  Him  and  place  or  time, 
or  any  other  being,  for  they  are  all  possible  of  existence 
and  He  is  necessary.  There  remains,  therefore,  a  fifth  way 
of  describing,  namely,  according  to  the  actions.  Such  kind 
of  attributes  it  is  not  impossible  to  apply  to  God,  for  they 
do  not  imply  any  plurality,  change,  or  division.  This  form 
of  attributes  is  paronymic,  after  the  actions  we  perceive. 
There  are,  however,  essential  attributes,  that  is,  such  as 
appertain  to  the  essence  without  having  any  bearing  on 
the  actions.  Such  by  the  consensus  of  religious  leaders 
and  philosophers  are  existent,  living,  knowing,  wise,  potent, 
and  willing.  It  is  to  be  noticed  that  Maimonides  includes 
will  as  an  attribute  just  as  his  peripatetic  predecessor 
Ibn  Daud  has  done,  while  Saadia  and  Bahia  do  not  count 
it  (cp.  Introduction).  How  then  shall  we  understand  these 
essential  attributes  ?  Of  course,  it  is  evident  that  in  applying 
them  to  both  God  and  man  we  employ  them  in  an  absolute 
homonymic  manner,  for  there  is  no  possible  relation  between 
God  and  other  beings.  These  attributes  have  to  be  con- 
ceived purely  negatively,  and  yet,  says  Maimonides,  they 
convey  to  us  some  positive  notion.  He  proceeds  to  explain 
his  assertion.  The  statement  that  God  is  existent  implies 
only  that  He  is  not  non-existing,  or  the  denial  of  privation  ; 

'■^  3":   p-|D   'N   pbn  :"10,  Moreh,  I,  52  (p.  72  a)  ;  Guide,  p.  178. 
W.  F 


66   CRESCAS'S  TREATMENT  OF  THE  PROBLEMS  RELATING 

and  when  we  say  that  God  is  living,  we  only  assert  that 
His  existence  is  not  like  the  existence  of  dead  matter. 
In  a  similar  way,  the  more  difficult  attributes  are  explained; 
potent  means  the  denial  of  weakness  ;  wise,  the  privation 
of  foolishness ;  willing,  the  absence  of  disorder.  This,  in 
short,  is  the  Maimonidian  theory  of  attributes.^^ 

Gersonides,  the  immediate  predecessor  of  Crescas,  had 
already  objected  to  such  a  theory.  He  argued  against  the 
assumption  of  absolute  homonymity  in  applying  the  attri- 
butes to  both  God  and  man.  It  is  impossible,  he  says, 
to  assume  that  there  is  only  a  likeness  of  name  in  the  two 
applications  of  the  attribute,  if  it  is  construed  to  have  a 
negative  meaning.  Take,  for  example,  the  negative  concept 
of  existing,  can  we  say  that  the  denial  of  non-existence 
which  the  concept  implies  has  two  absolutely  different 
meanings?  We  are  forced, then, to  admit  that  the  difference 
is  only  in  degree;  why  then  can  we  not  hold  the  same 
conception  in  regard  to  positive  attributes,  namely,  that 
they  are  applied  to  God  and  to  man  in  different  degrees 
of  perfection  ?^^  We  have  noticed  a  similar  argument 
advanced  by  Crescas  in  regard  to  existence.  We  shall 
now  pass  on  to  Crescas's  criticism  of  Maimonides'  theory. 
Maimonides  is  loath,  says  Crescas,  to  ascribe  to  God  any 
attributes  that  will  bring  Him  in  relation  with  something 
else,  for  fear  that  it  may  imply  a  privation  in  His  nature, 

nsi^  i6  inns-  p^yi  nny  ix  bni:  i6)  bo  i6^  mob  )ym  nnNnn 
i6^  in»N*  i^jyi  ,in^iT  nnm  onn  m'^^rb  n  nn  u^  •miN^vcc' 
-3  nriy  ah)  bn2:  i6  incs-  r^yi  .  .  .  -  ^n  -iDib  rK'o  ii)r\^  bo 
mnani  -no  bv  niacin  niN^fojn  n^s  b^,  Moreh,  p.  86  b;  Guide,  p.  l., 

p.  2IO. 

■'S   The  Battles  of  (he  Lord,  II,  p.  134  (Milhamot,  ed.  Leipzig,  1866;. 


TO   THE    EXISTENCE    OF   GOD   AND    HIS   ATTRIBUTES      67 

and  yet  he  allows  himself  to  describe  Him  with  active 
attributes.  But,  asks  Crescas,  does  the  application  of  such 
attributes  not  imply  any  defect  in  God's  perfection  ?  When 
we  say,  God  created  or  made,  does  it  not  mean  that  before 
the  act  His  power  was  potential  and  only  later  became 
active?  Such  an  implication  suggests  change  in  God's 
nature. ^^  Again,  Maimonides'  assertion  that  there  is 
absolutely  no  relation  between  God  and  created  beings  or 
time  is  false.  Is  not  God  the  cause  of  all  existing  being  ? 
But  if  He  is,  there  is  already  a  relation  established,  or  if 
we  assume  that  time  is  eternal,  there  is  a  relation  of  likeness 
between  God  and  time.  But  Crescas  sees  as  well  as 
Maimonides  the  danger  involved  in  ascribing  to  God  posi- 
tive attributes  and  at  the  same  time  asserting  that  He  is 
simple  and  one.  Yet,  he  says,  there  is  really  no  contra- 
diction. The  fact  that  we  humans  may  conceive  plurality 
through  attributes  does  not  mean  real  plurality.  His 
infinite  goodness  which  is  His  essence  unites  them.  Good- 
ness here  should  be  understood  to  mean  perfection,  or  in 
other  words,  God  is  infinitely  perfect — what  Spinoza  calls 
in  his  writings  the  absolute  perfect,^^  not  perfect  after  its 
kind.  Again,  since  God  is  indivisible  and  simple,  and 
perfection  is  essential,  then  why  cannot  existence  or  any 
of  the  other  attributes,  as  potence  or  wisdom,  be  posited 
as  a  positive  attribute  in  just  the  same  relation  as  light 

iNinn  p  Tnn  ix  n:n  bv^i  2)]i>'>  D"nKi  "h  ^yan  -im  n\T  ah^  id3 
ba  NU""  -i3D  nrii'  xnai  ny'yi  ^ys  -idnd  i^wVd  in^iysa  nann  -iNin'':^' 
nc  3"nN*i  n33  n^n  133  nNnnn  in*  n'^vn  is*  n^iyan  ni)p'^  -nyn 

by23,  Or  Adoiiai,  p.  23  a. 

81  Epistola  XXXI,  Opera,  V,  11. 

F  a 


68      CRESCAS'S   TREATMENT   OF   THE    PROBLEMS   RELATING 

is  posited  of  a  luminous  body?  Let  us,  following  up  the 
analogy,  suppose  that  the  first  cause  is  a  luminous  body ; 
it  is  consequently  necessary  of  existence.  Is  its  light, 
though  not  identical  with  the  essence  of  the  body,  less 
necessary  of  existence,  or  can  the  body  not  be  described 
by  it  ?  The  light  is  not  a  separate  thing,  but  is  an  essential 
quality  through  which  the  body  may  be  described.  In  a 
similar  manner,  we  can  call  the  attributes  of  God  positive, 
especially  such  as  eternity,  existence,  and  unity,  and  yet 
they  do  not  imply  plurality.^^  it  js  true  that  so  far  as  our 
conception  is  concerned  we  cannot  give  them  a  positive 
content,  for  that  would  determine  God,  and  we  must  use 
the  negative,  e.  g.  as  existent,  not  non-existent,  &c.,  but  in 
regard  to  God  himself  they  are  surely  positive,  and  He 
can  be  described  by  them.^^^ 

Especially  precarious  is  Maimonides'  position,  says 
Crescas,  when  we  consider  the  other  attributes  such  as 
wisdom  and  potence.  What  does  he  mean  by  saying  that 
potence  means  absence  of  weakness,  or  knowing,  privation 
of  ignorance?  He  does  not  remove  the  positive  content 
from  the  attribute.  There  is  no  tertmm  quid  between 
knowing  and  not  knowing,  if  not  not-knowing;  hence  it 
necessarily  follows  that  God  is  knowing.  But  if  the  attri- 
bute of  knowing  has  a  positive  content,  what  then  is  that 
content  ?  It  is  not  identical  with  essence,  for  the  essence 
of  God  is  inconceivable  in  its  totality ;  and  surely  it  cannot 

82  x^'oo  y:Dn  lovy^  nis^^'nn  Tin?:nD  n^sn  h^"o  Tin  ^y  n^in  h 

^isnc^  ^niovy  nan  Nin  bx  ppni  i^^nc^  yri  nh^k'  imnvyD  hn: 
'n^  !?N2  DnN*nn  ^3>3y  sin  p  u  nNinit^,  Or  Adonai,  p.  24  b. 

83   Ibid. 


TO   THE    EXISTENCE   OF   GOD   AND    HIS  ATTRIBUTES      69 

be  an  accident,  for  that  is  excluded  from  the  conception. 
It  follows,  therefore,  that  positive  attributes  are  essential. 
Again,  he  says,  if  we  assume  the  Maimonidian  view,  it 
follows  that  God  will  be  absolutely  qualityless,  almost 
equal  to  nothing ;  for,  he  says,  if  we  deny  any  essential 
attributes,  it  is  not  that  we  deny  our  knowledge  of  them, 
but  the  having  itself.  God  will  be  then  entirely  negative, 
neither  potent  nor  impotent,  nor  anything,  and  this  is 
absurd.  It  is  evident,  therefore,  that  positive  attributes 
must  be  posited  of  God  though  we  cannot  determine 
their  content,  and  for  human  purposes  may  be  described 
negatively.^^ 

As  for  unity,  Crescas  thinks  that  in  a  similar  manner 
to  existence  it  is  not  essence,  but  essential.  If  we  shall 
say  that  it  is  essence,  we  shall  encounter  the  same  difficulty 
in  predication  as  in  existence.  When  we  say  that  man  is 
one,  we  do  not  state  anything  new  about  man,  but  merely 
repeat  that  man  is  man.  It  follows,  therefore,  as  has  been 
mentioned,  that  unity  is  an  essential  attribute  and  a 
rational  mode  of  conception.  It  follows  also,  since  unity 
is  really  a  mode  of  differentiation,  that  God  who  is  the  most 
differentiated  of  all  other  beings,  is  one  par  excellence.^^ 

Crescas  makes  here  a  keen  observation,  namely,  that 
unity  has  a  double  meaning.  It  means  simplicity,  that  the 
object  is  not  composite ;  and  it  is  also  to  be  understood 
in  a  numerical  sense,  that  there  is  only  one  God.     Spinoza 

8^  Or  Acionat,  p.  25  a-b. 

.u  ^n-in  -^ivr^^  ri^bc  nrnni  b:i»i  ^ysa  nsd^h  ^3x  ^oxy  -ai 
N^'Djnc'  iNnn  sin  N^*t2:^  bnnm  rhun  n:mj  nnnNn  rwrh  pi 

)rb)m  nnsn  nca  ^nnN  nnv  xin,  OrAdonai,  p.  22  b. 


70   CRESCASS  TREATMENT  OF  THE  PROBLEMS  RELATING 

expresses  the  latter  by  wiiaim?^  As  for  the  first,  it  was 
well  established,  for  God  is  necessary  of  existence,  and 
everything  necessary  of  existence  cannot  be  composite, 
as  has  been  discussed.^^  The  question  remains  in  regard 
to  the  second.  Is  there  only  one  God  ?  We  have  shown 
above  that  Crescas  always  considered  the  arguments  sub- 
stantiating the  oneness  as  insuffioient.  The  interdependence 
of  the  world  and  the  harmony  of  action  are  counterbalanced 
by  his  supposition  of  the  possible  existence  of  two  worlds 
(cp.  above).  There  is,  however,  one  more  argument,  which 
says  that  since  we  posit  the  infinite  potence  of  God,  the 
existence  of  another  God  is  impossible,  for  they  would 
constrain  each  other.  Yet,  says  Crescas,  these  arguments 
are  not  convincing,  for  it  is  still  possible  that  the  other  one 
is  not  active.  He,  therefore,  concludes  that  the  numerical 
unity  of  God  is  only  a  subject  of  revelation.^® 

It  must  be  admitted  that  Crescas  in  this  point  is  not 
only  weak,  but  prejudiced.  His  polemical  nature  over- 
mastered the  philosophical.  What  does  he  mean  by  a 
passive  God  ?  Does  it  not  contradict  his  own  conception 
of  God?  If  God  possesses  infinite  potence,  what  then 
is  that  other  being?  It  is  neither  active  nor  potential. 
It  is  evident  that  this  absurd  argument  was  only  advanced 
just  as  a  shot  at  the  philosophers,  though  it  fell  short  of 
the  mark,  and  Crescas  well  conceived  it. 

It  is  necessary,  in  conclusion  of  this  part  of  Crescas's 
theory,  to  say  a  few  words  concerning  his  influence  on 
Spinoza,  regarding  which  there  is  some  difference  of  opinion. 
Dr.  Joel,  in  his  book  Zitr  Genesis  dev  Lehre  Spinozas^'^ 

86  Cogitata  Metaph.,  II,  2. 

87  The  same  proof  has  been  quoted  by  Spinoza. 

*^  OrAdonai,  p.  26  a,  ^9  pp^  19-24. 


TO   THE    EXISTENCE   OF   GOD   AND    HIS   ATTRIBUTES      ?! 

asserts  that  Spinoza  was  greatly  influenced  by  Crescas 
in  the  formation  of  his  theory  of  attributes.  He  says  that 
Crescas  makes  a  distinction  between  attributes  of  an 
essential  nature  and  such  as  are  rational  modes  of  con- 
ception. Again,  that  this  is  the  same  distinction  that 
Spinoza  makes  between  attributes  and  propria,^°  namely, 
such  qualities  which  are  a  part  of  God's  own  essence, 
though  they  do  not  affect  His  simplicity  or  immutabiHty. 
It  is  difficult  to  agree  with  Joel,  both  that  such  a  distinction 
is  made  by  Crescas  and  that  it  is  identical  with  Spinoza's. 
Crescas  calls  both  kinds  of  attributes,  such  as  eternity, 
existence,  and  unity  (rather  simplicity),  those  that  Joel  would 
include  in  the  second  class,  and  knowledge  or  potency, 
which  are,  according  to  Joel,  in  the  first  class,  by  one  name, 
namely,  D^^rovy  DnNin,^^  which  means  essential  attributes. 
It  is  true  that  Crescas  says  that  the  first-named  attributes 
are  less  apt  to  affect  the  simplicity  of  God,  for  their  content 
is  only  a  rational  mode  with  a  negative  form,  as  existence, 
not  non-being,  &c.^^  But  no  real  distinction  is  found.  He 
says  distinctly,  '  It  is  clear  from  the  foregoing  that  existent 
and  unity  (simplicity),  which  are  predicated  of  Him,  His 
name  be  praised,  are  essential  attribut,es ',^^  or  as  Dr.  Joel 
would  express  himself,  '  wesenhafter  Art '.  Where  then 
does  Joel  get  his  distinction?  Again,  Spinoza  bases  his 
distinction  on  the  definition  that  the  attributes,  according 
to  him,  are  identical  with  the   essence  of  God  which   is 

90  Or  Adonai,  p.  25  a. 

91  Korte  Verhandeling,  Opera,  p.  274. 

»2  niN^vcm  mm  ^nb  nihb'  T\'h'2V  nj^nn  n^n  ijj^njj'  ni»*ipn  ^"■2^ 
nhm  invn  hv  nniD  sin^'  nnnNm  myj  ^nb  inrn  nxnin  xina' 
jmvn  |JD  nvn  nvjc  u  px  Ninc'i  im'yn  "•m,  Or  Adonai,  ^.  2^h. 

93  Ibid.,  p.  25  a. 


72   CRESCAS  S  TREATMENT  OF  THE  PROBLEMS  RELATING 

conceived  through  them ;  of  such  we  know  only  two, 
thought  and  extension.  The  Propria  are  such  as  belong 
to  God,  but  do  not  express  His  essence.^*  Of  such  a 
distinction  there  is  no  mention  in  Crescas.  On  the  contrary, 
Crescas  asserts  that  the  essence  of  God  is  inconceivable. 
This  is  really  a  fundamental  difference  between  Crescas 
and  Spinoza.  Again,  we  find  many  of  those  Propria  of 
Spinoza  among  the  essential  attributes,  as,  for  instance, 
knowledge.^^  How,  then,  can  we  say  that  it  is  the  same 
distinction  ?  We  can  nevertheless  admit  that  the  idea  found 
in  Crescas  that  there  are  some  attributes  which,  though 
predicated  of  God,  do  not  by  all  means  express  His  essence, 
is  also  found  in  Spinoza.  But  to  consider  it  as  a  source  of 
influence  is  exaggerating. 

I  want  to  direct  attention  to  another  point  of  contact 
between  Crescas  and  Spinoza,  which  brings  the  possible 
influence  into  a  more  favourable  light.  It  is  the  relation 
of  the  attributes  to  the  essence  of  God.  Crescas  teaches 
the  infinite  perfection  of  God,  and  the  absolute  unity  of 
His  essence,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  we  predicate  essential 
attributes  of  Him,  for  in  His  infinite  essence  they  are  all 
one.  It  is  true  that  he  does  not  make  clear  in  what  way 
these  essential  attributes  are  to  be  understood  ;  they  do  not 
express  His  essence,  for  His  essence  cannot  be  conceived 
by  us,  but  nevertheless  are  positive  and  essential.  It  may 
be  that  in  his  insisting  that  the  essence  of  God  is  not  con- 
ceived by  us,  he  means  to  say  that,  while  these  attributes 
are  essential,  yet  they  are  not  to  be  understood  as  final ; 
but  our  conception  of  them  is  incomplete.  For  instance, 
we  predicate  knowledge  as  an  attribute,  but  we  do  not  know 
what    kind    or  what   degree  of  knowledge   He  possesses. 

'•'^  Korte  Verhandeling,  pp.  274-92.  ^^  7^/^?.,  p.  292. 


TO   THE    EXISTENCE   OF   GOD   AND    HIS   ATTRIBUTES      73 

Similarly,  Spinoza  teaches  the  infinite  perfection  of  God,^'' 
and  that  He  possesses  infinite  attributes,^^  all  of  which 
constitute  one  being.  What  Spinoza  means  by  attributes 
was  a  matter  of  great  controversy,  but  the  interpretation 
of  Fischer  ^^  is  the  correct  one.  According  to  it,  the  infinite 
attributes  are  infinite  forces  of  God  and  not  different 
substances.  Since  the  attributes  are  infinite,  it  follows  that 
the  human  mind  will  never  know  all  of  them,  and  so  the 
essence  of  God  is  not  conceived  fully.  The  attributes 
known  by  us  are  thought  and  extension.  We  see,  therefore, 
that  in  spite  of  the  widely  separating  gulf  between  the  two 
systems,  there  is  still  a  marked  similarity  in  the  basic 
conception  of  the  attributes.  Both  teach  infinite  perfection, 
infinite  unity  in  spite  of  the  positive  content  of  the  attri- 
butes, and  the  incomplete  knowledge  of  the  essence.  Of 
course,  I  am  not  blind  to  the  differences  of  their  teachings. 
Spinoza  emphasizes  that  the  attributes  of  extension  and 
thought  express  the  essence  of  God  as  forces,  and  as  such 
are  fully  conceived  by  man.  Crescas,  on  the  other  hand, 
would  shrink  in  horror  from  such  a  conception.  But  such 
differences  are  due  to  the  different  nature  of  Spinoza's 
system,  which  is  wholly  divergent  from  that  of  Crescas,  as 
far  as  the  God  of  a  religious  man  is  from  the  God  of  a 
philosopher.  Yet  they  afford  points  of  similarity,  especially 
at  the  base  of  their  systems  where  the  variance  is  at  its 
minimum.  It  can  almost  be  said  that  Spinoza's  system 
is  only  a  result  of  carrying  out  Crescas's  principles  to  their 
extreme  logical  conclusion.  It  will  be  best  illustrated  in 
the  chapters  on  the  relation  of  God  and  the  world,  for  it  is 
there  that  the  real  divergence  is  evident. 

s«  Epistola  XL.  07  Def.  6  ;  Ethics,  I. 

^^  K.  Fischer,  Spinoza,  pp.  380-92. 


74   CRESCAS'S  TREATMENT  OF  THE  PROBLEMS  RELATING 

We  see,  then,  that  in  spite  of  Fischer's  contention 
against  any  possible  influence  of  Crescas  on  Spinoza  there 
are  to  be  found  traces  of  marked  likeness  between  them. 
We  must  not  forget  that  when  we  say  influence  we  do  not 
mean  that  the  latter  actually  followed  the  former,  or 
anything  to  that  effect;  what  it  signifies  is  a  thought 
impulse  and  a  pointing  in  a  certain  direction.  That 
Spinoza  read  Crescas  carefully,  and  not,  as  Fischer 
maintains,  was  only  imperfectly  acquainted  with  him,  we 
have  shown  above.  I  wish  to  remark  that  Fischer  is  not 
entirely  just  to  Crescas  by  saying  of  him,  '  Denn  selbst  die 
Einheit  Gottes  ist  bei  ihm  kein  Object  der  Erkenntnis, 
sondern  der  Offenbarung',  and  using  this  fact  as  an 
argument  to  disprove  the  influence  of  Crescas  on  Spinoza. 
I  presume  that  Fischer  means  by  the  words  '  die  Einheit 
Gottes '  the  numerical  unity  of  God,  for  the  essential  unity 
was  demonstrated  by  Crescas  as  clearly  as  by  Spinoza. 
But  even  in  regard  to  the  former,  it  was  already  mentioned 
(cp.  above)  that  Crescas's  remark  in  that  regard  should  be 
taken  with  reserve,  and  that  it  is  only  a  polemic  expression. 
In  reality,  numerical  unity  of  God  is  established  according 
to  Crescas,  since  he  posits  the  infinite  potence  of  God. 
Of  course,  Spinoza  deduces  unity  with  great  accuracy  from 
the  mere  definition  of  God  ;  but  the  difference  of  deduction 
in  the  two  systems  in  regard  to  a  certain  point  does  not 
prove  that  it  is  impossible  for  one  system  to  have  influenced 
the  other.  It  is  only  religious  sufficiency  that  prevented 
Crescas  from  following  up  his  own  definition  and  reaching 
the  same  conclusion. 

In  concluding  his  theory  of  attributes  Crescas  discusses 
a  few  emotional  qualities  which  are  to  be  attributed  to  God. 
The  discussion  is  interesting,  both  by  the  novelty  of  the 


TO   THE   EXISTENCE   OF   GOD   AND    HIS   ATTRIBUTES      75 

conception,  as  well  as  by  the  interpretations  of  the  emotions, 
Aristotle  teaches  the  happiness  of  God,  and  deduces  it  in 
the  following  manner.  We  must  attribute  to  God  the 
highest  activity  which  is  no  higher  thing  than  contemplation, 
and  since  we  humans  feel  pleasure  and  happiness  in  thought, 
it  follows  that  God  who  is  eternally  active,  namely  con- 
templative, and  the  quality  of  His  contemplation  being  of 
the  highest  and  purest  kind,  must  necessarily  be  always 
happy.^^  Such  a  conception,  says  Crescas,  is  untenable, 
and  is  based  on  a  false  theory  of  emotions.  Joy  and  sorrow, 
or  pleasure  and  pain,  are  contraries,  and  consequently  fall 
under  the  category  of  action.  They  really  do  not  depend 
on  knowledge,  but  on  will.  Pleasure  is  only  the  gratification 
we  derive  from  the  carrying  out  of  our  will.  Pain,  on  the 
other  hand,  is  the  feeling  we  experience  when  our  will  is 
obstructed.^"**  If  we  do  experience  joy  in  our  knowing, 
it  is  because  there  is  a  will  to  know,  and  by  attaining 
knowledge  we  overcome  the  obstacle  to  our  will.  It  will 
be  evident,  therefore,  that  as  far  as  God  is  concerned  we 
cannot  attribute  any  happiness  to  Him.  His  knowledge 
has  no  limitations,  and  there  are  no  obstructions  to  His 
will.  When  we  humans  experience  any  pleasure  at  con- 
ceiving a  certain  thing,  it  is  because  that  conception  was 
not  known  to  us,  and  in  overcoming  the  obstacle  we 
experience  a  sense  of  pleasure.  But  in  regard  to  God 
such  a  mode  is  inapplicable:  whence,  then.  His  happiness 
at   knowing  ?      Crescas   asserts,  therefore,  that    if  we   do 

S5  Metaph.,  XII,  7;  Ethics,  y.. 

'"»  pvnn  nn:jnnn  xin  2vym  pv-ino  nu-iy  rhw  hjj^n'  r\r\^y^r\  >3 

C^CDJ  nivysn  nni,  Or  Adonai,  p.  27  a.  Just  to  know  how  modern  this 
theory  of  emotions  is,  we  have  but  to  compare  the  views  on  pleasure  and 
pain  of  the  English  psychologist,  E.  G.  Stout,  in  his  Manual  of  Psychology, 
chapter  on  Pain  and  Pleasure. 


76      CRESCAS'S   TREATMENT   OF   THE    PROBLEMS    RELATING 

attribute  happiness  to  God  it  is  because  of  His  love.  God 
is  voluntarily  the  cause  of  all  being,  and  since  we  know 
that  existence  is  goodness,  it  follows  that  in  so  far  as  God 
is  voluntarily  the  cause  of  being.  He  is  voluntarily  good. 
The  continuation  of  the  existence  of  beings  is  then  the 
continual  emanation  of  His  goodness.  It  is  evident,  then, 
that  in  so  far  as  God  continually  emanates  His  goodness 
and  perfection  voluntarily,  in  so  far  He  loves  the  emanation 
of  goodness  necessarily,  and  it  is  this  action  of  emanating 
permeated  with  love  that  is  described  as  joy  or  happiness.^°^ 
This  happiness  or  joy  is  essential  to  God,  for,  as  we  have 
seen,  it  is  inherently  connected  with  His  being  the  cause 
of  things  and  the  continual  emanation  of  His  goodness 
and  perfection.  We  cannot  help  but  express  our  admira- 
tion for  such  a  high  ethical  conception  of  the  happiness 
of  God,  in  comparison  with  which  the  Aristotelian  as  well 
as  the  Spinozistic  (as  will  be  shown)  pales  as  regards  the 
glow  of  ethical  warmth. 

In  regard  to  the  relations  of  Crescas  and  Spinoza  on 
this  point  of  Amor  Dei,  Joel  lays  great  stress  on  the 
influence  exerted  by  the  former  on  the  latter.  The  Amor 
Dei  intcllectJtalis  has  two  meanings:  the  love  of  man 
towards  God,  and  that  of  God  towards  man ;  but  we  have 
to  defer  the  former  to  a  later  discussion,  where  the  relation 
of  God  and  man  will  be  discussed,  and  occupy  ourselves 
at  present  with  the  latter.  Joel  contends  that  Crescas's 
love  of  God  is  not  far  from  the  teaching  of  Spinoza  that 
God    loves    Himself  with    an   infinite    intellectual    love.^"^ 

1"!  Nin  3"s'  mn  n^iDi   \xr\i  nwi'K'ni  aiono  vi^^^'^^  non  r\ir\ 
pvin  nmy  rhw  r\ir(^T\  Nini  rroro.  yyi^Oin  r\'^i^z'rv\  r\i'o>v,r\  nniN, 

Or  Adonai,  I,  27  a-b. 

102  Ethics,  V,  XXXV,  Proposition. 


TO   THE    EXISTENCE   OF   GOD   AND    HIS   ATTRIBUTES      77 

It  seems  to  me  that  Joel  exaggerates  a  little.  There  is, 
no  doubt,  a  similarity  in  language,  but  the  content  is  quite 
different.  That  of  Crescas  is  voluntaristic,  that  of  Spinoza 
is  intellectual  in  essence.  Pleasure,  according  to  Spinoza, 
is  a  transition  from  a  lesser  to  a  greater  perfection,^*^"  and 
since  pleasure  is  a  self-conscious  feeling,  knowledge 
necessarily  accompanies  it.  Again,  perfection  itself  is  only 
knowledge,  for,  according  to  the  whole  Spinozistic  system, 
true  ideas  have  an  adequate  object,  and  whatever  is  false 
can  surely  not  be  perfection.  Love  is  pleasure  accompanied 
by  the  idea  of  an  external  cause.^°*  The  external  is  only 
necessary  as  far  as  human  beings  are  concerned,  the  idea 
of  cause  is  the  main  necessary  condition.  It  follows, 
then,  that  since  God  is  absolutely  infinite  and  necessarily 
possesses  infinite  perfection,  for  reality  and  perfection  are 
synonymous,^°^'*  He  rejoices  in  that  perfection.  Furthermore, 
this  rejoicing  is  accompanied  by  the  idea  of  Himself,  for 
God  possesses  that  idea,^°^  which  is  the  idea  of  His  own 
being  as  a  cause,  and  this  is  what  is  meant  by  intellectual 
love.  We  say,  therefore,  that  God  loves  Himself.  But 
since  in  God  there  is  not  only  the  idea  of  His  essence,  but 
also  of  that  which  follows  necessarily  from  His  essence,^"^ 
and  under  this  all  beings,  and  men  especially,  are  meant, 
it  follows  that  in  so  far  God  loves  Himself  He  loves  man.^°^ 
We  have  seen  the  principal  features  of  this  Spinozistic 
love  of  God,  and  it  is  evident  that  its  content  is  materially 
different   from   that  of  Crescas.      On    its    emotional    and 

i"3  Ethics,  Part  III,  Definition  of  Emotions  II. 

1"*  Ibid.,  Definition  of  Emotions  II. 

i"5  Ethics,  II,  Definition  VI.  '"^  jbi^^^  Proposition  III. 

"^  Ibid.,  Proposition  III. 

!"«  Ethics,  V,  Proposition  XXXV,  Corollary. 


78      CRESCAS'S   TREATMENT   OF   THE    PROBLEMS   RELATING 

formal  side  it  approaches  Aristotle's  view,  which  also  makes 
the  happiness  of  God  consist  in  thinking,  and  Himself  the 
subject  of  His  thoughts.  But  there  is  essential  difference, 
this  is  the  idea  of  cause.  It  is  not  the  act  of  thought  that 
makes  up  the  rejoicing,  but  the  being  a  cause  and  ground 
of  all  being.  This  is  the  fundamental  difference  that  widely 
separates  the  two  conceptions.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is 
this  same  idea  of  cause  that  forms  a  point  of  contact  with 
Crescas's  view.  The  latter  states  that  in  so  far  as  God 
is  a  cause  of  existence  He  loves  the  good,  for  existence 
is  a  continual  emanation  of  good  and  perfection.  But, 
again,  there  is  a  fundamental  difference ;  Crescas  excludes 
all  knowledge  from  that  love.  On  the  other  hand,  according 
to  Crescas's  theory  of  emotions,  which  by  the  way  is  a  very 
true  one,  pleasure  is  not  connected  with  knowledge,  but 
with  will.  And  also  in  regard  to  God's  love  or  happiness 
he  in.sists  on  will.  With  Spinoza,  however,  will  is  entirely 
omitted;  the  mechanical  or  necessary  conception  takes 
the  ascendancy;  knowledge  and  reality  are  the  principal 
ingredients  in  the  teaching  of  Spinoza. 

We  may,  therefore,  conclude  that  while  the  Crescasian 
and  Spinozistic  views  on  the  love  of  God  have  a  basic 
point  of  contact,  yet  they  are  totally  different  in  their 
content ;  the  first  is  an  emotional-voluntaristic,  the  other 
a  strongly  intellectual.  There  is  a  possibility  that  the  term 
love  of  God,  if  not  directly  borrowed  from  Crescas,  is  at 
least  influenced  by  his  use  of  it,  as  the  term  love  does  not 
precisely  describe  the  idea  which  Spinoza  wishes  to  convey 
by  it.  There  are  some  critics  who  score  Spinoza  severely 
for  his  introducing  the  conception  of  Amor  Dei,  and 
point  to  the  difficulty  involved  in  speaking  of  God  as 
self-loving,  as  if  He  were  composed  of  subject  and  object. 


TO   THE   EXISTENCE   OF   GOD   AND    HIS   ATTRIBUTES      79 

They  assert  that  the  conception  is  contradictory  to  the 
fundamental  Spinozistic  doctrines."^  But  this  discussion 
is  beyond  our  point  of  interest.  The  real  point  of  gravity 
of  that  question  is  the  Amor  Dei  of  man,  but  this  is 
reserved  for  the  next  chapters.  In  general,  I  wish  to  say 
that  I  do  not  intend  to  minimize  the  influence  of  Crescas 
upon  Spinoza.  On  the  contrary,  I  believe  that  both  systems 
afford  many  points  of  contact,  and,  furthermore,  that  their 
source  is  really  one,  except  that  they  run  in  divergent  lines. 
It  is  possible  to  find  a  goodly  number  of  likenesses,  but 
they  are  never  commensurable.  To  this  point  more  space 
will  be  devoted  in  the  coming  chapters. 

103  See  K.  Fischer  in  his  Spinoza,  p.  573. 


PART  II 

GOD   AND   THE  WORLD 


W. 


CHAPTER   III.     INTRODUCTORY. 

Opinions    held    by   the   Pre-Maimonidian  Jewish 

Philosophers  concerning  the  Problems  of 

Omniscience,  Providence,  and  Freedom 

of  the  Will. 

The  problem  of  the  freedom  of  the  will  presents  one 
of  the  most  interesting  aspects  in  the  history  of  human 
thought.  Its  roots  lie  far  back  in  antiquity.  It  arose  out 
of  the  peculiar  position  that  man  holds  in  the  domain  of 
nature,  and  at  the  moment  that  self-consciousness  appeared 
in  man  and  enabled  him  to  reflect  upon  the  surrounding 
world,  and  his  own  personality  as  related  to  it.  Man 
represents  a  puzzling  riddle  unto  himself.  On  the  one 
hand,  he  feels  himself  to  be  the  master  of  things,  the  lord 
of  being ;  on  the  other,  contemplation  teaches  him  that 
he  is  only  a  part  of  that  great  mysterious  environment 
called  nature.  Furthermore,  this  nature  is  not  a  haphazard 
conglomeration  of  things  and  events,  but  there  is  a  kind 
of  succession  and  sequence,  law  and  order,  and  to  which 
even  he,  nolens  volens,  must  submit  himself.  The  develop- 
ment of  religion  simply  changed  the  aspect  of  the  problem. 
It  placed  man  in  conflict  with  the  will  of  the  gods,  instead 
of  with  the  blind  natural  force.  With  polytheism,  however, 
the  gods  were  not  strong  enough  to  replace  entirely  the 
G  a 


84    OMNISCIENCE,    PROVIDENCE,    AND    FREEDOM    OF   WILL 

old  something  that  rules  over  the  destiny  of  man,  now 
known   by  the   name  of  fate,  and   were  even  themselves 
supposed  to  be  dominated   by  it.      Homer   says,  'When 
the  hour  of  fate  comes  for  man,  even  a  god  is  helpless,  no 
matter  how  much  he  loves  him  '.""  Herodotus  goes  farther, 
and  asserts  that  a  God  is  not  able  to  avoid  it."^     Thus 
the  problem  becomes  a  much  discussed  subject  in  ancient 
thought ;  and  it  can  really  be  said  that  out  of  this  dual 
character  of  a  man's  position  there  developed  Greek  ethics 
with  its  special  emphasis  upon  contemplation  and  thought. 
With   the   rise   of  monotheism,  positing   a   being   all- 
powerful,  all-wise,  and  all-knowing,  the  problem  became 
more  acute.   How  in  the  face  of  such  a  being,  in  comparison 
with  which  man  dwindles  into  insignificance,  can  man  save 
his   personal    freedom?      It  ought  by  the   nature   of  the 
conception  of  God  to  be  given  up.     Yet  peculiarly  enough, 
the  first  monotheistic  religion  not  only  did  not  reject  the 
freedom   of  the   will,  but  incorporated   it  as  a  dogma."^ 
The  story  of  the  receiving  of  the  ten  commandments  as 
described  in  the  Bible,^^^  as  well  as  the  term  covenant  used 
innumerable  times  to  designate  the  process  of  receiving 
the  Law,  implies  plainly  that  man  is  free  and  that  the 
Israelites  were  entirely  at  liberty  to  reject  the  Law  of  God. 
The  idea  of  freedom  is  repeated  many  times  in  the  Bible.^^* 
One    may   argue   that   the   monotheistic    conception   was 
probably  loose  with  the  Hebrews  in  the  early  times,  yet 
none  can  accuse  the  Hebrew  prophets,  especially  the  later 
ones,  of  a  lack  of  pure  monotheism,  and  in  spite  of  it  the 
freedom    of  the  will  is  asserted  by  them  with  the  same 

110  Iliad,  XVII,  446.  I'l  Herodotus  I,  97. 

112  Dr.  D.  Neumark,  ^NlC^n   nnp''yn   nH/in,  I,  pp.  81-6. 
"3  Exod.  rg.  10,  "*  Deut.  30-  i9- 


IN    PRE-MAIMONIDIAN    JEWISH    PHILOSOPHY  85 

vigour  as  the  unity  of  God.^^'^  It  is  rather  a  curious  fact 
that  the  problem  of  the  compatibility  of  the  freedom  of 
the  will  with  that  of  God's  omniscience  and  providence 
is  never  found  in  prophetic  writings.  There  are  some 
allusions — in  the  Psalms — to  the  problem  of  injustice, 
namely,  why  the  righteous  suffer  and  the  wicked  prosper.^^'' 
and  quite  a  discussion  of  it  in  Rabbinic  literature/^'^  but  the 
problem  as  a  whole  was  never  touched  upon. 

However,  it  was  bound  to  crop  up.  With  the  rise 
of  scientific  philosophic  reflection  in  Judaism,  and  the 
manifestation  of  the  desire  to  base  religious  dogmas  on 
philosophic  principles,  the  monotheistic  conception  had 
to  be  carried  to  its  logical  conclusion,  and  as  a  result 
the  problem  of  the  relation  of  man  and  God  appeared 
in  its  full  vigour,  and  demanded  a  solution.  A  similar 
process  was  going  on  in  the  Mohammedan  world.  The 
Koran,  preaching  the  purest  and  most  abstract  monotheism, 
and  carrying  it  to  logical  conclusions,  presents  a  decided 
predestinarian  aspect,  though  some  endeavour  to  find 
vestiges  of  free  will  in  it.^^^  But  human  reason  and 
philosophic  speculation  felt  indignant  at  such  a  conception, 
and  revolted  against  it.     This  brought  about  the  rise  of 

"5  Cp.  Micah  6.  8. 

"•^  Ps.  37.  25,  26,  as  well  as  the  contents  of  the  whole  chapter,  which 
seems  to  be  intended  as  an  answer  to  the  problem  of  injustice.  The  problem 
itself  is  stated  by  Jeremiah  in  a  rather  bold  way  when  he  asks  (Jer.  12.  i), 
1:2  nia  b:>  "l^'C*  nn!?V  Q'V^'i  tit  ynO  ;  also  job  grapples  with  the 
problem,  and  cries  out,  i6  DN*  HDS^  n^D^)U^  ^JD  V^l  ^2  mnJ  pN* 
Nin  ''O  N1DN  '  the  earth  is  given  into  the  hands  of  the  wicked  :  he  covereth 
the  face  of  the  judges  :  if  not,  where  and  who  is  he?'  (Job  9.  24). 

'"  Berakot  7  a. 

1^*  Prof.  Guyard  in  his  book  on  *  Abd-er  Razzaquu  et  son  traite  de  la 
predestination  et  du  libra  arbitre',  quoted  by  L.  Stein  in  his  IVilletzsfreilieit, 
P-  3- 


86    OMNISCIENCE,    PROVIDENCE,    AND    FREEDOM    OF   WILL 

the  sects   and  various   doctrines,  attempting  the  solution 
of  the  problem  in  one  way  or  another.^^^ 

The  first  who  dealt  with  the  problem  in  Jewish  philo- 
sophy was,  as  might  be  expected,  Saadia.  Saadia  says, 
Man  is  free  in  his  actions,  and  there  is  no  intervention 
on  the  part  of  God.  This  fact  is  proved  by  the  evidence 
of  sense,  of  reason,  and  of  tradition.  We  see  in  daily  life 
that  man  is  master  of  himself;  he  speaks  or  is  silent  at  will, 
does  a  number  of  other  things  or  refrains  from  doing  them, 
and  never  conceives  that  anybody  can  restrain  him  in  acting 
according  to  his  wish.  This  evidence,  though  it  may  seem 
superficial  to  us,  carried  a  certain  amount  of  conviction 
to  Saadia,  who,  following  the  Mutazilites,  attached  great 
importance  to  conception,  for  whatever  can  be  conceived 
is  real,  and  the  contrary,  whatever  is  not  conceived  does 
not  possess  any  reality."^2o  Hence  the  emphasis  laid  by 
Saadia  on  the  fact  that  man  conceives  and  that  accordingly 
he  is  free.  Reason  testifies  to  freedom.  First,  it  is  proved 
that  it  is  impossible  for  one  act  to  be  produced  by  two 
ao'ents.  If  God  interfered  in  human  actions,  it  would  be 
the  effect  of  two  agents,  God  and  man.  Secondly,  if  God 
forces  man  to  do  a  certain  act,  what  reason  would  there 
be  for  his  punishment  or  reward?  The  believer  and 
the  atheist  would  be  on  an  equal  footing.^ ^i     ^g  foj.  ^he 

rhipi^'i  ninanc  nnoi  ^Dii'n  imoi  cmcn,  Emmwth  ivedcoth,  ed. 

Josefow,  1885,  p.  64  b. 

120  Cp.  Introduction,  sect.  3. 

t2i  Emunoth  Wedeoth,  p.  65  a.  Aristotle  offers  similar  arguments  to  prove 
his  assertion  that  man  is  the  originator  of  things.  He  says :  '  Testimony 
seems  to  be  borne  both  by  private  individuals  and  by  lawgivers,  too,  in  that 
they  chastise  and  punish  those  that  do  wrong,  while  they  honour  those  who 


IN    PRE-MAIMONIDIAN    JEWISH    PHILOSOPHY  87 

objection  on  traditional  grounds,  he  quotes  a  number  of 
verses  to  that  effect. 

The  problem  arises  then,  How  is  it  possible  to  conceive 
freedom  of  human  action  and  at  the  same  time  prescience 
of  God  ?  If  God  knows  beforehand  that  man  will  rebel 
against  His  will,  does  it  not  follow  eo  ipso  that  man  must 
act  in  this  fashion,  for  otherwise  God's  knowledge  is  not 
perfect  ?  Saadia  replies  that,  in  reality,  the  supposed 
conclusion  does  not  follow.  God's  knowledge  is  not  the 
cause  of  human  actions.  Were  it  the  cause,  we  should 
have  to  grant  that  man's  actions  are  predestined,  for  God's 
knowledge  is  eternal,  and  necessarily  the  effects  would  be 
determined,  but  the  case  is  not  so.  It  is  true  that  He 
knows  beforehand  the  events  that  are  going  to  happen, 
but  He  knows  them  in  their  true  light.  God  knows  which- 
ever way  man  is  going  to  select,  yet  His  knowledge  does 
not  have  any  causal  relation  to  the  things  which  are  going 
to  happen.  It  is  pure  knowledge  without  any  active  force. 
The  fact  that  the  things  happen  in  the  future  and  He  knows 
them  beforehand  does  not  bear  on  the  subject,  for  His 
knowledge  is  above  temporal  accidents.  There  is  only  one 
time  existing  in  regard  to  God,  and  that  is  the  present. 
If  one  will  ask,  How  is  it  possible  that,  if  God  knov\s 
a  man  is  going  to  speak,  yet  he  could  have  chosen  to  be 
silent  ?  to  this  the  reply  is  made,  that  had  he  kept  silent 
God's  knowledge  would  have  taken  cognizance  of  the  fact, 
for  God  knows  the  way  man  will  choose  after  deliberation.^-- 

By  way  of  illustration,  we  may  compare  the  prescience 

act  rightly'.  Of  course,  here  the  reference  is  not  to  theological  authoritj', 
but  political ;  however,  the  force  of  the  argument  is  the  same.  Nk.  Ethics, 
III,  V. 

12-  Eiimnoth  U'ecieoth,  p.  65  a-b. 


88    OMNISCIENCE,    PROVIDENCE,    AND    FREEDOM    OF   WILL 

of  God,  as  Saadia  conceived  it,  to  a  man  standing  on  a  very 
high  mountain,  and  from  this  exalted  position  he  views  an 
exceptionally  long  row  of  men  passing  by;  some  have 
passed,  some  are  passing,  and  some  will  pass.  He  sees 
them  all.  for  his  position  is  very  elevated,  but  his  seeing 
is  not  the  cause  of  their  passing.^23  However,  we  cannot 
help  admitting  that  a  shrinkage  in  God's  prescience  has 
been  assumed  by  Saadia.  As  a  result,  objections  to  his 
theory  have  been  raised  by  later  religious  philosophers.^^! 
But  Saadia  was  very  zealous  to  save  human  freedom,  and 
some  sacrifice  had  to  be  made.^^s  j^g  problem  of  the 
compatibility  of  the  providence  of  God  with  the  freedom 
of  the  will  is  not  treated  by  Saadia  definitely.  It  seems, 
nevertheless,  from  the  whole  tenor  of  his  book,  that  he 
believes  in  the  existence  of  such  a  providence,  for  how 
could  he  not  believe  it?  It  is  found  in  the  Bible.  There 
are,  however,  some  passages  bearing  on  the  subject.  In 
one  of  them  it  is  stated  that  the  events  that  happen  to  man 
are  through  Divine  causality,  but  at  the  same  time  they 
are  partly  caused  by  man  himself,  namely,  that  some  come 
as  a  punishment  for  his  previous  choice.^'*^  The  question 
still  remains  open.  Are  the  events  predestined  to  happen 
simultaneously  with  God's  prescience  of  them,  or  is  it  that 
God  causes  them  to  happen  after  the  human  actions  have 
taken  place  ?     But  no  such  discussion  is  found. 

Bahia,  as  an  ethical  philosopher,  and   a   man  imbued 

123  Commentary  to  Emunoth  IVcdeoth,  ad  locum. 

124  Albo  says  that  Saadia's  view  is  almost  tantamount  to  the  opinion  that 
denies  God  any  knowledge  of  possibles. 

125  The  early  Christian  fathers  encountered  a  similar  difficulty,  and 
followed  the  same  path.  So  did  Origen  allow  a  kind  of  narrowing  of  God's 
prescience.     Y'lscher,  History  of  Christian  Dogma,  io6. 

126  Eninnoth  JVedcot/i,  66  b. 


IN    PRE-MAIMONIDIAN    JEWISH    PHILOSOPHY  89 

with  religious  feeling,  does  not  devote  much  discussion 
to  this  difficult  problem  in  its  philosophical  aspect.  The 
conflict  between  freedom  and  prescience,  and  the  logical 
contradiction  resulting  from  the  full  conception  of  the 
former,  are  hardly  brought  to  light.  The  problem  is  rather 
viewed  from  the  aspect  of  Providence.  He  does  not  call 
it  the  problem  of  freedom  and  necessity,  but  of  necessity 
and  justice.  The  point  of  gravity  is,  How  can  we  conceive 
Divine  justice  in  distributing  reward  and  punishment  when 
human  actions  are  pre-ordained  ?  Bahia  puts  forth  several 
solutions  to  the  problem.  Some,  he  says,  have  denied 
Providence  in  regard  to  human  actions,  and  asserted  that 
man  is  entirely  free,  thus  saving  the  justice  of  God.  Some, 
on  the  other  hand,  have  given  up  freedom,  but  as  for  justice 
they  denied  the  possibility  of  the  human  understanding 
to  grasp  it.  Some  admit  Providence  in  human  actions, 
excepting  such  as  pertain  to  right  and  wrong.  In  such 
acts  choice  is  left  to  man.  This  is  really  the  traditional 
view  expounded  in  the  Talmud. ^-'^  It  is  also  the  one  that 
Bahia  follows.  He  feels,  however,  that  the  problem  is  not 
solved  yet,  that  there  are  points  which  demand  a  solution, 
especially  prescience ;  this  last  is  not  even  mentioned  by 
name,  but  it  is  surely  meant  by  the  following  explanation. 
Just  to  cover  all  difficulties,  Bahia  adds  that  the  ways  of 
God  are  hidden  from  man,  and  human  understanding  cannot 
conceive  the  way  God's  justice  works  in  the  universe.^"^^ 
It  must  be  admitted  that  this  solution  of  the  problem  is 
hardly  a  philosophical  one.      Bahia's  distinction  between 

'2'  -i"nD  noxp  ab  pn:»'i  y:^n  i^>ni  ....  .T^y  Nnn  no  ir  nsD 

D'^OL*'     nXT'O     )"in     D-CC     "l^a     ^^n   .    .    .    .   WJn,  Nlddah  i6b;  also 
Berakot  33  b. 

1-*  Hobot  lia-Lebabot,  pp.  131-32. 


90    OMNISCIENCE,    PROVIDENCE,    AND    FREEDOM    OF    WILL 

human  and  Divine  knowledge  does  not  carry  with  it  the 
speculative  characteristics  which  attend  that  of  Maimonides, 
who  offered  a  similar  suggestion  (cp.  infra).  It  is  simply 
a  blind  resignation  of  a  believer  to  the  dogmas  of  belief. 

Halevi  treats  the  problem  of  freedom  in  an  accurate 
and  philosophical  manner.  He  asserts  that  human  actions 
are  possible  and  not  necessary,  and  proves  it  from  the 
general  belief  of  man.^^'  Halevi  always  laid  great  emphasis 
on  the  generality  of  an  idea  and  the  consensus  omnmm. 
As  for  the  conflict  of  freedom  with  God's  providence, 
Halevi  evades  it  by  asserting  that  there  are  two  kinds  of 
Divine  causality,  direct  and  indirect.  As  examples  of  the 
first  kind  may  serve  such  things  as  the  order  of  the  universe, 
the  way  and  manner  of  the  composition  of  all  living  being, 
the  genera  of  the  vegetable  kingdom,  and  all  such  pheno- 
mena that  eo  ipso  testify  to  the  plan  of  a  wise  maker. 
As  an  instance  of  the  second  kind,  we  may  quote  the 
burning  of  a  log  of  wood  by  fire.  The  immediate  cause 
of  this  phenomenon  is  easily  explained  ;  but  this  cause  has 
another  cause,  and  so  on  until  we  finally  reach  the  first 
cause,  still  the  connexion  is  not  a  direct  one.  We  have 
then  a  fourfold  division  of  events,  divine,  natural,  chance- 
wise,  and  elective  or  choice-wise.^^°  The  Divine  are  those 
that  must  be  referred  immediately  to  Divine  attention, 
such  as  have  been  mentioned.  The  natural  arise  through 
mediate  causes  (nvyvON  nuD),  but  with  an  end  in  view. 
The  chance-wise  arise  also  through  mediate  causes,  but 
with  no  particular  order  or  design.     The  elective  are  those 

12''  Kusari,  ed.  Isaac  Metz,  Hamburg,  1838,  p.  119. 

13"  (Corrected  by  Zifrinowitsch  in  his  edition,  p.  120,  "IVpn    DNV)      3"lpri 

D^nn3D  IN.     Cp.  for  a  similar  division  the  Physics  of  Aristotle,  II,  5-6. 


IN    PRE-MAIMONIDIAN    JEWISH    PHILOSOPHY  9I 

of  which  the  human  will  is  the  cause.  Freedom  is  one  of 
the  mediate  causes.  We  have  then  a  twofold  system 
of  Divine  causality,  the  immediate  and  the  mediate.  The 
mediate  through  the  causal  nexus  returns  to  God,  but 
the  connexion  is  a  loose  one,  no  force  is  exerted  and  man 
is  free  to  choose.^^^  Divine  providence  is  thus  saved,  for 
all  events  revert  to  Him  indirectly.  Halevi  goes  on 
polemizing  against  those  that  deny  the  possible.  He  argues, 
If  man  has  no  choice  in  acting,  but  is  forced  to  perform 
the  act  by  the  sequence  of  events,  why  then  do  men  display 
greater  anger  at  the  one  who  injures  them  willingly  than 
at  the  one  who  does  so  wnwillingly  ?  Are  not  all  human 
actions  involuntary  ?  ^^^ 

In  regard  to  the  problem  of  the  compatibility  of  the 
prescience  of  God  with  freedom,  Halevi  does  not  add 
anything  original,  but  follows  Saadia  and  the  Mutazilites,^^^ 
in  asserting  that  the  knowledge  of  an  event  beforehand 
is  not  the  cause  of  the  realization  of  that  event.  Halevi 
lays  a  great  deal  of  stress  on  the  middle  causes  (cp.  above). 
His  ethics  thus  receives  a  contemplative  aspect.  The  middle 
causes  are  powerful  influences,  and  it  is  necessary  to  know 
which  to  choose  and  which  to  obviate.^^^  The  natural 
causes  are  necessary,  but  yet  there  is  a  possibility  by 
a  knowledge  of  facts  to  obstruct  their  results  and  avoid 
them.  Halevi  admits  a  special  kind  of  Providence,  for 
in  his  division  of  events  there  is  one  class  of  Divine  action  ; 
and  there  is  nothing  preventing  God  from  interfering  at 

131  Ktizari,  p.  120.     The    idea    of  the    mediate    causes  was   known    in 
antiquity  by  the  Stoics.     Cp.  L.  Stein  in  his  Willensfreilteit.  p.  no,  note  175. 

132  Kitzari,  p.  120. 

133  Halevi  alludes  directly  to  the  Muta'ziliah  in  that. 

134  Kitzari,  p.  122. 


92    OMNISCIENCE,    PROVIDENCE,    AND    FREEDOM    OF    WILL 

certain  occasions,  and  effecting  sometliing  immediately- 
even  in  a  world  of  mediate  causes.  He  evades,  however, 
the  problem  of  injustice.  It  is  possible,  he  says,  that  if  we 
were  able  to  penetrate  and  follow  up  the  long  series  of 
causes,  we  might  discover  the  reasons  why  the  righteous 
suffer  and  the  wicked  prosper,  but  this  is  really  beyond 
human  intelligence.  We  must,  therefore,  rely  on  the 
knowledge  of  God  and  His  justice,  and  admit  our  own 
shortcomings.^^'^ 

Abraham  Ibn  Daud,  the  first  Aristotelian  in  Jewish 
philosophy,  is  a  strong  supporter  of  the  freedom  of  the 
human  will.  In  fact,  it  is  his  principal  ethical  foundation. 
He  says,  Man  possesses  the  possibility  to  do  evil,  and  the 
stronger  the  inclination  is  in  a  certain  man,  the  harder 
the  struggle  to  overcome  that  inclination,  the  higher  the 
value  which  is  attached  to  the  virtuous  act.^^°  He  utilizes 
the  doctrine  of  the  twofold  Divine  causality,  but  it  is  hardly 
possible  that  he  borrowed  it  from  Halevi,  as  he  evidently 
did  not  know  him.^-''''  Most  likely  both  derived  it  from 
a  common  source. ^^^  In  regard  to  the  problem  of  prescience 
and  freedom,  Ibn  Daud  solves  it  in  a  very  simple  manner. 
He  concedes  that  God's  foreknowledge  is  undecided  in 
regard  to  the  exact  way  man  will  act.  He  knows  before- 
hand that  certain  actions  will  be  presented  to  human  choice, 

135  (Zifriiiowitsch  pnv2)  nvs  nuDH  3n3   m^nn  nbi'^tr   n-csNi 

ipn\*i,  p.  125. 

136  Emunah  Ramah,  ed.  Weil,  Frankfurt  a   M.,  p.  97. 

137  In  the  introduction  to  the  Emunah  Ramah,  p.  2,  Ibn  Daud  mentions 
that  he  read  Saadia's  book  as  well  as  Ibn  Gabirol,  but  makes  no  mention 
of  the  Kiisari.  This  goes  to  prove  that  he  was  unacquainted  with  it,  for 
otherwise  he  certainly  would  have  mentioned  it. 

138  On  this  subject  there  is  a  difference  of  opinion  between  D.  Kaufmann. 
Attributenlelire,  p.  279,  and  Stein  in  his  Willcnsfreiheil,  p.  20,  note  43. 


IN    PRE-MAIMONIDIAN    JEWISH    PHILOSOPHY  93 

but  not  which  way  he  will  choose.^^^  Ibn  Daud  is  also 
radical  in  his  theory  of  Providence.  According  to  him 
it  extends  only  to  the  universals,  namely,  as  far  as  things 
are  connected  with  the  order  of  the  universe,  but  not  to 
the  particulars.  He,  however,  excepts  the  human  genus, 
an  exception  which  we  find  later  in  Maimonides.  He 
introduces  also  an  ascending  scale  of  Providence,  even  in 
regard  to  this  genus.  Those  that  strive  more  in  the 
knowledge  of  God  and  the  principles  of  reason  are  especially 
looked  after.'*°  The  question  of  the  existence  of  evil  in 
the  world  is  answered  by  Ibn  Daud  by  negating  its  reality. 
There  is  no  evil  in  the  world  ;  God  is  the  cause  of  good 
only.  The  answer  is  often  repeated  in  Jewish  as  well  as  in 
general  philosophy.  We  shall  meet  it  in  a  modified  form 
also  in  Spinoza. 

issi  Emiinah  Raniali,  p.  96. 

"o  ^•ij'iJNn  pmi  'hb:^2  D^iyn  nr  niNvron  nmc^n  D^najn  D^Dvyh 
'^^'\>tirh  ininr  -ins  an  iiy^cn  nnjOTn  nnv^  d^jd  b  ^y  n^n^  dim 

V^N   inn,  Ibid.,  p.  97. 


CHAPTER   IV 

Maimonidks'  View  and  Crescas's  Comments. 

Maimonides,  the  chief  conciliator  between  theology 
and  philosophy  in  Jewish  thought,  devotes  much  space 
to  the  elucidation  of  the  problem  discussed  in  the  previous 
chapter,  as  well  as  to  its  solution  in  all  its  aspects. 
Maimonides,  as  his  predecessors,  distinguishes  between 
the  first  cause  of  events  and  the  proximate  ones.  The 
proximate  ones  he  divides,  as  those  before  him,  into  natural, 
chance-wise,  and  choice-wise.^*^  Choice,  however,  is  the 
exclusive  gift  of  man  who  is  endowed  with  a  special  faculty. 
Maimonides  introduces  a  distinction,  already  made  by 
Aristotle,'*^  between  instinctive  willing  which  is  only 
a  result  of  desire,  and  human  choice.^*^  He,  however, 
does  not  connect  choice  with  reason  as  much  as  Aristotle 
does.  Maimonides,  as  a  theologian,  attributes  it  to  a  direct 
act  of  the  will  of  God.  Just  as  God  willed  that  fire  should 
tend  upwards  and  earth  downwards,  so  did  He  institute 
that  man  should  be  master  of  himself,  and  his  actions 
should    be   in    his    own    hands.^**      He,   like    Ibn    Daud, 

1*1  Moreh,  II,  cli.  48;  Guide,  p.  222. 

*^-  Moral  choice  is  plainly  voluntary,  but  the  two  are  not  coextensive, 
voluntary  being  the  more  comprehensive  term  ;  for  first,  children  and  all 
other  animals  share  in  voluntary  action,  but  not  in  moral  choice.  Ethics, 
III,  2.  113  b. 

D''"'n   hv^  "IXC'D   "inX   JIVI   ^"yor^   nriNn,   Monk,   II,  ch.  48.     Notice  the 
distinction  between  DIN  HTHa  and  D^''n   "'^yn   p^*"1. 

i^<  Code,  Div.  i,  Teshubah  (Penitence  ,  ch.  5,  4  ;  Guide,  III,  8. 


MAIMONIDES     VIP:VV    AND    CRESCAS  S    COMMENTS  95 

recognizes  the  inclination  in  man  to  do  evil,  and  therefore 
assumes  freedom  as  a  standard  of  actions ;  the  more  the 
struggle,  the  higher  the  worth  of  the  ethical  action.  Since 
free  will  was  instituted  in  man  by  the  will  of  God,  it  may 
on  special  occasion  be  taken  away  from  man,  such  as  we 
find  in  the  case  of  Pharaoh. ^^"^  This  case  is  well  known  to 
all  theological  philosophers,  Christian  as  well  as  Jewish."" 
Of  course,  such  a  possible  limitation  will  not  be  pleasing 
to  the  upholder  of  absolute  free  will. 

In  regard  to  the  Divine  knowledge,  Maimonides,  after 
polemizing  against  some  of  the  philosophers  who  wanted 
to  limit  it,  asserts  that  God  is  omniscient  and  nothing  is 
hidden  from  Him."^  In  this  connexion,  Maimonides 
remarks  that  great  phrlosophers  of  the  pre-Aristotelian 
period  accepted  the  doctrine  of  omniscience.  He  refers 
to  the  book  De  Regimine,  by  Alexander  of  Aphrodisias, 
where  their  opinions  are  quoted.  The  only  one  to  whose 
opinion  we  find  a  distinct  reference  is  Socrates.  In 
Xenophon's  Memorabilia  he  is  quoted  as  preaching  that 
the  gods  know  all  things,  what  is  said,  what  is  done,  and 
what  is  meditated  in  silence."^  Maimonides  further  asserts 
that  this  knowledge  is  eternal.  The  problem  then  appears 
in  full  vigour,  How  are  we  to  reconcile  the  freedom  of 
man  with  this  prescience?  The  answer  to  this  problem 
Maimonides  finds  in  his  Theory  of  Attributes  (cp.  above)."' 
Maimonides  conceives  the  Divine  attributes  in  a  negative 
way,  and  says  that  when  applying  the  same  attributes  to 
God  and  man,  we  use  them  in  an  absolute  homonymous 

I'S  Chapters  of  Maimonides,  ch.  8,  ref.  to  Exod.  7.  3. 

i^«  Origen,  De  Priiicipiis,  III,  i,  grapples  with  this  problem. 

1"  Guide,  III,  16.  "*  Memorabilia,  I,  i.  19. 

"9  Chapter  2. 


96  MAIMONIDES     VIEW    AND    CRESCAS  S    COMMENTS 

way.  This  theory  contends  that  it  is  absolutely  impossible 
for  the  human  mind  to  grasp  the  meaning  of  the  attributes 
applied  to  God.  Since  the  attribute  of  prescience  forms 
no  exception,  the  difficulty  is  solved.  The  problem  arises 
only  when  we  conceive  knowledge  in  the  human  sense. 
With  man,  knowledge  is  correlative  with  fact.  Applying 
the  same  conception  by  analogy  to  that  of  God,  it  follows 
that  God's  prescience  ought  to  agree  with  the  fact,  otherwise 
it  contradicts  itself.  But  since  we  do  away  with  that 
analogy  and  assert  that  His  knowledge  is  different  in  kind, 
the  difficulty  disappears.  God  knows  things  beforehand, 
yet  the  possible  still  remains. ^^°  This  teaching  is  not 
merely  a  concession  of  ignorance,  but,  as  mentioned, 
grounded  in  the  theory  of  attributes.  God's  knowledge 
is  not  a  separate  thing  from  His  essence  but  connected 
with  it,  and  just  as  the  essence,  it  is  unknown.  In  the  act 
of  human  knowledge  we  distinguish  the  yiD  yiT*  yTf,  the 
knower,  the  known,  and  the  knowledge  itself,  but  with  God 
He  is  all  three  in  one.^^i 

As  for  the  question  of  Providence,  Maimonides  treats 
it  in  detail.  He  quotes  four  different  opinions,  and  then 
adds  his.  The  first  is  the  Epicurean,  denying  Providence 
entirely.  The  second  is  the  Aristotelian,  in  the  garb  of 
Alexander  of  Aphrodisias,^^^  namely,  that  Divine  providence 
ceases  at  the  sublunar  world.  But  as  Providence,  even 
in  regard  to  the  spheres,  consists  mainly  in  their  preserva- 

150  Guide,  III,  ch.  20. 

'^1  Chapters  1-8.  A  similar  use  of  the  homonymous  theory  is  made  by 
Spinoza,  Cogitata  Metaph.,  VI,  9.  It  is  interesting  to  compare  with  the  last 
Fischer's  note  24  in  his  Anlia>ig  to  Spinoza. 

152  As  for  Aristotle  himself,  it  is  doubtful  whether  he  ever  expressed  any 
opinion  on  the  subject.  See  Jules  Le  Simon  in  his  Ehtde  dc  la  Theodicee  de 
Platon  et  Aristote,  p.  100  f. 


MAIMONIDES     VIEW   AND   CRESCAS  S   COMMENTS  97 

tion,  it  filtrates  also  to  a  certain  degree  to  the  sublunar 
world,  in  so  far  as  the  genera  are  endowed  with  perpetual 
preservation.  The  third  is  that  of  the  Ash  aria— extremists 
on  the  orthodox  side  of  the  Kalamitic  movement — assuming 
perfect  subjection  of  the  universe  and  its  beings  to  the 
Divine  will,  denying  chance  and  choice.  The  fourth  is 
that  of  the  Mutazilites,  positing  freedom,  and  Divine 
justice  and  Providence  at  the  same  time.  They  went  so 
far  in  their  conception  of  justice,  according  to  Maimonides, 
that  they  extended  reward  even  to  animals  for  their  being 
killed.^^^  The  fifth  is  his  own,  which  according  to  him 
agrees  with  the  Jewish  tradition.  Divine  providence 
extends  in  the  sublunar  world  to  the  human  species  only. 
The  other  beings  are  subjected  to  chance  or  natural  law. 
However,  he  admits  that  the  genera  of  other  beings  have 
a  kind  of  providence  in  so  far  as  the  natural  law  originates 
from  God.^^*  As  it  is  evident,  the  Maimonidian  theory 
differs  from  the  so-called  Aristotelian  only  in  attributing 
Providence  to  the  human  species.  The  reason  for  the 
exception  is  found  in  the  possession  by  the  human  genus 
of  the  mind,  which  is  a  means  of  conveyance  for  Divine 
emanation.  It  follows,  therefore,  as  we  noticed  in  Ibn  Daud, 
that  the  one  who  is  more  intellectually  perfect  should 
receive  more  attention  from  Providence.^^^ 

Note. — Objections  to  this  last  assertion  have  been  raised 
by  many  religious  thinkers,  and  with  justice.  Among  the 
thinkers  is  also  the  Karaite  Aaron  Ben  Elijah  in  Es  Hayim. 

12b   DINH   pD   '•C'N'n   nTH   b^J   Dnno  ^'-l,  il/on-//,  ch.  17. 

1^*  Guide,  III,  ch.  17.     For  a  certain  inadequateness  in  his  exposition  of 
the  Mutazilistic  teaching  see  Stein,  Die  Willensfreiheit,  p.  86. 

"5  Guide,  III,  17,  18. 

W.  H 


98  MAIMONIDES'    VIEW   AND    CRESCAS's   COMMENTS 

The  chief  critic,  however,  is  Crescas  himself.  This  question 
will  be  discussed  in  detail.  I  have  also  omitted  for  the 
present  the  Maimonidian  theory  of  origin  of  evil,  as  well 
as  some  philosophic  arguments  for  the  denial  of  prescience 
and  Providence  quoted  by  Maimonides.  These  are  dis- 
cussed at  length  by  Crescas,  and  should  be  taken  in 
connexion  with  his  own  solutions  as  they  form  a  part 
of  his  theory. 

Crescas  on  Prescience. 

Crescas,  as  a  foundation  to  his  discourse  on  the  subject, 
posits  three  principles,  which,  according  to  him,  agree  with 
and  are  necessitated  by  tradition.  These  are  (a)  the  infinite 
science  of  God,  (d)  His  prescience,  (c)  that  His  foreknow- 
ledge of  the  possible  event  does  not  change  the  nature  of  it. 
He  proceeds  then  to  analyse  the  philosophical  doubts  that 
arise  in  connexion  with  such  conceptions,  and,  as  usual, 
reproduces  them  first.  First,  if  God  knows  the  events 
happening  in  this  world,  it  follows  that  God  is  being 
perfected  by  this  knowledge,  for  it  has  been  established 
that  knowledge  is  a  kind  of  perfection  ;  but  such  conclusion 
is  absurd,  for  how  can  the  absolute  Perfect  be  perfected 
through  the  knowledge  of  inferior  things  ?  Second,  since 
it  is  known  that  the  mind  in  conceiving  things  becomes 
identified  with  the  concepts  and  assimilates  them  to  its 
essence,  it  follows  that  there  will  result  a  multiplicity  in 
God's  essence,  for  the  things  are  many.  The  third  and 
fourth  arguments  attack  God's  assumed  knowledge  of 
particulars.  There  were  two  current  philosophical  opinions 
in  regard  to  the  Aristotelian  conception  of  the  matter. 
The  first  denied  entirely  God's  knowledge  of  anything 
external   to  Himself.     (This  seems   to  be  the  right  one, 


MAIMONIDES     VIEW   AND    CRESCAS  S   COMMENTS  99 

cf.  above,  Introduction,  IV.)  The  other,  following  Alexander, 
admitted  the  knowledge  of  universals.^^*^  Particular  things 
can  be  conceived  only  through  their  matter  and  passive 
intellect,  but  God  has  no  matter ;  it  follows  that  He  cannot 
conceive  the  particular  things.^^'^  Again,  particulars  are 
temporal,  and  whatever  relates  to  time  is  an  accident  of 
motion  ;  but  God  is  above  motion  and  time,  He  therefore 
does  not  know  of  the  particulars.  Finally,  the  positing 
of  Divine  science  of  the  world's  affairs  is  untenable,  as  the 
disorder  in  the  natural  sphere  and  the  existence  of  evil 
in  human  aiTairs  testify.^^^ 

These  are  the  objections  to  the  general  principle  of 
positing  God's  knowledge  of  the  world's  affairs.  There 
are  several  objections  especially  to  several  of  the  specific 
principles,  namely,  the  infinite  science  of  God  and  His  pre- 
science. How,  asks  the  opponent,  can  God's  knowledge  be 
infinite?  Is  not  knowledge  a  comprehensive  and  determining 
thing?  How,  then,  can  the  infinite  be  comprehended  or 
determined  ?  There  is  then  a  contradiction  in  terms.  Again, 
prescience  seems  to  be  impossible.  Real  knowledge  of  a  thing 
implies  that  the  object  known  exists,  for  in  what  consists 

15°  Gersonides,  Milhamot,  III,  i,  p.  120. 

157  All  these  objections  are  also  found  arranged  in  a  similar  order  in 
Gersonides,  Milhamot,  III,  2.  However,  we  notice  in  Crescas  a  more  logical 
arrangement.  It  is  not  necessary  that  he  borrowed  them  directly  from 
Gersonides,  though  the  contents  and  form  are  similar.  These  objections 
were  current  in  the  thought  of  the  age.  Some  of  them  are  also  mentioned 
by  Maimonides.  In  the  third  objection  there  is  a  digression  by  Crescas 
which  deserves  some  notice.  It  is  the  first  with  Gersonides.  He  says  that 
the  particular  is  conceived  through  the  hylean  power  such  as  sense  and 
imagination.  Crescas  substitutes  matter  instead  of  sense.  That  would  agree 
with  the  Aristotelian  conception  of  individuality  which  consists  in  matter, 
for  it  is  this  that  gives  the  uniqueness  since  form  is  general  to  genus. 
Metaph.,  XII,  8. 

15^  Or  Adonai,  p.  29  a. 

H  2 


lOO        MAIMONIDES'   VIEW   AND    CRESCAS's    COMMENTS 

the  truthfulness  of  a  conception  of  things  if  not  in  the  fact 
that  the  mental  conception  of  a  thing  agrees  with  the  object 
existing  outside  of  the  mind  ?  ^^^  Furthermore,  if  we  grant 
that  God  does  know  things  before  their  occurrence,  a  change 
in  His  knowledge  is  necessitated.  Before  they  occur  He 
knows  them  as  future  happenings,  after  that  as  past.  And 
since  the  mind  essence  changes  with  the  concepts,  there 
will  then  be  a  change  in  His  essence,  but  this  is  impossible. 
The  assumption  that  the  existence  of  possible  future  events 
is  compatible  with  the  prescience  of  God  is  also  assailed. 
If  we  posit  that  God  knows  before  the  realization  of  one 
of  the  two  possible  aspects  of  a  future  event,  and  at  the 
same  time  we  assert  that  the  opposite  aspect  is  possible 
of  occurrence ;  then  while  in  His  prescience  the  opposite 
is  still  conceived  as  possible,  after  the  action  occurs  the 
possibility  is  removed  and  a  change  in  the  Divine  knowledge 
necessarily  effected.  Moreover,  the  assumption  that  God 
knows  whichever  aspect  is  going  to  occur  proves  to  be 
untenable,  for  with  a  possible  event,  in  as  far  as  it  is 
possible,  either  side  may  be  assumed.  Suppose,  then, 
that  we  assume  the  opposite  side  of  that  of  which  God  is 
prescient,  existing,  if  so  absurdities  would  result,  (a)  a  change 
in  His  knowledge,  (d)  a  falsity  in  it.  If  that  cannot  be  the 
case,  the  possible  is  done  away  with  and  God's  prescience 
involves  the  necessity  of  human  actions.'^*^ 

After  reproducing  at  length  all  the  objections,  which, 
as  remarked,  are  identical  with  those  quoted  by  Gersonides 
in  his  book  Milhainot  (The  Battles  of  the  Lord),  Crescas 
quotes  also  the  Gersonidian  solution,  though  not  mentioning 

1^^  Cp.  Locke's  definition  of  knowledge  in  Essay  oti  Human  Understanding, 
Bk.  4,  ch.  I. 

160  Or  Adonai,  Tr.  II,  p.  29a. 


MAIMONIDES'    VIEW   AND    CRESCAS  S   COMMENTS       lOI 

him  by  name.     The  objection   may  be   answered  in   the 
following  manner :    The  first  which  involves  the  question 
of  God's  perfection  disappears  when  we  consider  that  the 
existence  of  other  beings  arises  through  God's  existence, 
and  also  conceived  through  His   own  conceptions.      His 
knowing  other  beings  would  not  mean  then  an  additional 
perfection,  for  He  knows  them  through  the  general  order 
of  things  (^^Dn  nno),  the  principle  of  which  is  in  Himself.^^^ 
The  second,  raising  the  objection  of  multiplicity,  is  solved 
by  the  same   conception.     Since   God   knows  the  general 
order  which  emanates  from  Himself,  and  this  order  unites 
all  the  different  things  (for  though  things  are  different  in 
certain  respects  they  are  also  connected  in  a  certain  aspect 
and  perfect  each  other).  He  then  knows  the  particulars  from 
their  side  of  unity.     In  the  same  manner  the  third  doubt 
is  refuted.     It  is  founded  on   the  principle  that  in  order 
to  know  the  particulars  God  must  possess  hylic  powers, 
but  though  we  grant  the  validity  of  the  principle  it  does 
not  follow  that  God  should  not  know  the  particular  things 
through  their  general  conceived  order  wherein  their  unity 
is  manifested.     The  doctrine  of  the  inherence  of  things  in 
the  general  order  also  meets  the  fourth  objection,  basing 
itself  on  the  fact  that  particulars  are  in  time,  while  God 
is  above  time,  for  God's  conception  of  the  general  order 
does  not  depend  upon  time.     The  fifth,  the  question   of 
evil,  is  deferred   for  future  discussion.     Again,  the  other 
doubts,   named    by  Crescas   partial,  are   also    met.      The 
difficulty  of  knowledge  being  infinite  (cp,  above),  it  is  done 
away  with  by  removing  the  infinite.     Things  are  infinite 
in   their   differentiation    but   not   in    their    unity.^^^      The 

161  Milhnmoi,  III,  4;  Or  Adonai,  p.  29  b. 

16-  The  words  in  the  text,  both  in  Gersonides  and  Crescas,  are  p^tJ'IO  "IHO, 


I02         MAIMONIDES     VIEW   AND    CRESCAS  S   COMMENTS 

general  order  preconceived  by  God  is  finite.  In  the  same 
way  the  two  objections  raised  against  prescience  (cp.  above) 
are  righted.  Since  God  knows  things  through  their  general 
order  which  emanates  directly  from  Him,  the  things  are 
already  existing,  and  surely  there  is  no  change  in  the 
knowledge  itself.  If  God  knew  the  particulars  in  as  far  as 
they  are  particulars,  that  is  from  the  point  cf  their  differ- 
entiation, that  change  would  be  implied,  but  He  knows 
them  from  their  general  order,  and  this  is  not  changed. 
Finally,  the  most  difficult  question  is  solved  ;  this  is  the 
question  of  the  existence  of  the  possible  in  spite  of 
prescience.  Possible  events  have  two  aspects,  and  may 
be  preordained  in  one  way,  and  possible  in  the  other. 
From  the  aspect  of  general  order  of  events  they  are 
determined,  but  from  the  aspect  of  human  choice  they 
are  indetermmate.  God  knows  these  things  only  so  far 
as  they  are  possible,  but  He  does  not  know  which  side 
of  the  possibility  will  be  realized.  It  is  evident,  therefore, 
that  when  Gersonides  speaks  of  possible  things  as  being 
determined  by  the  general  order,  he  means  that  only  their 
possibility  is  determined  but  not  their  realization.^*'" 

Crescas,  in  resuming  the  foregoing  discussion,  points 
out  that  the  reasoning  of  those  philosophers — still  not 
mentioning  any  name — compel  us  to  posit  two  principles : 
(i)  God  knows  the  particulars  only  through  their  general 
order  ;  (2)  God  knows  only  that  certain  things  are  possible, 
but  not  the  manner  of  their  realization.  From  these  two 
conceptions  there  follows  necessarily  a  third  one.  God 
does  not  know  of  the  happenings  of  one  of  the  possible 

which  means  literally  conceived  arrangement,  i.e.   division    into   genera. 
But  the  concept  of  genus  implies  alwrays  the  notion  of  unity. 
163  Milliamot,  III,  4;  Or  Adonai,  pp.  295-303. 


MAIMONIDES'   VIEW   AND   CRESCAS  S   COMMENTS        I03 

sides,  even  a  posteriorly'^^  Were  He  to  know  of  the  fact, 
a  change  in  His  knowledge  would  be  implied.  Before  the 
occurrence  of  the  event  He  knew  of  it  only  as  a  possible, 
and  after  it  as  actual.  Crescas  sees  in  such  an  assumption 
a  shrinkage  of  God's  science,  a  dangerous  doctrine,  and  sets 
out  in  his  acute  manner  to  refute  it.  These  philosophers, 
he  says,  have  not  solved  the  doubts  at  all.  In  spite  of 
their  insisting  on  unity  by  positing  that  God  knows  things 
through  the  unified  aspect,  namely,  the  general  order,  these 
philosophers,  according  to  Crescas,  have  not  succeeded  in 
removing  multiphcity.  True  knowledge  consists  in  knowing 
things  through  all  their  causes,  mediate  or  immediate. 
Knowledge  of  composed  things  then  would  be  perfect  only 
when  the  elements  of  which  they  are  composed  would  be 
conceived  by  the  knower,  for  the  elements  are  causes 
of  things,  but  the  elements  are  many,  there  follows  then 
that  the  knower  must  conceive  the  manifold.  Again,  even 
if  we  grant  that  existing  things  form  a  kind  of  unified  order 
of  perfection,  this  will  be  true  only  of  the  broadest  genera, 
such  as  the  division  of  the  kingdoms,  e.  g.  the  vegetative, 
animal,  &c.,  but  considering  the  narrower  genera  or  the 
species,  we  find  that  one  does  not  perfect  the  other,  e.  g. 
the  horse  has  no  relation  of  perfection  to  the  donkey. 
If  we  posit,  then,  of  God  a  knowledge  of  genera,  He  cannot 
escape  conceiving  multiplicity.  Thirdly,  even  if  we  assume 
that  God's  knowledge  is  limited  to  the  spheres  and  in- 
telligibles,  the  difficulty  is  not  solved,  for  though  they 
present  a  certain  unity  they  also  exhibit  differentiation; 
the   knowledge   of  the  differentiating   aspect  would  then 

i<"  T^Dsn  v^n»  nnxn  p^nn  vi^y^^  inNC'  nn  'J  l^jy  cn^  rnriM 

13   nyT*   I?    pX ,  Or  Adonai,  p.  30  a. 


I04        MAIMONIDES'    VIEW   AND    CRESCAS's   COMMENTS 

imply  multiplicity.^*'^  Lastly,  there  is  an  astrological 
argument  directed  chiefly  against  Gersonides,  who  attri- 
butes great  influence  to  the  spheres  and  constellations. 
The  knowledge  of  particulars  by  God  arises,  according  to 
him,  out  of  the  order  of  the  heavenly  spheres,  which  order 
is  due  to  the  various  combinations  of  the  constellations. 
But  the  combinations  may  be  infinite ;  for  the  great  circle 
in  the  sphere  is  a  quantity,  and  it  is  infinitely  divisible. 
It  follows,  then,  that  the  arrangements  can  be  infinite,  and 
so  God's  science  does  not  escape  multiplicity. 

It  is  evident,  then,  that  the  principal  object  in  removing 
the  manifold  from  Divine  knowledge  has  not  been  obtained. 
But  there  is  still  a  greater  error.  The  followers  of  the 
foregoing  theory,  in  their  endeavours  to  put  forth  an  exalted 
conception  of  God,  have  attributed  to  Him  imperfections, 
namely,  finiteness.  If,  as  they  say,  God  does"  not  know 
the  particulars  as  particulars,  it  follows,  since  the  number 
of  particular  things  is  infinite,  that  He  possesses  ignorance 
in  regard  to  the  infinite,  and  that  the  relation  of  God's 
knowledge  to  His  ignorance  is  as  the  finite  to  the  infinite, 
for  the  number  of  things  that  He  does  know  is  finite. 
Again,  if  God  does  not  know  beforehand  which  of  the  two 
possible  sides  of  an  event  will  be  realized,  it  appears,  since 
the  possible  events  are  incomparably  greater  than  the 
necessary  ones,  that  God  is  ignorant  of  most  of  the  hap- 
penings of  the  world.  Lastly,  those  philosophers,  in  order 
to  avoid  the  assumption  of  the  possibility  of  a  change  in 
God's  knowledge,  asserted  that  God  does  not  know  of  the 

165  Q^^^^f2^ri  D^»-in  bb)2r\  -inon  n^-o  ^i;n^^  nmmti's  ':ni 
1)12  n:n  pon  o^a^nno  oni  ir'«s*n  "''•nvj  Dn"'t:^''t<c'  nniDjn  □•'ij^trni 
nn^Dvy  fj^nnna  3"k  nyn\n  DnnNnn  dj^n  pen  D^Di?nn»  en  ncN 

D-yn''   '"\21   n'^nn   122   ]'^2,OrAdonai,  p.  sob. 


MAIMONIDES'   VIEW   AND   CRESCAS's    COMMENTS        105 

result  of  a  possible  happening,  even  as  a  past  occurrence. 
If  this  is  the  case,  we  must  evidently  assume  that  God  is 
ignorant  of  the  greatest  part  of  human  history,  for  in  the 
long  row  of  centuries  thousands  of  possible  actions,  events, 
and  occurrences  were  realized,  and  all  these  things  escaped 
His  knowledge  ;  such  an  assertion  is  certainly  absurd.^^'" 

To  meet  all  these  doubts  and  objections,  Maimonides 
put  up  his  theory  of  the  homonymity  of  the  Divine  attri- 
butes. (See  above  in  the  exposition  of  the  Maimonidian 
theory.)  This  theory  was  severely  attacked  by  Gersonides. 
He  argues  that  it  is  impossible  to  speak  of  absolute 
homonymity  in  regard  to  Divine  attributes.  In  attributing 
to  God  certain  qualities,  and  speaking  of  them  as  belonging 
to  Him,  we  inevitably  borrow  human  conceptions.  The 
case  in  question  furnishes  an  example.  We  conceive 
knowledge  as  a  perfection,  we  attribute  it  also  to  God. 
But  in  this  case  no  absolute  homonymy  is  possible,  for 
when  one  attribute  is  predicated  of  two  things,  it  is  im- 
possible to  be  used  in  an  homonymous  way,  as  it  does  not 
then  convey  the  same  idea.  Again,  when  we  negate  certain 
attributes  in  regard  to  God,  we  do  not  negate  them  in  an 
homonymous  way.  When  we  say,  God  is  not  movable, 
we  do  not  mean  that  His  net  being  moved  and  the  not 
being  moved  of  a  certain  thing  are  absolutely  homonymous, 
for  in  this  case  the  idea  that  we  wish  to  convey  is  not  at  all 
proved.  He  may  be  moved,  and  yet  the  movement  has 
no  association  with  what  we  call  being  moved.  Still  we 
go  on  negating.  Again,  if  all  attributes  are  employed 
in  an  homonymous  way,  why  shall  we  not  say,  God  is 
a  body,  conceiving  it  in  an  absolute  homonymous  way  with 
no  relation  to  what  we  call  body?     Gersonides,  therefore, 

1^*  Or  Adonai,  p.  31a. 


Io6        MAIMONIDES'    VIEW   AND    CRESCAS's   COMMENTS 

assumes  that  all  attributes  and  knowledge  included  are 
said  to  differ  in  their  application  to  God  and  man  only 
in  degree,  but  not  in  kind.  The  Maimonidian  solution 
of  the  problem  of  prescience  and  the  possible  falls  then, 
the  foundation  being  undermined. ^^^ 

Against  the  assailment  of  Gersonides,  Crescas  steps 
forth  as  a  defender  of  Maimonides.  Knowledge  attributed 
to  God  and  man  must  be  in  an  absolute  homonymous  way. 
It  cannot  be  said  that  it  differs  only  in  degree,  for  the  content 
of  any  attribute  predicated  of  things  and  differing  in  degree, 
is  the  same,  no  matter  how  widely  the  degrees  it  may 
connote  in  various  applications  may  differ,  as,  for  instance, 
the  content  of  existence,  which  is  predicated  of  substance 
as  well  as  of  other  things.^*^^  The  contents  in  both  predi- 
cations are  the  same,  namely  being,  but  the  degrees  are 
various ;  substance  exists  through  itself,  while  the  other 
things  exist  through  the  substance.  But  in  speaking  of 
the  knowledge  of  God,  since  His  knowledge  is  a  kind  of 
essential  thing,  and  His  essence  is  different  from  ours  in 
kind,  it  follows  that  the  same  will  be  said  of  His  knowledge. 
It  is  true  that  negatively,  when  conceiving  the  attributes 
under  a  negative  aspect,  namely  knowledge,  denoting  not 
ignorant,  existent,  not  non-existent,  the  contents  are  one 
when  employed  of  God  and  man.  But  when  applying 
these  attributes  in  a  positive  way,  we  must  admit  that  the 
application  is  homonymous.  It  is  evident  from  the  ex- 
position, and  more  so  on  reading  the  original,  that  Crescas 
finds  himself  in  his  defence  in  a  rather  difficult  position. 

"■^  Mtlhamot,  III,  3. 

1^^  The  word  in  the  text  is  JTnON^D,  which  means  literally  Categories, 
but  to  one  who  is  not  acquainted  with  the  Aristotelian  conception  of 
Categories  the  word  here  would  be  confusing. 


MAIMONIDES    VIEW  AND   CRESCAS  S   COMMENTS        107 

He  apparently  contradicts  himself  in  defending  Maimonides, 
and  in  assuming  the  homonymy  theory  he  changes  his  own 
attitude  which  he  expressed  in  his  first  section,^*"''  where  he 
distinctly  states  that  existence,  when  applied  to'  God  and 
man,  is  not  used  absolutely  homonymously,  but  in  a  kind 
of  non-essential  likeness,^''*'  and  he  speaks  definitely  of 
a  difference  in  degree.  However,  the  contradiction  is 
removed  by  his  insisting  on  the  distinction  between  a 
negative  proposition  and  a  positive,  and  claiming  that 
while  the  negative  content  may  have  a  likeness,  the  positive 
which  we  are  going  to  assume  may  differ  absolutely.  Still, 
Crescas  admits  that  it  is  only  defensive,  but  he  himself 
probably  holds  a  different  view.  Towards  the  end  of  the 
argument  he  remarks :  'Be  it  whichever  way,  whether 
following  the  master  (Maimonides)  that  knowledge  is 
applied  homonymously  or  that  there  is  only  a  difference 
of  degree  as  we  say,  and  denotes  an  essential  attribute 
as  we  showed  in  the  third  section  of  the  first  tractate, 
it  remains  for  us  to  solve  the  question  in  a  different  way.' ' '^ 
Crescas  then  proceeds  to  state  his  own  view.  The  real 
and  special  distinction  between  the  knowledge  of  God  and 
ours  is  that  His  knowledge  is  active  and  causal,  and  ours 
derivative.  Through  His  knowledge  and  true  plan  of  His 
will,  the  known  existing  things  have  acquired  their 
existence.     Our  knowledge  is  derived  from  the  existing 

^^'  See  Or  Adoiiai,  I,  sect,  iii,  p.  22  a,  and  supra,  ch.  II,  2. 
^■^^  The  Hebrew  word  is  pIDD ,  which  is  to  be  translated  by  the  whole 
phrase;  cp.  Maimonides,  IVJiin  DVIS,  p-  43. 

n^b  i3n]x  r\^'\y\y  ir:3  imnvy  nxin  ^y  n-ivi  nin-'xi  no'-npa  n»N"'cr 
103  13  p^sD^-j'  no  invo  -\'-\ii  nipDon  -inn3  '^o^•3E^•  ir^y  inb'J 

1  Jly^C ,  Or  Adouai,  p.  32  b. 


Io8        MAIMONIDES'   VIEW   AND    CRESCAS's    COMMENTS 

things  by  means  of  the  senses  and  imagination.^^^  This 
fundamental  difference  will  remove  all  objections.  First, 
in  regard  to  God  it  cannot  be  said  that  knowledge  of 
external  things  adds  perfection,  for  it  is  this  knowledge  that 
causes  the  existence  of  other  things.  It  is  evident,  there- 
fore, that  the  things  themselves  cannot  add  anything  to  their 
cause  since  they  are  dependent  upon  it.  The  difference 
between  Crescas's  point  of  view  and  that  of  Gersonides 
must  be  made  clear  at  the  outset,  as  the  solution  of  the 
first  objection  by  Gersonides  seems  to  be  similar  in 
language.^'^^  Gersonides  also  speaks  of  the  fact  that  the 
existence  of  other  things  is  dependent  upon  the  existence 
of  God,  and  that  God's  conception  of  other  things  is  derived 
through  the  conception  of  His  self.  The  difference  consists 
in  this,  that  Gersonides  left  out  the  voluntary  element ;  the 
God  of  Gersonides,  as  well  as  of  some  others  of  the  Peri- 
patetic followers,  was  to  a  certain  degree  an  imperfect 
personality.  God,  they  say,  is  the  cause  of  existence,  but 
not  directly,  only  through  a  kind  of  emanation  by  means 
of  certain  emanative  beings  which  form  a  channel  of 
causality.  He  knows  the  beings  by  knowing  Himself,  but 
He  knows  them  only  by  means  of  the  general  order; 
the  details  were  left  to  the  other  emanated  beings.  It  is 
this  loophole  that  enabled  Crescas  to  overthrow  the  whole 
Gersonidian  structure,  and  show  its  logical  unsoundness 
(see  his  argument  above).  The  great  failure  of  the  Peri- 
patetic philosophical  theologians  was  that  they  stopped 
midway  between  an  absolute  personality  of  God  and   an 

c^'inn  niy^v:N3  D'^yn-'no  n'):p)  n^ivx  i^nyT'i    .nis^v?^n  D'-yn^n  i3p 

jVlDini,  Or  Adonai,  p.  32  b. 

i'3  Milhamot,  III,  2,  and  exposition  above. 


MAIMONIDES     VIEW   AND    CRESCAS  S   COMMENTS        I09 

absolute  impersonality.  Spinoza  followed  the  last  path, 
and  arrived  at  his  system  where  God  is  not  only  the  cause 
of  the  world  but  also  the  ground;  Crescas  the  first;  and 
both  of  them  succeeded  in  a  certain  way.  Moreover,  several 
of  their  conclusions  are  strikingly  similar,  for  the  principle 
is  really  one,  a  certain  wholeness,  but  of  this  further. 
Crescas  conceives  the  beings  as  arising  not  through 
emanation,  but  through  the  will  and  plan  of  God,  and 
as  every  plan  requires  preceding  knowledge ;  God's  know- 
ledge of  things  therefore  is  causal,  nay,  it  is  creative.  He 
knows  things,  not  because  He  knows  Himself,  but  eo  ipso; 
it  is  through  His  knowledge  that  they  exist.  This  know- 
ledge and  will  are  not  to  be  construed  in  any  gross  form, 
but,  as  has  been  discussed,  they  are  essential  attributes. 
The  second  objection  disappears  also,  for  there  is  no  mul- 
tiplicity implied  on  account  of  the  fact  that  the  known 
things  are  many  and  the  mind  assimilates  and  identifies 
itself  with  the  things  known.  This  objection  may  be  true 
of  a  derivative  mind,  but  not  of  God  who  is  the  cause 
of  the  existence  of  things,  and  thus  knows  them  whether 
one  or  many. 

In  this  way,  God  also  knows  the  particulars  without 
using  the  senses  and  imagination  as  a  means  of  conception, 
for  the  particular  also  acquires  its  existence  through  His 
knowledge.  The  question  of  time,  which  is  raised  by  the 
fourth  objection,  namely,  that  particulars  are  in  time,  is 
removed,  for  even  time  derives  its  existence  from  Him. 
Besides,  Crescas  has  already  shown  (above,  chapter  I)  that 
time  is  not  an  accident  of  motion  but  a  mental  concept. 
The  argument  from  the  existence  of  evil  in  this  world 
is  deferred  for  a  later  chapter.^^'^ 

!■*  Or  Adoiiat,  p.  32  b. 


no        MAIMONIDES     VIEW   AND    CRESCAS  S    COMMENTS 

Crescas  then  proceeds  to  discuss  the  objections  which 
he  terms  partial.  The  question,  How  can  knowledge  com- 
prehend an  infinite  number  of  things?  is  answered  by 
maintaining  that  the  objection  would  be  valid  if  the  know- 
ledge were  of  a  finite  kind  such  as  the  human  is,  but  since 
it  is  itself  infinite  there  is  no  difficulty.  The  contention 
that  God's  knowledge  may  be  infinite  is  strictly  connected 
with  the  possibility  of  the  existence  of  an  infinite  number 
of  effects,  and  this  is  maintained  by  Crescas  (cp.  above, 
chapter  I  of  this  work).  The  second  argument  insisting 
that  foreknowledge  of  a  thing  implies  already  the  existence 
of  the  thing  known,  for  it  is  this  that  constitutes  true 
knowledge,  is  met  by  Crescas  in  the  following  manner. 
The  assertion,  he  says,  is  true  of  human  knowledge  which 
is  derivative,  but  not  of  God's ;  His  prescience  of  a  thing 
that  it  will  exist  is  real  and  true,  for  it  is  that  which  assures 
the  thing  its  existence.  The  other  difficulty  connected 
with  the  question  of  prescience,  the  one  of  change,  namely, 
that  there  is  a  change  in  the  status  of  the  thing  from  being 
a  future  happening  to  a  past  occurrence,  and  therefore  also 
a  change  in  the  knowledge  of  it,  does  not  affect  the  know- 
ledge of  God,  for  He  knows  beforehand  that  at  a  certain 
time  the  event  will  happen.  He  finally  arrives  at  the  most 
difficult  part  of  the  problem,  the  compatibility  of  the 
existence  of  the  possible  with  God's  prescience.  How  can 
we  call  a  thing  possible  when  God  knows  beforehand 
whichever  way  it  is  going  to  happen  ?  Here  Crescas  gives 
us  a  glimpse  of  his  theory  of  an  apparent  or  nominal 
possible.  His  consistency  in  refusing  to  admit  any 
shrinkage  in  God's  prescience  forces  him  to  abandon 
a  great  part  of  the  freedom  of  the  will.     A  thing,  he  says, 


MAIMONIDES'    VIEW   AND   CRESCAS  S    COMMENTS       HI 

may  be  necessary  in  one  way  and  possible  in  another.^^^ 
As  an  example  he  cites  the  knowledge  which  a  man  has 
of  certain  things  that  are  possible  of  existence,  as  most 
things  are.  The  knowledge  that  we  have  of  them  necessi- 
tates their  existing,  for  knowledge  is  an  agreement  of  the 
mental  ideas  with  the  things  existing.  Yet  this  knowledge 
does  not  change  their  nature  of  being  possible  of  existence. 
In  a  similar  way,  the  knowledge  of  God  knowing  the  way 
which  man  will  elect  does  not  change  the  nature  of  the 
possibility.  It  must  be  admitted  that  the  example  is  not 
happily  chosen,  for  human  knowledge  of  things  is  a  posteriori, 
the  possibility  of  the  existence  is  already  a  past  thing, 
while  the  knowledge  of  God  which  we  speak  of  is  a  priori, 
and  the  possibility  is  still  existing.  In  addition,  human 
knowledge  is  not  causal,  while  that  of  God  is,  and  His 
prescience  must  affect  the  future  occurrence,  unless  we 
assume  with  Saadia  that  God's  knowledge  is  not  the  cause 
of  things  ;  but  Crescas  really  argued  the  contrary.  How- 
ever, the  question  is  taken  up  again  in  connexion  with 
freedom  of  the  will,  and  he  solves  it  quite  dexterously. 

It  is  a  mooted  question  whether  Spinoza's  reputed 
impersonality  of  God  is  so  complete  as  many  of  his  inter- 
preters want  to  attribute  to  him.^"''  There  are  others  who 
assert  that  in  spite  of  some  passages  which  lend  themselves 
to  such  an  interpretation,  the  God  of  Spinoza  is  not  entirely 
robbed  of  consciousness.^"''  The  question  what  Spinoza 
meant  by  God's  knowledge  or  intellect  is  dependent  on 
the  previous  conception.     The  language  is  confusing,  and 

"=  nn  nvn  a^njo  "imr,  r\yr\'^  pao  ps*  -i?:wl:'  n?:n  n^  "isnn^  n^ni 
iniJDvya  "lann  3vn  y'rr  iS,  Or  Adonm,  p.  33  a. 

i7f'  Cp.  K.  Fischer,  Spinosa,  p.  366. 

"'  Joel,  Znr  Genesis  det  Lelire  Spinozas,  p.  16. 


112       MAIMONIDES'   VIEW   AND   CRESCAS  S   COMMENTS 

the  passages  often  ambiguous.  It  seems,  however,  that 
a  certain  discrepancy  exists  between  his  earlier  remarks 
on  the  subject  of  Divine  knowledge  in  the  Cogitata  Meta- 
physica  and  that  of  thQ  Ethics.  In  the  former,  his  language 
is  more  in  accord  with  the  philosophico-theological  terms. 
He  attributes  omniscience  to  God,  and  of  singulars  more 
than  of  universals.  In  his  polemics  against  those  that  want 
to  exclude  singulars  from  God's  science,  he  reminds  us  of 
Maimonides  in  denying  any  existence  to  universals.^^^  He 
further  speaks  of  God  being  the  object  of  His  own  thoughts. 
In  the  Ethics,  on  the  other  hand,  in  the  famous  scholium 
to  proposition  XVII  in  the  first  book  of  Ethics,  Spinoza 
remarks,  '  that  neither  intellect  nor  will  appertain  to  God's 
nature',  yet  again,  in  the  same  scholium  he  describes 
the  way  he  attributes  intellect  and  will  to  God  in  quite 
Maimonidian  fashion,  insisting  on  absolute  homonymy  in 
applying  these  attributes  to  God.  Again,  in  a  corollary 
to  proposition  XXXII,  in  the  first  book,  Spinoza  says: 
'  Will  and  intellect  stand  in  the  same  relation  to  the  nature 
of  God  as  do  motion  and  rest  and  absolutely  all  natural 
phenomena.'  This  last  passage  shows  Spinoza's  view  of 
God  to  be  impersonal ;  yet  he  goes  on  to  say  in  the 
scholium  to  proposition  VII,  book  H,  that  '  whatsoever  can 
be  perceived  by  the  infinite  intellect  as  constituting  the 
essence  of  substance  belongs  altogether  to  one  substance '. 
What  the  word  '  perceived '  means  here  is  difficult  to  tell. 
Joel  concludes  that  all  that  Spinoza  means  to  say  in  the 
scholium  is  that  there  is  no  relation  between  the  human 

i'8  Cp.  Maimonides,  Guide,  III,  i8,  and  Cogiiata  Metaph.,  pt.  II,  ch.  7  : 
'  deinde  res  realiter  existentes  Deum  ignorare  statuunt  universalium  autem, 
quae  non  sunt  nee  ullam  liabent  praeter  singularium  essentiam,  cognitionem 
Deo  affingunt '. 


MAIMONIDES'   VIEW   AND   CRESCAS's   COMMENTS        II3 

conception  of  these  attributes  and  their  real  nature  as  they 
exist  in  God.^''^  His  conclusion,  however,  may  be  un- 
justified, but  the  discussion  is  beyond  the  range  of  our 
work. 

What  interests  us  most  are  two  points,  which  bear  a 
decided  resemblance  to  the  theory  of  Crescas.  Spinoza 
speaks  of  the  intellect  of  God  as  the  cause  of  things  both 
in  regard  to  their  essence  and  their  existence.^^°  Things 
arise  because  they  exist  by  representation  as  such  in  the 
intellect  of  God.  It  is  not  clear  what  Spinoza  may  mean 
by  '  representation '.  To  take  it  literally  would  mean 
a  too  great  concession  to  personality,  but  whatever  it 
intended  to  convey,  even  if  we  grant  that  it  may  connote 
the  necessity  of  the  unfolding  of  the  attribute  of  thought, 
the  formal  side  of  it  is  almost  identical  with  the  teaching 
of  Crescas,  which,  as  was  shown,  emphasizes  the  point 
that  the  knowledge  of  God  is  the  cause  of  things  not 
only  through  the  general  order,  but  of  the  essence  of 
all  things.  Again,  Spinoza  repeats  continually  that  the 
intellect  and  the  will  of  God  are  identical.^^^  It  is  exactly 
the  same  teaching  that  we  find  in  Crescas  when  he  says 
that  'through  His  knowledge  and  representation  of  His 
will  the  things  acquired  existence  '.^^^  Such  a  conception 
is  necessitated  when  knowledge  is  conceived  as  an  efficient 
cause,  not  merely  contemplation  as  Aristotle  conceives 
the  Divine  thought  to  be.  It  is  true  that  there  may  be 
a  difference  of  contents  in  these  two  conceptions,  that  of 
Crescas  having  a  voluntaristic  ring,  while  that  of  Spinoza 

1^'  Zur  Genesis  der  Lehre  Spinosas,  p.  18. 

180  Ethics,  Bk.  I,  Prop.  17,  scholium. 

181  Ethics,  Prop.  17,  scholium,  p.  32. 

182  Or  Adottai,  p.  32  b. 
W.  I 


114       MAIMONIDES'   VIEW   AND   CRESCAS  S   COMMENTS 

a  ground  of  causal  necessity,  but  still  the  kinship  of  the 
teachings  cannot  be  denied.  It  is  not  definitely  known 
whom  Spinoza  had  in  mind  when  he  makes  the  statement 
in  connexion  with  the  intellect  of  God  in  the  foregoing 
passage, '  This  seems  to  have  been  recognized  by  those  who 
have  asserted  that  God's  intellect,  God's  will,  and  God's 
power  are  one  and  the  same ' ;  but  that  in  Crescas  this  idea 
is  expressed  clearly  is  evident.  However,  we  shall  return 
to  this  subject  later  in  the  discussion  on  will  and  creation. 

I  wish,  nevertheless,  to  say  a  few  words  concerning 
K.  Fischer's  stand  on  the  subject.  Spinoza,  in  scholium 
to  proposition  VII,  book  II  of  his  Ethics,  in  discussing 
the  unity  of  thinking  and  extended  substance,  remarks: 
'  This  truth  seems  to  have  been  dimly  recognized  by  those 
Jews  who  maintained  that  God,  God's  intellect,  and  the 
things  understood  by  God  are  identical  '.  Fischer,  in 
quoting  this  passage,^^^  does  not  attach  much  importance 
to  any  influence  which  it  may  possibly  indicate,  but  in 
note  34  in  his  Anhang  he  says :  '  Derartige  Vorahnungen 
einer  Identitatsphilosophie  finden  sich  nicht  wie  man 
gemeint  hat  bei  Maimonides,  sondern  bei  Ibn  Esra,  so  in 
dessen  beruhmtem  Satz  (Exod.  24),  nyni  ynv  insb  Nin  ^3 
(He  alone  is  knower,  knowledge,  and  known)'.  Why 
Fischer  should  see  in  this  dictum  the  foreshadowing  of  the 
Spinozistic  identity  of  substances  is  difficult  to  see,  as  well 
as  his  discovery  of  it  in  Ibn  Ezra  alone.  This  identical 
dictum  is  quoted  also  by  Maimonides  in  the  eighth  chapter 
of  his  treatise  known  as  '  The  Eight  Chapters ',  where  he 
says  :  '  It  has  been  explained  that  He,  blessed  be  His  name, 
is  His  attributes,  and  His  attributes  are  He,  so  that  it  is 
said  of  Him  that  He  is  the  knowledge,  the  knower,  and  the 

183  Spinoza,  p.  273. 


MAIMONIDES     VIEW   AND   CRESCAS  S   COMMENTS       II5 

known ;  He  is  life,  living,  and  the  cause  of  His  own  life  '. 
It  was  also  quoted  quite  often  by  the  Arabic  philosophers. 
This  dictum  does  not  contain  any  other  idea  than  the 
Aristotelian  conception  that  God  is  the  object  of  His  own 
thought,  and  it  is  quoted  by  Maimonides  in  this  sense  to 
show  the  difference  between  God's  knowledge  and  that 
of  man,  which  is  something  separate  from  the  subject, 
the  knower.  The  later  commentators  of  Aristotle  inter- 
preted Aristotle  to  mean  that  God  in  thinking  of  His  own 
subject  conceives  ideas  which  are  realized  in  the  world 
as  general  principles,  and  so  He  knows  the  universals. 
It  is  in  this  sense  that  it  was  used  by  Ibn  Ezra,  following 
the  Arabic  philosophers  who  maintained  that  God's  science 
is  only  limited  to  general  order,  but  no  foreshadowing  of 
Spinoza  can  be  seen  in  that  dictum.  If  any  claim  to 
foreshadowing  is  admitted  on  that  basis  alone,  Maimonides 
surely  cannot  be  excluded  from  being  a  forerunner  of 
Spinoza,  as  has  been  shown.  That  the  origin  of  the  dictum 
is  to  be  found  in  the  Aristotelian  conception  of  God's 
thinking  quoted  in  Metaphysics,  XII,  7  and  9,  has  been 
pointed  out  by  L.  Stein.^^*  Vestiges  of  a  Spinozistic 
identity  conception  can  be  found  only  in  Crescas,  but  of 
that  later. 

i8<   IVilknsfreiheit,  pp.  70,  116. 


I  2 


CHAPTER   V 

Providence,  Potence,  and  Free  Will. 

Crescas  posits  that  the  providence  of  God  extends 
also  to  particulars,  yet  it  is  not  entirely  uniform.  It 
presents  rather  a  kind  of  graded  scale.  It  is  in  some 
aspects  generic  and  universal,  and  in  some  way  individual. 
The  general  is  again  subdivided  into  a  more  general  order 
where  the  system  is  natural  law  without  any  particular 
attention  to  the  perfection  of  the  species  or  individual 
included,  and  into  a  special  kind  where  the  perfection 
of  the  unit  is  in  some  way  taken  into  consideration. 
Again,  the  individual  providence,  though  not  in  the  form 
of  natural  law  and  a  kind  of  special,  yet  admits  of  division. 
There  is  some  kind  in  which  the  perfection  of  the  provided 
individuals  is  completely  taken  into  view,  and  some  kind 
in  which  the  relation  of  Providence  to  the  provided  is  not 
so  absolute  in  regard  to  their  perfection.  Crescas  goes 
on  to  exemplify  his  division.  The  general  Providence  is 
seen  in  every  existing  being,  in  its  composition,  natural 
tendencies,  organic  functions,  mental  powers,  and  so  forth. 
Although  these  forces  vary  according  to  the  genus  and  the 
species,  they  are  alike  in  every  individual  of  the  species ; 
we  see,  therefore,  that  natural  laws  are  taken  in  as  a  part 
of  Providence.   The  human  species  is  an  example  of  general 


PROVIDENCE,    POTENCE,    AND    FREE    WILL  II7 

and  special  Providence,  since  it  is  endowed  with  reason. 
It  is  general,  for  every  individual  participates  in  it  alike, 
but  special  at  the  same  time  as  it  is  only  for  that  species 
alone.  Thus  he  goes  on  to  unnecessary  details.  The 
particular  Providence,  in  his  conception,  consists  in  the 
spiritual  reward  and  punishment,  for  the  following  of  an 
ethical  and  religious  life  or  the  opposite.  This  kind  of 
Providence  is  in  complete  relation  to  the  degrees  of  per- 
fection of  the  various  individuals,  and  it  is  arranged  and 
determined  by  God's  eternal  will.^^'  We  observe  here 
already  a  departure  from  the  theories  of  the  Jewish 
Aristotelians  who  emphasized  the  intellect  as  a  means  for 
special  providence,^^^  and  asserted  that  the  higher  man 
ascends  in  the  scale  of  intelligence  the  greater  claim  he 
has  upon  God's  special  interest.  Crescas,  on  the  other 
hand,  asserts  the  practical  and  ethical  value  over  the 
intellectual.^" 

The  problem  of  injustice  in  this  world  is  taken  up  next 
by  Crescas.  It  was  always  a  stumbling-block  to  religious 
thinkers,  and  various  solutions  have  been  offered  for  its 
removal.  Of  these  Crescas  quotes  several.  The  first  is  the 
Maimonidian,  which  denies  the  existence  of  the  problem 
either  by  doubting  the  subject,  namely,  whether  the  righteous 
is  really  righteous  or  only  apparently  so,  or  by  questioning 
the  predicate,  saying  that  the  evil  of  the  righteous  is  for 
the  purpose  ot  the  good,  and  the  good  of  the  wicked  for 
the  purpose  of  evil.^^*^  Both  possibilities  are  objected  to 
"»  Dinpn  liivna  ^2:101  nmiDD  nNin  ^^3:^'^^  nvn  inuo  nihi, 

Or  Adonai,  p.  35  a.  DHp  here  is  to  be  taken  rather  as  eternal  than  pre- 
destined.    Crescas  uses  the  word  often  in  the  sense  of  eternal. 

186  See  above,  chapter  III.  Ibn  Daud,  and  cp.  also  Maimonides  on  this 
point. 

1"  Or  Adonai,  p.  35  a.  "^  Ibid.,  p.  35  b. 


Il8  PROVIDENCE,    POTENCE,    AND    FREE   WILL 

by  Crescas.  The  fact  is  that  we  observe  at  times  that 
evil  befalls  a  man  when  he  acts  righteously,  and  again  when 
the  same  man  turns  to  the  wrong  path  he  succeeds.  This 
turn  of  events  gives  the  case  a  problematic  status,  for 
whatever  the  man  really  is,  not  apparently,  the  results 
ought  at  least  to  follow  in  opposite  directions.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  denial  of  the  predicate  is  contravened  by 
fact,  for  we  find  many  evils  that  befall  the  righteous  with 
no  purpose  for  the  good,  and  the  opposite. 

Again,  the  solution  of  the  quasi-Aristotelians,  which 
is  rather  Neo-Platonic,  that  evil  has  its  origin  in  matter 
and  has  little  to  do  with  God,  is  not  satisfactory,  for  that 
simply  leads  to  admit  a  shrinkage  of  God's  power. 
Gersonides  tried  to  solve  this  question  in  a  peculiar 
manner.^^^  Providence  follows  the  intellectual  scale.  Man 
through  his  reason  and  potential  unity  with  the  active 
reason  stands  in  a  certain  relation  to  God.  The  more  man 
develops  his  mental  powers  the  nearer  he  comes  to  God, 
and  so  is  said  to  be  under  special  Providence.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  one  that  neglects  the  cultivation  of 
the  intellect  is  forsaken.  The  purpose  of  the  special 
Providence  is  to  provide  the  deserving  with  adequate 
causes  to  obtain  the  good.  However,  exceptions  to  the 
rule  occur  very  often,  and  the  cause  of  these  exceptions 
is  the  influence  of  the  spheres.  The  wicked  sometimes 
prosper  because  of  a  certain  sidereal  arrangement.  Again, 
the  suffering  of  the  righteous  may  be  explained  through 
other  causes  also.  As  for  the  influence  of  the  spheres, 
though  in  particular  cases  it  may  be  unjust,  yet  taken  as 
a  whole  it  tends  for  the  good,  preservation  of  the  existence, 

18!*  Crescas  refers  to  Gersonides  by  the  term  I^Mn   JlVpO  'some  ol"  our 
sages',   Or  Adonai,  p.  35b. 


PROVIDENCE,    POTENCE,    AND    FREE   WILL  II9 

and  general  good.  In  this  way  they  tried  to  solve  the 
problem  of  injustice  as  well  as  the  question  of  evil,  how 
they  can  be  related  to  God.  The  evil  is  severed  from  the 
direct  connexion  with  God.  It  befalls  man  when  forsaken 
to  the  natural  order,  caused  by  sidereal  or  spherical 
influence."" 

This  confused  theory  is  justly  rejected,  for  according 
to  it  the  n\ain  emphasis  is  laid  upon  contemplation,  and 
a  man  can  be  as  wicked  as  possible,  yet  by  virtue  of  his 
philosophical  attainments  be  entitled  to  special  Providence, 
which  is  contrary  to  every  religious  principle.  Again,  the 
undue  influence  of  the  spheres  causes  shrinkage  in  Divine 
providence.  Crescas,  therefore,  propounds  his  own  solution. 
It  is  actuated  by  a  deep  religious  motive,  but  at  the  same 
time  by  an  exalted  feeling  which  may  compare  in  depth  to 
the  Kantian  theory  of  ethical  autonomy.  The  real  good  is 
not  the  material  good,  nor  is  the  real  bad  the  material  evil, 
but  the  spiritual.  It  has  been  evidenced  by  experience  that 
practice  of  virtue  brings  about  the  acquisition  by  the  soul 
of  a  tendency  and  inclination  to  virtue,  and  surely  this 
tendency  is  strengthened  if  it  was  there  before.  The  more 
a  man  practises  virtue  under  adverse  circumstances  the 
greater  his  perfection.  It  follows  then  that  when  the 
righteous  suffer  it  is  really  for  their  own  good,  for  by  this 
their  perfection  increases,  and  their  inclination  is  deepened, 
which  is  the  real  good."^     Crescas  does  not  exclude  other 

I90  Milhamot,  IV,  6;   Or  Adonai.  p.  36  a. 

1"  nji3n  i:p'  nibiyanc'  mDVs*n  nonpnn  nnnxn^c'  ins*  djdx  rw^ 
ncsn^  r\h'\  ,'^yyi  r^^'s::^  nm  dn  nnis*  iprn^c'  c'"3i  :;'2n  r\)i\i\>  moi 
by  ^IDi:  r\yoh^  mp  naa  r\y\  ijvd32  ni»y>::'D  dic't  byan  noiiDnc 
N^c'  HM  DSM  r\\r\  innn  y^j^c*  ynn  n^n  n\n>c'  i^s-i  ....  \T\\rhz> 
"nrrxn  bi?::n  n:inc'  nns  -n?::  21d  xm  njn  'ct:^  3iu  in^b^n  .Tnn 

^^L"S2n    N'ln,  Or  Adonai,  p.  37  b. 


I20  PROVIDENCE,    POTENCE,    AND    FREE    WILL 

possibilities  such  as  have  been  put  forth  by  previous 
thinkers,  as  evil  occurring  to  the  righteous  through  an- 
cestral wrongs  ^^^  or  other  causes.  He,  however,  does  not 
succeed  with  the  other  part  of  the  problem,  why  the  wicked 
prosper.  He  resorts  to  the  usual  methods  employed  by 
his  predecessors.  He  remarks,  nevertheless,  that  it  is 
possible  that  the  good  of  the  wicked  is  for  the  purpose 
of  spiritual  badness,  but  it  does  not  work  out  so  well  as 
in  the  first  case. 

The  question  of  the  existence  of  evil  in  this  world  is 
answered  by  him,  that  there  is  not  such  a  thing  in  the 
world.  We  must  observe  here  that  all  these  philosophers 
have  nev^r  reflected  upon  the  natural  evil  which  abounds 
so  much  in  the  external  world ;  they  concentrate  their 
discussions  upon  human  events,  and  though  these  may 
arise  through  natural  agencies,  yet  the  question  of  the 
wherefore  of  such  agencies  of  destruction  has  never  been 
taken  up,  otherwise  they  would  form  a  better  conception 
of  natural  law.  Maimonides  makes  some  remarks  on  the 
subject  attributing  evil  to  the  imperfection  of  matter,  but 
does  not  treat  the  problem  sufficiently.  The  bad  things 
that  befall  the  righteous  have  been  shown  to  be  for  the 
purpose  of  the  good,  and  as  for  the  sufferings  of  the  wicked 
such  a  phenomenon  from  the  point  of  justice  cannot  be 
called  but  good.  Crescas  here  takes  up  a  third  question. 
It  has  been  asked.  How  can  we  say  that  God's  providence 
extends  to  man?'  Is  it  not  a  belittling  of  God  to  speak  of 
Him    as   being   interested   in   man  ?      In   answer  to    this, 

"2  Such  a  solution  of  the  question  was  not  unknown  to  the  ancient 
Greeks.  The  whole  trilogy  of  Oedipus  Rex  and  Antigone  by  Sophocles  is 
interwoven  with  that  idea.  Oedipus  and  his  children  suffer  through  no 
wrong  of  their  own,  but  because  of  the  ancient  curse  on  the  house  of  Laius. 


PROVIDENCE,    POTENCE,    AND    FREE    WILL  121 

Crescas  brings  out  an  interesting  point  in  his  theory.  We 
have  seen,  he  says,  that  God  through  His  will  is  the  cause 
of  the  existing  things  and  their  continual  creation.  But 
there  is  no  will  in  regard  to  a  certain  thing  unless  there 
is  a  certain  desire  or  love  for  the  things  created  by  that 
will.  It  follows,  then,  that  since  there  is  a  love  of  God 
for  the  created  things,  that  those  things  should  be  provided 
no  matter  what  the  actual  causal  relation  is,  whether 
mediate  or  immediate,  for  the  love  of  God  which  is  strictly 
connected  with  His  creative  will  permeates  them  all,  and 
there  is  no  belittling  in  saying  that  God  takes  interest 
in  man.  This  love  of  God  to  His  created  things  does  not 
lay  any  special  emphasis  upon  the  degree  of  contemplation 
the  being  possesses.^^^  This  remark  is  intended  against 
the  Jewish  Peripatetics  who,  as  remarked,  made  speculation 
an  important  step  in  the  ladder  of  Providence.  The 
difference  between  this  kind  of  love  of  God,  which  is  ethical, 
and  that  of  Spinoza's,  which  is  strictly  intellectual,  has  been 
remarked  above.-^^'*  The  interesting  Spinozistic  discussion 
of  evil,  which  resembles  in  some  point  that  of  Crescas,  will 
be  discussed  with  the  question  of  determinism. 

POTENCE. 

Since  it  is  evidenced  by  experience  and  reason  that 
incapacity  is  a  defect  in  God,  it  follows  that  God's  potence 
is  infinite  in  all  respects,  in  whatever  way  reason  may 
conceive  its  existence,  though  experience  may  not  corro- 
borate it.  He  is  omnipotent,  for  would  He  be  limited 
in  one  way,  then  beyond  that  boundary  He  would  be 
incapable,  and  this  is  contrary  to  the  conception  we  have 

193  Of  Adoitai,  p.  38  a,  '"  Chapter  II. 


122  PROVIDENCE,    POTENCE,    AND    FREE   WILL 

of  God.  When  saying  'infinite  in  all  respects',  Crescas 
explains  that  he  means  by  it  the  inclusion  of  several  kinds 
of  infinite."^  There  may  be,  he  says,  an  infinite  in  time 
and  an  infinite  in  strength,  and  he  emphasizes  that  God 
is  said  to  be  infinite  in  both  ways.  He,  however,  expresses 
himself  against  a  blind  and  extreme  conception  of  omni- 
potence. As  it  was  mentioned,  this  infinity  of  potence  is 
bounded  by  reason.  We  cannot,  therefore,  attribute  to  God 
the  accomplishment  of  a  logical  impossibility,  such  as  the 
existence  of  two  contraries  in  one  thing  at  the  same  time. 
Such  a  limitation  is  really  no  contradiction  to  the  concept 
of  omnipotent,  for  the  ability  to  bring  about  the  existence 
of  a  thing  which  cannot  be  conceived  by  reason  is  not 
included  at  all  by  the  word  potence,  and  therefore  the  lack 
of  such  potence  is  not  a  defect.  Likewise,  we  can  affirm 
that  God  cannot  contradict  the  first  axioms,  ni73trinn 
mJltfN-in,  for  their  annulment  would  imply  a  concentration 
of  the  contraries  and  such  things.  He  is,  however,  not 
bounded  by  experience ;  we  cannot  assert  that  God  cannot 
do  such  things  as  are  impossible  according  to  our  ex- 
perience, for  as  long  as  reason  can  possibly  conceive  it, 
it  is  within  His  sphere  of  potency.^^*^ 

In  connexion  with  his  discussion  on  potence,  Crescas 
makes  a  few  remarks  on  Aristotle's  proof  of  the  existence 
of  God  and  the  conception  of  it.  Aristotle,  he  says, 
has  only  proved  through  the  eternity  of  movements  the 
existence  of  an  infinite  separate  force  in  time  but  not  in 
strength.  In  other  words,  the  God  of  Aristotle  is  not 
perfect.      It  is  true  that  the  force  moving  the  sphere  is 

'^=  i:?oc  ni3^n3  'n  )b  n"aanD'  n^b  jmvn  ^3d  r\"22  mos*  djcni 
prnn  n"an  ij?odi  pti  n"22,  OrAdoimi,  p.  40 h. 

"6  Ibid. 


PROVIDENCE,    POTENCE,    AND    FREE    WILL  1 23 

eternal  or  infinite,  but  it  does  not  follow  that  it  can  move 
the  daily  sphere  in  less  than  twenty-four  hours,  and  it  may 
be  limited  by  impotency.  But  the  right  conception  is, 
he  says,  that  there  is  no  relation  between  God  and  the 
things  acted  upon,  for  all  determination  arises  from  a 
certain  relation,  but  when  doing  away  with  that  relation 
He  is  necessarily  omnipotent.  Crescas  goes  on  to  say 
that  the  infinite  potence  in  time  and  strength  is  not  only 
potential  but  actual.  The  attribute  of  potence  is  inde- 
termined,  for  the  foundation  is  only  will,  and  it  is  this  that 
is  meant  by  infinite,  namely,  the  impossibility  of  being 
determined."'^ 

In  comparing  the  Spinozistic  theory  of  potence  with 
that  of  Crescas,  we  notice  a  striking  resemblance  not  only 
in  conception  but  also  in  language.  Spinoza,  as  well  as 
Crescas,  conceives  God  to  be  omnipotent,  and  understands 
by  it,  at  least  in  formal  language,  the  same  thing  as  Crescas, 
that  'He  decreed  things  through  and  purely  from  the 
liberty  of  His  will  '.^'^^  It  reminds  us  directly  of  the  closing 
sentences  of  the  preceding  paragraph,  where  Crescas 
emphasizes  the  relation  of  potence  to  will  and  defines 
God's  infinity  to  consist  in  the  lack  of  determination,  which 
is  exactly  what  Spinoza  means  by  the  liberty  of  His  will."* 
Spinoza  also  quotes  in  several  places  the  fact  that  true 
things  cannot  become  false  by  God's  potence. ^°°  It  is  true 
that  the  contents  of  the  later  (especially  in  the  Ethics) 

!'•'■'  Or  Adonai,  pp.  40  b,  41  a. 

198  <  Nos  vero  qui  iam  ostendimus  omnia  a  decreto  Dei  absolute  dependere, 
dicimus  deum  esse  omnipotentem  ;  at  postquam  intelleximus  cum  quaedam 
decrevit  ex  mera  libertate  sue  voluntatis,  ac  deinde  eum  esse  immutabilem,' 
Cogitata  Metaph.,  Part  II,  9. 

199  Ethics,  Proposition  XVII. 

200  Cogiiata  Metaph.,  ibid.,  p.  493  !  Epistola  XLIII. 


124  PROVIDENCE,    POTENCE,    AND    FREE   WILL 

Spinozistic  conception  of  omnipotence  is  considerably 
different  from  that  of  Crescas.  The  impersonahty  of  it 
and  the  mechanical  interpretation  are  too  patent  to  ignore, 
while  Crescas's  view  is  surely  a  personal  one.  Crescas 
has  not  discussed  the  question  whether  God  could  create 
another  world  or  a  better  one  than  the  present,  a  question 
which  is  discussed  by  Spinoza  at  great  length  in  scholia  to 
propositions  XVII  and  XXXII  in  his  first  book  oi  Ethics, 
and  to  which  he  gives  a  negative  answer ;  but  from  the 
trend  of  Crescas's  thought  it  can  be  inferred  that  he  would 
be  forced,  following  the  logic  of  his  reasoning,  to  assume 
a  similar  view.  If,  as  he  insists,  God  is  indeterminate  and 
infinitely  perfect,  what  then  prevented  Him  from  creating 
that  other  world  unless  we  should  attribute  to  Him 
imperfection.  But  Crescas  really  never  followed  the  logical 
conclusions  to  the  extreme,  but  always  turned  off  at  an 
angle  (as  has  been  remarked  above  in  Chapter  II  concerning 
the  unity  of  God).  The  same  occurred  here  ;  he  uses  his 
definition  of  infinite  potence  rather  to  prove  the  possibility 
of  miracles  and  creatio  ex  nihilo,  which  really  do  not  follow 
logically.     We  shall  return  to  this  subject  once  again. 

Free  Will  and  Determinism. 

Crescas,  in  discussing  the  very  important  question  of 
free  will  and  determinism,  follows  his  usual  method  in 
analysing  all  the  points  pro  and  contra.  The  possible 
("I'J'SSn)  exists,  for  we  observe  that  things  have  a  number 
of  causes,  and  some  of  them  are  cognizable,  others  are 
wanting,  and  it  is  possible  that  all  the  causes  exist  and 
possible  that  some  do  not  exist,  and  since  the  causes  are  only 
possible  then  the  things  themselves  are  also  only  possible. 


PROVIDENCE,    POTENCE,    AND    FREE   WILL  125 

Again,  many  things  are  dependent  on  the  human  will, 
and  it  seems  that  man  is  master  of  himself,  he  can  will 
them  or  not.  Further,  in  the  Physics  of  Aristotle,  there 
is  a  classification  of  events,  and  in  it  are  included  such 
things  as  happen  by  chance  and  by  accident.  If  there 
is  no  existence  of  the  possible,  how  can  we  speak  of  chance 
and  accident?  Finally,  if  the  possible  does  not  exist, 
wherefore  all  the  endeavour  and  diligence  that  man 
displays  in  his  daily  occupations,  of  what  avail  all  the 
preparations  and  studies  and  the  expenditure  of  energy 
in  seeking  the  right  way  to  his  welfare?  All  these  things 
seem  so  natural  and  common  to  the  human  nature  that 
a  denial  of  the  possible  would  contradict  the  fundamental 
principle  of  feeling  and  perception.^"^ 

On  the  other  side,  there  are  many  arguments  against 
the  existence  of  the  possible.  It  was  established  in  the 
Physics  that  all  things  which  are  corruptible  come  into 
existence  only  through  four  causes.  It  follows  then  that, 
since  their  immediate  causes  exist,  they  must  exist  by 
necessity.  Again,  when  we  say  that  a  thing  is  possible 
of  existence,  we  mean  by  it  that  it  needs  a  cause  to  over- 
balance the  non-existent  element.  The  existence  of  any 
possible,  then,  is  necessitated  by  a  preceding  cause,  and 
this  cause  was  necessitated  by  another  one,  and  so  on, 
until  we  arrive  at  the  first  cause.  The  possible,  therefore, 
does  not  exist.  The  subject  may  be  viewed  yet  from 
another  aspect.  It  is  accepted  that  whatever  is  being 
realized  from  the  potential  to  the  actual  needs  some 
external  cause  to  produce  it  from  the  state  of  potentiality 
to  actuality.  It  follows  that,  when  the  human  will  acts 
upon  something,  the  will  has  changed  its  state  from  the 

2"!  Or  Adotiai,  p.  45  b. 


126      PROVIDENCE,  POTENCE,  AND  FREE  WILL 

potential  to  the  actual.  The  cause  of  this  change  must 
be  external,  such  as  the  agreement  between  the  desire 
and  the  imagination  which  is  the  cause  of  the  will.  It  is 
evident,  therefore,  that  when  the  particular  agreement 
exists  the  will  is  necessitated,  and  if  we  go  on  searching 
we  shall  discover  causes  for  the  arrangement,  and  so 
further.  On  the  other  hand,  we  cannot  assume  that  the 
mover  of  the  will  is  the  will  itself;  first,  that  would  con- 
tradict the  principle  that  a  thing  being  realized  from  the 
potential  to  the  actual  needs  an  external  cause ;  secondly, 
the  will  would  require  a  preceding  will  as  its  cause,  and 
so  on  to  infinity.^°^  Finally,  the  possible  does  not  exist 
on  religious  ground,  for  it  was  accepted  that  God's  science 
extends  to  particulars  ;  and  if  events  are  possible  it 
would  contradict  the  concept  of  prescience,  for  we  can 
hardly  call  it  knowledge  when  the  contrary  to  it  may 
occur.  It  follows,  then,  that  there  exists  a  kind  of  necessity 
in  the  order  of  the  world.  These  are  the  arguments 
pro  and  contra.^^^ 

Crescas,  after  reviewing  these  arguments,  comes  to  the 
conclusion  that  the  possible  exists  in  some  aspects  and  in 
some  it  does  not  exist.  He  is,  however,  more  inclined  to 
the  deterministic  side.  He  asserts  that  the  possible  exists 
only  in  regard  to  itself.  In  Spinozistic  language  it  means 
that  when  attended  to  itself  as  an  isolated  phenomenon 
it   is    a   possible   event,    but   that    when   attended    to    its 

202  "jsn   sine  13^   p^*-in   xin   Ninn   pv^n  y^jiDc  ni3  niDN«jjr:3i 
itDvyi?  yjD  nmn  n^TC'  ox  cht^n  a"D  nns*  nro  n^nn''  n^n  nvnn 

D^3i>fn  2^nn^i  mip  inx  pvn  ompn  p^;-l^1  i^yisn  i?x  n^n  p  inx^vri 

n"33>  Or  Adonai,  p.  46  a, 
2"3  Ibid.,  p.  47a-b. 


PROVIDENCE,    POTENCE,    AND    FREE    WILL  127 

causes  and  viewed  in  the  long  chain  of  causaHty  the  event 
is  necessary.  He  proceeds  then  to  refute  the  arguments 
produced  on  behalf  of  the  possible,  even  in  regard  to  its 
causes.  The  first  argument  saying  that  with  some  things  it 
is  possible  that  all  their  causes  are  found,  and  possible  that 
some  do  not  exist,  is  simply  a  petitio  principii.  It  is  just 
the  possibility  of  their  causes  that  we  seek  to  establish.  The 
second  one  that  appeals  to  common  sense  and  for  which 
the  fact  is  adduced  that  man  wills  one  thing  or  another, 
partakes  of  the  same  defect,  for  the  theory  of  necessity 
asserts  that  the  will  must  have  a  cause,  and  it  is  one  cause 
that  makes  him  choose  one  way,  and  another  cause  that 
makes  him  choose  another  way,  and  yet  will  remains  will 
without  strict  mechanism,  for  the  will  per  sc  would  probably 
choose  either  of  the  possibilities,  but  the  cause  pushes 
it  in  one  direction  ;  still  the  will  itself  does  not  feel  any 
necessity.  The  other  argument,  appealing  to  everyday 
facts  of  endeavour  and  expenditure  of  energy,  which  testify 
to  the  existence  of  the  possible,  proves  only  the  existence 
of  the  possible  per  se,  but  not  in  respect  to  the  causes. 
Nay,  even  these  very  endeavours  and  exertions  of  energy 
are  causes  in  the  long  chain  of  events  that  bring  about 
the  state  of  prosperity  of  the  man  who  displays  them  ; 
for  the  causes  are  not  determined  or  fixed,  but  can  be 
increased  or  diminished. ^"'^ 

Similarly,  the  theory  of  causal  necessity  does  not  find 
any  objection  from  the  religious  point  of  view.  The 
question  of  the  superfluity  of  precepts  and  commandments 
if  the  events  are  necessitated,  is  answered    in   a   manner 

^M  Or  Adonai,  pp.  47  b,  48  a.    Crescas  sums  up  his  theory  in  the  following 

words:  n'ix''VD  T''n^'j'  |vyn  ^:;c:^•  niJyDn  ba  ps'c'  iNun  Nin  nth 


128  PROVIDENCE,    POTENCE,    AND    FREE   WILL 

resembling  the  refutation  of  the  last  speculative  argument. 
The  precepts  and  commandments  are  causes  in  the  long 
chain  of  events  that  lead  up  to  a  certain  action.^"^  Reward 
and  punishment,  however,  seem  to  form  quite  an  obstacle 
to  the  theory,  for  is  it  reasonable  to  speak  of  being 
punished  or  rewarded  when  there  is  a  kind  of  necessity- 
pervading  human  action  ?  Crescas  nevertheless  is  not 
dismayed,  and  advances  a  peculiar  hypothesis  (we  shall 
find  its  counterpart  in  Spinoza) :  If  we  look  upon  reward 
and  punishment  as  the  effects  of  observing  the  precepts 
and  their  transgressions  there  is  no  injustice,  just  as  there 
is  no  injustice  in  the  fact  that  a  man  is  scorched  on 
touching  fire,  even  when  that  touching  is  accomplished 
without  any  wilful  inclination.  In  short,  there  is  a  strict 
cause  and  effect  necessity  which  brings  about  that  punish- 
ment should  follow  from  one  or  reward  from  the  other  with 
the  same  force  as  any  natural  phenomenon  follows  from 


Its  cause 


20G 


The  view  of  Crescas  on  the  question  of  determinism 
and  free  will  is  already  apparent  though  presented  in  an 
indirect  way.  To  sum  up,  events  are  possible  per  se  but 
necessary  through  their  causes,  and  the  one  does  not 
conflict  with  the  other.  The  potentiality  cf  the  primal 
matter,  according  to  the  Aristotelian  conception,  serves 
2«»  ViT  N^  DiTnuD  n^^nnn  o^n^inDi  n'n'J'D^«  nnm.'*i  nx  ^ax 

ni3Dn  nmDn  DD^:y3  n^nt^'ss  on  -ib'n  anm^,  ibid. 

2"'=  ^DJn  i>n  DNC'  nn  t^^\>^^-  hod  nnnn  px  nn  pnn:c3  DJrrsi 
n^nniDDn  n-nnn  (perhaps  nniyn)  nnayni  mnuyniD  D^n^nno  t^'jiym 
W  mmpn  ^ly  ijj''nc'  '•ca  biy  onvn  ona  -ids''  n^  njn  nuon  p 

^P^'l    nhin    inmp      nnM     DNI     'inC^C'    :^•Nn   and  further  in  the  page 

nnon  jd  aniD^n  TJ'cn^  nnyno  nc'oj  coyn-i^' Vl"3"i^  n^i,  Or  Adonai, 

p.  48  a. 


PROVIDENCE,    POTENCE,    AND    FREE    WILL  129 

as  an  excellent  example  for  Crescas.  Matter  is  potential 
in  assuming  various  forms  in  succession,  but,  in  regard 
to  the  causes  of  each  form  being  realized,  that  form  is 
necessary  especially  after  it  was  realized.  Similarly,  in 
human  actions,  each  action  per  se  might  have  occurred 
or  not,  but  in  regard  to  the  causes  that  brought  about 
its  occurrence  it  is  necessary.  However,  the  publication 
of  such  a  theory  would  be  a  rather  dangerous  weapon 
in  the  hands  of  the  wicked  who  could  not  see  the  necessary 
consequences  entailed  by  the  evil  acts.  God,  therefore, 
revealed  His  precepts  and  prohibitions  in  order  that  they 
should  become  causes  and  directors  of  human  actions 
towards  the  way  leading  to  human  happiness.  The  founda- 
tion of  free  will  (for  this  is  not  denied  entirely),  according 
to  Crescas,  lies  in  the  fact  that  man  is  ignorant  of  the  real 
situation  or  at  least  does  not  feel  the  force  of  the  causal 
chain.  It  is  because  of  this  that  the  human  will  and 
determination  become  a  factor  in  the  long  causal  nexus. 
On  the  other  hand,  when  man  is  self-conscious  that  he  has 
done  a  certain  act  against  his  will,  such  as  when  a  man 
is  compelled  by  external  forces  to  commit  a  certain  crime, 
it  follows  that  no  punishment  should  be  meted  out  to  him, 
at  least  by  legislators,  for  the  self-consciousness  of  freedom 
which  is  a  factor  in  the  action,  was  absent.^^'  A  similar 
theory  of  freedom  as  relating  to  human  consciousness  is 
advanced  by  Kant.^°^ 

As  for  the  relation  of  future  events  to  prescience,  we 
must  admit,  says  Crescas,  that  events  are  not  possible  in 
regard  to  their  being  known  beforehand  but  in  regard 
to  themselves.     The  science  of  God  is  beyond  time.  His 

-07  Or  Adonai,  p.  48  a-b. 

''OS  Metaphysical  Foundations  of  Ethics,  p.  67  and  note  ad  locum. 
W.  K 


130  PROVIDENCE,    POTENCE,    AND    FREE   WILL 

knowledge  of  the  future  is  like  His  knowledge  of  things 
existing  which  does  not  impart  an  essential  necessity  to 
them,  for  there  is  still  some  room  for  the  possible  in  so  far 
as  endeavours  and  attempts  are  factors  in  the  decision. 
But  that  does  not  affect  the  knowledge  of  God,  for  in 
whichever  way  the  event  may  result  He  would  have  known 
it  beforehand.2°^  We  have  seen  above  that  this  same 
remark  of  God's  science  being  above  time  was  as  well 
as  the  last  assertions  already  advanced  by  Saadia.  The 
originality  in  Crescas  consists  in  his  conception  of  the 
nature  of  events,  and  in  admitting  only  a  partial  kind 
of  freedom,  an  anticipation  which  was  followed  by  great 
philosophers. 

Spinoza's  view  on  the  question  of  determinism  resembles 
that  of  Crescas  in  a  good  many  ways,  especially  in  its  first 
stage,  for  in  his  view  there  is  to  be  noticed  a  kind  of 
gradation  which  is  apparent  when  we  compare  his  earlier 
writings,  the  Cogitata  Mctaphysica,  with  his  Ethics. 
Spinoza,  more  than  Crescas,  must,  by  the  virtue  of  his 
whole  system,  viewing  things  in  a  strictly  causalistic  chain, 
be  a  determinist,  yet  in  his  early  work  he  attempts  a 
reconciliation  between  necessity  and  liberty  which  looks 
almost  Crescasian,  even  in  language.  In  Cogitata  Meta- 
physica  he  says  \^^^  '  If  we  attend  to  our  nature,  we  are  free 
in  our  actions  and  deliberate  about  many  things  for  the 
sole  reason  because  we  wish  to.  On  the  other  hand,  if 
we  attend  to  the  Divine  nature  we  perceive  clearly  and 

209  Or  Adonai,  p.  48  b. 

21'^  Cogitata  Metaph.,  Pars  I,  ch.  3  '  Si  ad  nostram  naturam  attendamus, 
nos  in  nostrls  actionibus  esse  liberos,  et  de  multis  deliberare  propter  id  solum 
quod  volumus,si  etiam  ad  dei  naturam  attendamus  ut  modo  ostendimus  clare 
et  distincte  percipimus,  omnia  ab  ipso  pendere,  nihilque  existere  nisi  quod 
ab  aeterno  a  Deo  decretum  est  ut  existat.' 


PROVIDENCE,    POTENCE,   AND    FREE   WILL  I3I 

distinctly  that  everything  depends  upon  Him,  and  nothing 
exists  except  that  which  was  eternally  decreed  by  God 
that  it  should  exist'.  He  expresses,  however,  his  ignorance 
to  conceive  how  both  necessity  and  liberty  are  compatible, 
and  simply  says  that  there  are  many  things  that  escape 
human  comprehension.  Again,  in  the  same  work  in  the 
second  part,  Spinoza  asserts  once  more  the  liberty  of  man, 
in  spite  of  his  taking  cognizance  of  the  causal  force  which 
impels  the  mind  to  affirm  or  negate.-"  He  does  not  explain 
how  the  thing  is  accomplished,  but  in  a  previous  section 
Spinoza  again  declares  his  ignorance.^^^  We  see,  there- 
fore, that  Spinoza  grapples  with  the  problem  in  the  same 
manner  as  Crescas  does,  and  like  him  assumes  that  actions 
are  possible /^-r  se,  and  necessary  through  the  causal  chain. 
But  we  must  admit  that  Spinoza  does  not  carry  that 
principle  out  with  the  same  consistency  as  Crescas,  and 
later  abandons  human  freedom  entirely,  and  then  again 
speaks  in  its  name  trying  to  save  it  at  least  in  a  shadowy 
form. 

Fischer  insists  that  even  in  Cogitata  Metaphysica  Spinoza 
is  already  an  avowed  and  thorough  determinist,  and  con- 
strues his  confession  of  ignorance  in  respect  to  the  way 
human  liberty  exists  in  spite  of  necessity  to  mean  that 
we  conceive  that  human  liberty  does  not  exist.^^^  He 
quotes  a  number  of  passages  to  substantiate  his  view,  but 
in  reality  these  passages  do  not  add  more  to  what  is  said 
in  the  passage  quoted  where  Spinoza  makes  his  confession. 
All  that  they  show  is  that  Spinoza  recognizes  the  chain 
of  necessity,  and  that  man  is  a  part  of  nature,  but  this 
is  also  contained  in  the  passage  quoted  above.     On  the 

-"  Cogitata  Mctaph.,  Pars  II,  ch.  12,  p,  503. 

212  Ibid.,  ch.  II,  p.  500.  -'^  Spinoza,  p.  308. 

K  3 


132  PROVIDENCE,    POTENCE,   AND    FREE   WILL 

other  hand,  Fischer  fails  to  explain  a  fact  which  decidedly 
shows  that  there  are  two  stages  in  Spinoza's  conception 
of  freedom.  This  is  the  famous  example  of  Buridan's  ass. 
In  his  earlier  work  {Cogitata  Mctaphysica)  Spinoza  asserts 
that  were  a  man  placed  in  such  an  equilibrium  of  forces 
to  die  of  hunger,  he  would  not  be  considered  a  man  but 
the  most  stupid  donkey.-^*  On  the  other  hand,  in  the 
Ethics,  the  same  example  is  quoted,  and  Spinoza  remarks  : 
*  I  am  quite  ready  to  admit  that  a  man  placed  in  the  equi- 
librium described  would  die  of  hunger  and  thirst.  If  I  am 
asked  whether  such  a  one  should  not  rather  be  considered  an 
ass  than  a  man,  I  answer  that  I  do  not  know'.^^^  Spinoza 
agrees  with  Crescas  in  the  theological  question  of  punish- 
ment. The  wicked,  he  says,  are  punished  by  a  decree 
of  God,  and  if  you  ask  why  they  should  be  punished 
since  they  are  acting  from  their  own  nature,  we  may  reply, 
Why  should  poisonous  snakes  be  exterminated  P^^*^  In  his 
letter  to  Oldenburg,^^''  a  more  striking  example  is  given : 
'  He  who  goes  mad  from  the  bite  of  a  dog  is  excusable, 
yet  he  is  rightly  suffocated.'  This  is  exactly  the  same 
as  the  saying  by  Crescas  that  whoever  touches  fire  must 
be  burned. 

In  the  Ethics,  Spinoza  becomes  an  absolute  determinist. 

'^'^  Cogitata  Mctapli.,  Pars  II,  ch.  11  'Quod  autem  anima  tantem  potentiam 
habeat  quamvis  a  nullis  rebus  externis  determinetur  commodissime  explicari 
potest  exemplo  asinae  Buridiani.  Si  enirn  hominem  loco  asinae  ponamus 
in  tali  aequilibrio  positum,  homo  non  pro  re  cogitante  sed  pro  turpissimo 
asino  erit  habendus,  si  fame  et  site  pereat '. 

215  Ethics,  scholium  to  proposition  XLIX. 

-16  Cogitata  Metaph.,  Pars  II,  ch.  8  '  At  respondeo  etiam  ex  decreto  divino 
esse  ut  puniatur  et  si  tantum  illi  quos  non  nisi  ex  libertate  fingimus  peccare 
essent  puniendi,  cur  homines  serpentes  venonosos  exterminare  conantur,  ex 
natura  enim  propria  tantum  peccant  nee  aliud  possunt'. 

21^  Epist.  XLI. 


PROVIDENCE,    POTENCE,    AND    FREE   WILL  133 

Man  is  viewed  as  a  part  of  nature  subject  to  its  laws  and 
regulations,^^^  and  free  will  is  openly  denied.  'The  mind 
is  determined  to  wish  this  or  that  by  a  cause  which  has 
also  been  determined  by  another  cause,  and  so  on  to 
infinity '. 2'^  Yet  in  spite  of  all  this,  Spinoza  does  not 
want  to  give  up  freedom,  and  tries  to  maintain  it  by  all 
means.  The  way  Spinoza  reaches  freedom,  though  different 
from  that  of  Crescas  who  makes  man's  consciousness  of 
freedom  a  factor  in  determining  human  action  (a  way  which 
was  followed  by  Kant,  as  indicated  above),  yet  retains  the 
basic  Crescasian  principle,  namely,  that  human  endeavour 
is  a  cause  in  the  determination  of  human  act.  Spinoza 
arrives  at  the  conception  of  freedom  mainly  through  his 
principle  of  self-preservation.  Everything  in  so  far  as  it  is 
itself  endeavours  to  persist  in  its  own  being,  says  Spinoza,^^° 
but  the  principle  itself  would  not  be  fruitful  unless  we 
emphasize  the  '  own  ',  namely,  the  principle  of  individuality. 
It  is  true  that  man  is  a  part  of  nature,  but  a  higher  part 
or  at  least  a  different  part  than  that  of  the  animal,  and  as 
such  his  essence  or  his  nature  must  be  different  in  degree 
from  that  of  the  animal  or  the  stone.  The  persistence 
of  man  in  his  own  being  will  also  be  different  from  the 
persistence  of  the  animal,  and  this  is  to  be  called  virtue 
according  to  the  definition  :  '  Virtue  in  so  far  as  it  is  referred 
to  man  is  a  man's  nature  or  essence,  in  so  far  as  it  has  the 
power  of  effecting  what  can  only  be  understood  by  the  laws 
of  that  nature.'  ^^^  '  This  effort  for  self-preservation  is 
nothing  else  but  the  essence  of  the  thing  in  question', 
writes  Spinoza,  'which  in  so  far  as  it  exists  such  as  it  is, 

218  Ethics,  IV,  p.  4.  219  Ibid.,  II,  48. 

220  Ibid.,  Ill,  I.  2^1  Def.  VIII,  Book  III. 


134  PROVIDENCE,    POTENCE,   AND    FREE   WILL 

is  conceived  to  have  force  for  continuing  in  existence.' 222 
It  is  clear  from  the  foregoing  that  man  does  possess  a  kind 
of  determination  and  is  not  merely  mechanically  acted 
upon.  The  idea  of  self-preservation  carries  in  itself  already 
the  conception  of  a  struggle,  there  is  something  external 
which  tends  to  destroy  the  individual  or  to  pervert  it 
from  developing  according  to  its  own  laws ;  it  is  against 
this  external  force  that  the  power  of  self-preservation 
battles.  This  is  well  recognized  by  Spinoza  when  he  says : 
'  The  force  whereby  a  man  persists  in  existing  is  limited, 
and  is  infinitely  surpassed  by  the  power  of  external 
causes.' 22^  The  term  'infinitely'  may  probably  refer  to 
physical  existence,  but  not  to  existence  according  to  its 
own  laws,  for  otherwise  it  is  impossible  to  conceive  how 
man  can  ever  become  free  even  in  the  Spinozistic  fashion. 
Hence  follows  the  bondage  of  man,  which  means  his  sub- 
jection to  emotions  and  passions  the  causes  of  which  are 
external,  and  do  not  follow  from  the  laws  of  his  nature. 

Where  then  is  the  way  to  freedom?  This  consists 
simply  in  positing  against  a  lower  emotion  which  intends 
to  enslave  the  activities  of  man  ^^^  another  one,  for  an 
emotion  can  only  be  controlled  or  destroyed  by  another 
one  contrary  thereto  and  with  more  power.^^^  It  is  here 
that  knowledge  comes  in  as  a  potent  factor,  for  by  means 
of  it  man  can  discern  what  is  useful  to  him,  and  so  perceive 
his  own  being,^-''  Ascending  in  the  scale  of  knowledge, 
we  find  that  the  highest  point  is  to  know  God,  which  in 
other  words  means  to  know  true  nature  and  its  unfoldings, 
man's  own  powers  included.  It  follows  then  that  when 
man  reaches  that  state  or  is  on  the  path  to  it  that  he  is 

222  Ethics,  IV,  26,  demon.  223  /^/^.^  m.  22*  /^^-^.^  ly,  5. 

22=  Ibid.,  6.  2^«  Ibid.,  20. 


PROVIDENCE,    POTENCE,    AND   FREE   WILL  I35 

said  to  be  free,  for  viewing  things  under  the  species  of 
reason,227  he  must  necessarily  follow  the  laws  of  his  own 
nature  and  avoid  things  which  tend  to  sway  him  from  that 
or  subject  him  to  bondage.  Spinoza  goes  on  to  show  in 
detail  the  way  man  frees  himself;  and  his  ethical  con- 
ception is  evolved  through  that  notion  of  freedom.  But 
that  does  not  concern  us  here.  What  we  wish  to  show 
is  the  generation  of  that  freedom,  and  what  it  is.  To  sum 
up,  Spinoza's  freedom  is  not  a  free-willist's  freedom,  but 
a  reasonable  intrinsic  necessity,  subject  to  immutable  laws, 
as  against  a  slavish  irrational  necessity  subject  to  external 
causes  the  results  of  which  tend  toward  destruction.  This 
human  freedom  corresponds  exactly  to  that  Divine  freedom 
of  which  Spinoza  speaks  in  his  first  book,  where  the  main 
element  consists  in  the  absence  of  external  forces  coercing 
it.  What  interests  us  mainly  in  the  theory  is  the  recogni- 
tion of  the  struggle,  and  the  consideration  of  the  human 
power  as  a  factor  in  bringing  about  the  result,  the  same 
steps  which  were  taken  by  Crescas  to  liberate  man  and 
restore  to  him  a  part  of  his  lost  freedom. 

As  regards  the  question  of  evil,  Spinoza  gives  on  that 
point  a  clear  and  more  comprehensive  explanation  than 
that  of  Crescas.  His  view  is  analogous  to  that  of  the 
Peripatetics  who  saw  in  evil  a  kind  of  imperfection  which 
cannot  be  attributed  to  God  but  to  matter.  Spinoza  denies 
entirely  the  positive  existence  of  evil  and  error,^28  f^j-  j^  go 
far  as  any  act  of  evil  expresses  reality  it  is  not  evil,  the 
badness  of  it  comes  only  in  comparison  with  another  act 
of  more  perfection,^^^  and  so  the  whole  conception  of  it  is 
only  human.^^° 

227  Ethics,  IV,  67.  228  Epist.  XXIII,  ed.  Vloten. 

229  Epist.  XIX.  22°  Cogitata  Metaph.,  II,  ch.  8. 


136  PROVIDENCE,    POTENCE,    AND    FREE   WILL 

To  return  to  Crescas,  he  feels  that  the  question  of 
conciliating  Divine  justice  with  that  of  necessity  ought 
to  be  discussed  more  thoroughly.  He  endeavoured  to 
establish  the  difference  between  necessity  without  man 
being  conscious  of  it,  and  that  where  the  subject  is  con- 
scious. It  seems,  nevertheless,  that  since  reward  and 
punishment  are  evolved  from  good  and  bad  acts  as  effects 
from  causes,  there  is  really  no  reason  for  this  distinction, 
for  the  cause  is  a  cause  just  the  same  whether  accompanied 
by  consciousness  or  not.  But  then  the  whole  foundation 
of  punishment,  whether  Divine  or  human,  is  undermined, 
for  both  assume  this  distinction  as  their  basis.^^^  Another 
difficulty  is  raised  by  the  question  of  dogmas.  Religion 
requires  its  adherents  to  believe  in  certain  dogmas,  but 
what  connexion  has  will  with  dogma  ?  Crescas  produces 
three  arguments  against  the  possibility  that  will  may  be 
a  necessary  element  in  belief.  First,  if  will  is  pre-requisite 
to  belief,  then  belief  does  not  possess  that  kind  of  truth 
which  it  claims  to  possess,  for  the  nature  of  will  carries 
the  possible  with  it,  either  man  wills  to  believe  or  not, 
and  he  may  also  will  contrarily  in  succession  ;  where  then 
is  the  truth  ?  Secondly,  belief  implies  that  a  certain  thing 
exists  outside  of  the  mind  as  well  as  in  the  mind,  and  if  so 
what  dependence  can  it  have  on  the  will,  especially  if 
a  certain  kind  of  dogma  is  necessitated  by  proofs?  It  is 
impossible  not  to  believe  it.  What  foundations  have,  then, 
the  punitive  measures  attached  to  dogmas  ?^^^ 

In  answer  to  these  questions,  Crescas  reiterates  his 
doctrine  that  God's  precepts  act  as  causes  in  determining 
human  actions.      Divine  righteousness  aims  at  the  good 

231  Or  Adoiiai,  p.  49  b.  '^^"  Ibid. 


PROVIDENCE,    POTENCE,    AND    FREE   WILL  I37 

and  the  perfection  of  man.  The  precepts  are  instituted 
by  God  as  incitements  for  good  actions,  and  the  rewards 
and  punishments  really  are  evolved  from  them  as  effects 
from  causes.  But  as  for  the  question,  why  is  consciousness 
necessary  in  order  to  receive  reward  or  punishment  for  the 
committing  of  a  certain  act,  it  will  be  answered  if  we  look 
upon  actions  in  the  light  of  their  intensity.  The  most 
important  ethical  quality  in  doing  good  is  the  joy  and 
intensity  of  pleasure  experienced  while  carrying  out  the 
will  to  do  good.  God  possesses  absolute  love  and  intensity 
of  doing  good ;  the  human  intensity  would  therefore  form 
a  link  in  the  human  relation  to  God.  It  is  evident,  there- 
fore, that  when  this  will  and  intensity  are  absent,  such 
as  when  things  are  committed  from  conscious  necessity, 
the  actions  do  not  entail  either  reward  when  they  are  good 
or  punishment  when  wrong  ;  for  there  is  also  a  kind  of 
intensity  in  doing  evil  as  it  is  the  love  and  intensity  that 
form  important  ingredients  in  the  causing  of  reward  and 
punishment.^^^ 

In  the  same  light  we  may  solve  the  question  of  dogmas. 
It  is  true  that  essentially  dogmas  are  not  related  to  will, 
but  they  may  be  connected  in  some  way.  It  is  not  the 
belief  in  the  dogmas  that  counts,  but  the  intensity  and 
pleasure  which  a  religious  man  feels  at  the  believing,  or  in 
the  endeavour  to  follow  up  to  the  root  of  the  matter. 
This  intensity  and  pleasure  is  a  matter  of  will  and  choice, 
for  a  thing  may  be  true  and  man  may  conceive  it  as  such 

"3  nrnn  pni  mam  djin  -cnn  n^m  nvnn  pa  -ic-'s  fj-innn  qjcni 
moipDn  . . .  -iN3n^  nnac^  nn  •'ixnn  Nin  njn  ma-i  D:is'n  mini  lua 

^^'JD''^'  ''"ix-i  n\T  nb)  aijan  b)V^b  pvnn  nmy  nbiT  "im  i3:\sc^  nna 
T]2Dn  p  aniDcn  y^'j^hd  c'Jiym  fjiojn  ijoo,  OyAdo,iat,p.4Th. 


138  PROVIDENCE,    POTENCE,    AND    FREE   WILL 

without  experiencing  any  particular  emotion,  as,  for 
instance,  the  fact  that  the  three  angles  of  a  triangle  are 
equal  to  two  right  angles  ;  but  the  knowledge  of  certain 
dogmas  may  be  accompanied  by  the  emotion  if  there  is  the 
corresponding  exertion.  It  is  from  this  point  of  view 
that  reward  and  punishment  are  attached  to  dogmas.^^* 

-3*  Or  Adouai,  p.  50  a. 


CHAPTER  VI 

Teleology  and  Ethics. 

There  are  four  possible  ends  which  may  be  the  goal 
of  human  life,  (a)  either  the  practical-ethical,  that  is,  the 
perfection  of  morals,  {d)  or  contemplation,  or  happiness, 
which  may  be  (c)  material,  or  (d)  spiritual.  The  object 
is,  then,  to  determine  which  of  these  is  the  final  end,  for 
while  all  may  be  mediate  ends,  there  must  be  a  final  one 
which  is  the  highest  of  all.  Crescas  proceeds  then  to 
eliminate  some.  Material  happiness  cannot  be  thought 
of  as  a  final  end  in  view  of  the  fact  that  we  posited  as 
a  possible  end  also  spiritual  happiness.  A  final  end  must 
eo  ipso  be  the  highest ;  but  material  happiness,  no  matter 
how  great,  is  only  temporal,  while  spiritual,  meaning  the 
happiness  of  the  soul,  may  be  eternal.  It  follows  that 
the  balance  is  on  the  side  of  soul  happiness.  As  for  the 
perfection  of  morals,  though  it  is  undoubtedly  a  great  end, 
it  cannot  be  viewed  as  a  final  end.  It  is  the  means  to 
purify  the  soul  and  overcome  the  passions  that  prevent 
the  soul  from  reaching  the  desired  perfection.  It  also  helps 
to  bring  out  the  latent  qualities  and  develop  the  powers 
of  the  soul,  and  as  such  it  is  a  subsidiary  one.  It  is  rather 
curious  to  hear  such  an  opinion  from  Crescas,  who  showed 
himself  several  times  endowed  with  a  true  ethical  spirit, 
139 


140  TELEOLOGY   AND    ETHICS 

and  giving  an  autonomous  basis  to  good  deeds,  to  speak  of 
morality  as  preparatory  to  development  of  contemplative 
power,  the  very  idea  which  he  immediately  combats.^^^ 
It  may  be  explained  that  even  Crescas  had  to  pay  his  toll 
to  the  spirit  of  the  age. 

Crescas  devotes  some  attention  to  the  discussion  of  the 
perfection  of  thought  and  contemplation  as  a  final  end. 
Some  (most  likely  he  refers  to  Gersonides),  he  says,  have 
developed  such  a  theory.  It  is  known  that  the  mind 
becomes  assimilated  with  the  conceptions  it  perceives. 
In  other  words,  the  substance  of  the  mind  increases  by 
means  of  the  conceptions,  and  so  we  have  finally  an 
acquired  mind  (njpjni'^C')  which  is  to  a  certain  degree 
different  from  the  potential  mind,  or,  as  Aristotle  called  it, 
the  passive  mind.^^"  Since  this  acquired  mind  is  different 
from  the  potential  in  so  far  as  the  last  is  only  potence, 
Gersonides  as  well  as  Crescas  in  exposition  calls  that 
hiiulian,  after  analogy  of  vXyj,  matter,  potential.  It  is 
eternal  in  spite  of  being  generated,  for  it  has  no  cause 
of  destruction  since  it  does  not  contain  anything  material. 
Eternal  happiness  will  therefore  consist  in  contemplation 
and  reason,  for  it  is  this  only  that  gives  immortality.^^^ 
The   higher   the    conception,    the    greater    the    degree    of 

235  misi  c*D:n  inrn  n^Dvy  nno  nvn  nni  px  nnon  nin^u*  d^isi 
nn-^  mvjm  ni^^pn  niixno  msDiDn  n'^npnm  nnx^n  n:t2rD  -loni 
nr  b  "ic'S  n-iix  ^133^  (perhaps  njiD^  n^^m  nnnpo)  nnnpn  nno 

nn   ni^DC'lJSn   rW^n,  OrAdonai,  p.  52 a-h. 

-36  This  idea  of  an  acquired  '  nous '  was  already  taught  by  Alexander, 
from  whom  the  mediaeval  philosophers  borrowed  it.  See  Zeller,  Greek 
Philosophy,  p.  296;  also  Af/yZ/rt/MO/ by  Gersonides,  sect,  i,  chs.  i,  2. 

DOVi?3   D''1p"'   inV,  Or  Adonai,  p.  52  b;  also  Miikaniof,  sect,  i,  chs.  7-14. 


TELEOLOGY   AND    ETHICS  14I 

eternity  and  that  of  happiness.  Even  during  life  we 
experience  pleasure  from  thinking,  and  so  much  more 
after  death,  when,  freed  from  hindrances,  the  acquired 
reason  unites  with  the  active  reason  (7to6t}tiko?  vovs)  and 
the  range  of  conception  is  increased,  and  in  the  same 
degree  also  that  of  the  intellectual  pleasure.  In  that 
theory  there  are  to  be  distinguished  two  tendencies, 
a  more  rationalistic  and  a  religious.  The  first  says  that 
happiness  increases  with  the  number  of  ideas,  of  whatever 
character  these  ideas  may  be,  whether  of  the  physical  or 
the  spiritual  world,  for  the  active  reason  contains  in  itself 
the  order  of  all  existing  things,  and  so  the  larger  the  scope 
of  ideas  the  nearer  the  approach  to  the  active  reason  on 
the  part  of  the  acquired.  The  second  emphasizes  the 
necessity  of  acquiring  true  ideas  of  God  and  the  spiritual 
world. 

Against  this  theory  Crescas  directs  his  criticism.  If, 
as  the  intellectualistic  theory  asserts,  the  acquired  reason 
is  a  separate  thing,  and  remains  eternal  while  the  body 
as  well  as  the  soul,  that  is  the  perceptive  one,  perishes,  it 
is  impossible  that  this  perfection  should  be  the  end  of  life. 
Otherwise,  we  should  have  the  anomalous  phenomenon 
of  a  being  striving  for  an  end  which  is  really  not  its  own 
perfection,  but  of  another  being  which  is  quite  distinguished 
from  itself.  It  does  not  agree  with  reason  nor  with  Divine 
justice  that  the  reward  and  punishment  should  be  meted 
out  to  a  being  which  really  has  very  little  to  do  with  the 
one  who  followed  the  precepts  or  transgressed  them.^^^^ 
Besides,  the  theory  per  se  is  full  of  contradictions,  since 
the  acquired  reason  is  something  different  from  the  hiiulian, 
that  is  the  ordinary  perceptive,  mind,  then  it  has  no  subject 

23S  Or  Adoiiai,  p.  53  a. 


142  TELEOLOGY   AND    ETHICS 

out  of  which  it  is  generated ;  it  follows,  then,  that  it  is 
generated  out  of  nothing,  which  is  contradictory  to  all 
principles.  Again,  there  is  a  contradiction  in  terms  in  the 
dictum  that  reason  acquires  its  essence  through  the  con- 
ceptions. Which  reason  is  meant  here?  Shall  we  say 
the  hiiulian  ?  But  its  essence  is  not  acquired,  it  is  given ; 
and  the  essence  acquired  through  conceptions  is  something 
different.  It  must  then  be  the  acquired  reason ;  but  it  is 
impossible  to  speak  of  it  as  reason  since  it  does  not  exist 
as  yet.'^"^  It  is  evident  from  the  foregoing  that  the  in- 
tellectualistic  theory  is  untenable.  It  remains  for  us  to 
find  a  tertimn  quid  which  shall  serve  as  the  final  end 
leading  to  spiritual  happiness  and  eternity.  This  Crescas 
finds  in  the  love  of  God.^'^^  It  is  not  an  intellectual  concept 
by  all  means,  and  widely  different  from  the  Peripatetic 
notion  as  well  as  the  Spinozistic,  though  the  intellect  may 
be  a  useful  ingredient  in  it.  It  is  best  understood  and 
conceived  after  the  consideration  of  three  propositions. 
First,  that  the  human  soul  which  is  the  form  of  the  body 
is  a  spiritual  being  and  potential  in  regard  to  conception. 
The  second,  that  the  perfect  being  loves  the  good  and 
perfection,  and  that  desire  for  it  as  well  as  its  intensity 
is  proportional  to  the  degree  of  perfection  the  said  being 
possesses.  Third,  that  love  and  intensity  of  desire  for 
a  thing  are  not  related  to  the  intellectual  vigour  employed 
in  conceiving  that  thing.^^^  The  establishment  of  these 
three  propositions  is  very  interesting,  for  the  first  proposi- 

233  \^'\^)2'o  Di*yn?o  bi^nc^  mine's  ^3  icj'qj  nmo  nrn  nosnnt;'  dhdi 
ha:  mm  ins  nvynnc'  byi)r\^  nn  ,^hv?^\  ^rjcn  u  miisn  pN  mn 

invr  Diip  J<VD3  \r\  n''33  "i3d  si^\'o  t^'ona,  Or  ^f/oH«;;  p.  53  a. 

2to  Ibid.,  p.  53  b.  '"  Ibid.,  54  a. 


TELEOLOGY   AND    ETHICS  I43 

tion  contains  in  a  short  form  the  psychology  of  Crescas, 
while  the  other  two  relate  to  the  foundation  of  his  ethical 
theory.  The  soul  is  the  form  of  the  body,  for  we  see  that 
on  its  departure  the  body  becomes  corrupted  just  as  do 
things  without  form.  Again,  it  is  spiritual,  for  it  possesses 
powers  which  are  not  dependent  on  the  senses,  such  as 
imagination,  memory,  and  reason.  It  is  potential  of  con- 
ception or  reasoning,  for  it  is  evident  that  it  is  the  subject 
of  the  reasoning  power,  since  that  one  is  related  to  the 
body  by  means  of  the  soul.  Crescas  then  endeavours 
to  prove  his  statement  that  the  soul  is  the  subject  of  the 
potentiality.  But  as  it  is  objected  that  since  the  soul 
is  a  form  it  cannot  be  a  subject,  for  forms  are  not  subjects 
for  other  forms,  we  must  therefore  suppose  that  this  is 
done  through  the  medium  of  the  body.^"*^  This  theory 
is  primarily  Aristotelean  in  its  main  concepts,  except  that 
it  differs  in  the  concept  of  immortality. 

The  second  proposition  treating  of  perfection  and  the  love 
of  good  is  evidenced  from  the  following :  God,  who  is  the 
source  and  fountain  of  all  perfection,  loves  the  good,  for  this 
can  be  seen  through  his  causing  general  existence  of  beings 
and  the  continual  creation — here  we  see  already  the  origin 
of  the  dictum,  '  reality  is  good ',  which  will  play  an  im- 
portant part  later — and  since  the  causality  is  all  through 
His  will,  it  is  necessitated  that  the  love  of  the  good  is  an 
essential  conception  of  His  perfection.  It  follows,  then, 
that  the  higher  the  perfection  the  stronger  the  love  and 
the  intensity  of  the  desire  to  do  good,  for  God  possesses 
the  highest  perfection  and  at  the  same  time  the  strongest 
will  to  do  good  as  evidenced  from  creation. ^'^^     The  third 

2«  It  is  all  Aristotelean. 

2«  yuDi  mpc  Tinn^  n-^n'Cf  yn^  Nvnc'  'th  p  noNnn  'an  dni 


144 


TELEOLOGY   AND    ETHICS 


one,  asserting  that  intensity  of  desire  is  independent  of 
reasoning,  is  proved  by  definition  of  the  terms.  Will  is 
a  relation  between  the  appetitive  and  the  imaginative 
powers,  and  according  to  the  degree  of  relation  will  be 
the  intensity  of  the  desire.  Reason,  on  the  other  hand, 
depends  on  concepts  and  principles,  both  of  which  reside 
in  the  reasoning  faculty,  and  that  faculty  is  different  from 
the  imaginative  and  appetitive.  It  is  evident  that  intensity 
of  desire  is  independent  of  reason.  After  establishing  these 
three  propositions,  Crescas  formulates  his  theory  of  im- 
mortality and  purpose,  which  follow  as  a  result  of  the 
premises.  Since  it  has  been  proved  in  the  first  proposition 
that  the  soul  is  a  spiritual  being,  it  may  be  immortal 
after  its  departure  from  the  body,  for  it  has  no  factors  of 
corruption.  The  second  proposition  showed  us  that  the 
love  of  the  good  is  proportional  to  the  degree  of  the  per- 
fection of  the  soul ;  the  converse  follows  that  the  higher 
the  good  loved,  the  higher  the  perfection.  It  is  evident, 
therefore,  that  the  love  of  God,  who  is  infinitely  good, 
is  necessary  for  the  perfection  of  the  soul.  As  for  the 
independence  of  this  love  of  contemplation  and  intellectual 
exercise,  it  was  established  by  the  third  proposition.^'^'' 
It  is  seen,  then,  that  the  essential  thing  for  the  perfection 
of  the  soul  is  something  independent  of  contemplation, 
and  that  is  the  love  of  God.  Since  we  have  seen  that 
there  is  nothing  lasting  about  man  except  his  soul,  and 

ainn  nnis  imrovy  sin  nc-j^  miobc^  innn^  Nim  ch^  nvn^^'no 
n^n  nr^nm  imcnm  bb^i  nix^vDn  nxvona  vmbiystD  nsnjc^  mob 
)m'ob^b  im'y  rc^o  nion  nnnx  mnnn  n\T  dic^dh  iJi^nn  djds  nn, 

Or  Adonai,  p.  54  b. 

nnnsn  Nini  nb^C'nn  rh'\i  "i3"i  sin  c^aan  ninbc-'b,  ibid.,  p.  55  a. 


TELEOLOGY   AND    ETHICS  I45 

that  the  perfection  of  the  soul  consists  in  the  love  of  God 
and  the  intensity  of  that  love,  it  follows  that  this  is  the  end 
and  purpose  of  human  life. 

In  positing  the  love  of  God  as  an  end  of  human  life 
Crescas  laid  the  foundation  of  a  high  ethical  system,  for 
the  love  of  God  is  urged  not  on  religious  mystical  grouno 
as  the  Neo-Platonists  used  to  speak  of  a  longing  of  the  soul 
to  return  to  its  source,  but  mainly  because  the  love  of  God 
is  really  the  love  of  good.  The  centre  of  ethical  virtue 
is  transferred  from  the  mind  to  the  heart,  from  the  cold 
logical  syllogisms  to  the  warm  feeling  of  man.  It  is  not 
the  contemplative  side  that  is  emphasized,  as  has  been 
done  continually  from  Aristotle  down,  but  the  practical 
side.  This  part,  however,  would  not  speak  so  much  for 
Crescas's  originality,  for  it  simply  keeps  in  line  with  the 
pure  Jewish  ethics,  but  what  is  interesting  in  Crescas  is 
that  he  raises  the  ethical  principle  to  a  cosmic  one,  since 
he  sees  in  it  the  basis  of  creation,  as  follows. 

There  are  two  final  ends ;  though  this  statement  seems 
contradictory  at  first,  yet  it  can  be  made  consistent.  The 
word  'final'  must  be  viewed  under  two  different  aspects, 
in  respect  to  human  life  and  action,  and  in  respect  to 
God. 2*^  As  for  the  first,  we  have  already  seen  what  that 
end  is.  As  regards  the  Divine  purpose,  it  must  be  the 
distribution  of  good.  The  final  end  spoken  of  does  not 
refer  only  to  the  human  genus,  but  to  the  universe  as 
a  whole.  There  is  a  manifest  purpose  in  it,  in  spite  of 
the  prevailing  necessity  of  natural  law,  and  the  purpose 

n:^n3ni  nnnxn  Nin  jnnsn  n^bnn  nm^n  nrnan  r\:r]  >2  nis^nriD 
iian  nxjpn  Nin  pnnxn  n^bnn  nixon,  Or  Adonai,  p.  seh. 

W.  L 


146  TELEOLOGY    AND    ETHICS 

is    really    one    in    genus     in    regard    to    man    and    the 
universe.2^^ 

But  in  order  to  conceive  this  '  purpose '  clearly,  a  little 
more  discussion  as  regards  the  becoming  of  the  world  is 
necessary.  It  is  accepted  that  the  universe  in  its  manifold- 
ness  presents  a  certain  unity  and  an  interdependence  of  its 
parts.  This  unity  would  lead  us  to  accept  the  unity  of 
purpose,  but  here  a  problem  presents  itself  to  us.  It  is 
known  that  from  the  simple  arises  the  simple,  and  since 
God  is  the  absolute  simplest  being,  whence  then  the 
multitude  of  composite  beings  ?  The  various  answers 
proposed  to  that  problem  are  insufficient.  The  theory 
of  emanations,  which  sees  in  existence  a  gradual  descend- 
ing scale  from  pure  spirituality  to  materiality,  is  inadequate, 
for  the  problem  is  still  there.  Whence  the  matter  ?  Another 
explanation,  saying  that  the  caused  beings  by  being  caused, 
that  is,  by  being  possible  of  existence,  acquire  composite- 
ness,  and  the  lower  the  being  in  the  scale  of  emanations 
the  greater  the  compositeness,  for  the  cause  of  it  is  also 
possible,  since  it  is  the  third  or  fourth  emanation,  is  also 
weak.  A  thing  may  be  composite  in  regard  to  its  exist- 
ence, but  simple  in  regard  to  essence.  Crescas  offers, 
therefore,  his  solution.  It  is  true  that  if  the  process  of 
causation  were  a  mechanical  one  tliere  would  be  no  place 
for  composition,  but  the  fact  is  that  it  is  a  voluntary  one. 
It  is  the  will  of  God  that  is  the  cause  of  all  beings,  and 
it  is  through  it  that  they  arise.  But  here  the  question 
arises.  How  can  a  simple  being  have  more  than  one  will  ? 
for  in  the  positing  of  the  manifold,  we  shall  have  to  see 

niDn  Kin  :iDa  nns*  n-iinn  isci'"),  OrA(ionai,p.  sgh. 


TELEOLOGY   AND    ETHICS  I47 

a  manifold  expression  of  the  will.  To  this  Crescas  replies 
that  the  unity  of  the  will  consists  in  goodness.  The  will 
to  do  good  and  distributing  it  is  the  predominant  feature ^'^ 
(the  real  question  of  will  as  creative  cause  will  be  discussed 
later  in  chapter  VII,  it  is  only  brought  in  here  casually). 
It  is  already  manifest  that  the  purpose  in  the  universe 
is  one.  It  is  creative,  not  as  an  end  to  be  realized,  but  as 
a  cause.  The  conception  of  it,  according  to  Crescas,  is 
best  put  in  syllogistic  form.  The  will  of  God  is  the  will 
to  do  good.  Existence  or  reality  is  goodness.  Hence  the 
existing  universe  carries  its  own  purpose  within  it. 

In  comparing  the  Spinozistic  conception  of  the  love 
of  God  (of  =  for)  with  that  of  Crescas,  we  cannot  help 
noticing  the  striking  similarity  in  form,  yet  there  is  a  vast 
difference  as  to  contents.  There  is  much  discussion  on 
the  subject,  by  those  who  assert  that  Spinoza  in  this 
important  teaching  of  his  was  greatly  influenced  by 
Maimonides  and  Crescas,  his  predecessors,  and  those  who 
deny  such  influence.  Of  the  first,  the  most  vigorous  is 
Joel,  who  ventured  to  go  as  far  as  to  assert  that  Spinoza's 
expression,  'The  intellectual  love  of  God',  is  borrowed 
from  two  sources,  the  '  love '  from  Crescas,  and  *  intellectual ' 
from  Maimonides.^^^  That  Joel  went  too  far  in  his  as- 
sertion, and  that  his  conclusions  are  unjustifiable,  is  evident 
from  a  strict  comparison.  However,  a  thorough  investi- 
gation of  the  theory  and  that  of  Maimonides  would  be 
beyond  the  limits  of  our  work  ;  we  shall,  therefore,  limit 
ourselves  to  Crescas. 

2<^  DiK'D  nnN  pvi  DC'DH  mab  nvn  n^-'n''  b^^n  nvn  DNti'  nn 
— aiD  ms^VD  ^3  nrn^i— naona  r\ir\  p^fin  rwina  nosn^  n:n  p  d3 
"j-)3n''  i^sn  niDrh  rfn,  Or  Adonni,  p.  60 a. 

^*'  Joel,  Spinoza's  Theologisch-Politischer  Tractat,  Vorwort,  X. 
L  2 


148  TELEOLOGY   AND    ETHICS 

The  conception  of  the  love  of  God  in  Spinoza  forms 
an  integral  part  of  his  system,  as  any  of  his  fundamental 
ideas.  It  is  strictly  connected  with  his  conception  of 
freedom,  as  well  as  with  his  psychology.  The  freedom 
of  Spinoza,  as  seen,^^^  is  freedom  from  emotions,  and  doing 
such  things  as  follow  from  the  very  essence  of  man  and 
tend  to  self-preservation.  This  freedom  can  be  obtained 
by  inculcating  in  the  mind  a  kind  of  controlling  idea  or 
power.  But  in  proportion  as  a  mental  image  is  referred 
to  more  objects,  so  it  is  more  frequent  or  more  often  vivid, 
and  occupies  the  mind  more.^^*^  It  follows,  then,  that  the 
idea  of  God,  which  really  means  the  comprehension  of 
the  exact  order  of  the  universe,  and  through  which  man 
conceives  himself  clearly  and  distinctly ,'^^^  is  such  an  idea 
which  may  control  the  mind,^''^  and  therefore  occupy  the 
chief  place  in  it.  This  endeavour  to  reach  the  heights 
of  understanding  is  termed  love,  for  love  is  by  definition  ^^^ 
pleasure  accompanied  with  the  idea  of  an  external  cause. 
In  this  conception  of  God  we  have  pleasure,  for  pleasure 
is  defined  as  a  transition  from  lesser  to  greater  perfection, 
and  in  conceiving  the  idea  of  God  we  are  acquiring  greater 
perfection,  that  is,  more  of  reality  and  truth.  Again,  we 
conceive  the  causality  in  its  fullest  aspect.  It  is  also  the 
highest  virtue  of  the  mind,  for  virtue  in  the  Spinozistic 
conception  is  power  or  man's  essence.-^*  This  love  arises 
only  through  the  third  kind  of  knowledge,  or  intuition,^" 
namely,  the  possession  of  an  adequate  idea  of  the  absolute 
essence  of  God  which  is  eternal,  for  God  is  eternal,  hence 

2^5  Cp.  above,  chapter  VL  ^^5"  Ethics,  V,  proposition  XL 

2'*i  Ibid.,  proposition  XV.  252  /^^/^^  proposition  XVL 

253  Definition  of  Emotions,  6,  IL  ^54  Ethics,  III,  dcf.VIII,  4,  p.  28. 

255  Scholium  to  proposition  XLI,  Book  II,  p.  32. 


TELEOLOGY   AND    ETHICS  1 49 

also  the  knowledge  of  Him ;  it  follows  also  that  the  love 
which  arises  through  it  is  eternal.  It  is  the  quality  of 
eternity  which  Spinoza  connects  with  the  love  of  God, 
that  supplies  a  basis  to  the  doctrine  of  immortality.  There 
is  something  eternal  in  the  human  mind,  for  in  God  there 
is  something  that  expresses  the  essence  of  the  body  and 
the  mind,  that  essence  must  therefore  be  eternal.^^'^  The 
eternity  increases  the  more  the  mind  conceives  things 
under  the  form  of  eternity,^^^  and  this  is  accomplished 
by  the  knowledge  of  God.  It  follows  therefore  that  the 
mind  which  possesses  the  love  of  God  is  blessed,  for  it 
attains  to  acquiescence  of  mind,^^^  and  perfect,  since  it  is 
more  of  reality  that  it  conceives,  and  eternal.^^^  Such 
is  Spinoza's  conception  of  the  love  of  God. 

From  the  foregoing  it  is  evident  that  there  is  very  little 
in  common  between  the  Crescasian  and  the  Spinozistic 
love  of  God  as  far  as  the  contents  are  concerned,  and  that 
Joel  can  hardly  be  justified  in  saying  that  Spinoza  borrowed 
a  part  of  it  from  Crescas.  The  first  is  vokmtaristic, 
emotional,  and  special  emphasis  is  laid  upon  the  degree 
and  intensity  of  the  love.  The  second  is  intellectualistic 
and  causal.  Yet,  as  we  remarked  on  previous  occasions, 
in  spite  of  their  divergence  there  are  some  points  of  contact. 
Both  systems  have  perfection  for  their  basis.  Crescas  as 
well  as  Spinoza  asserts  that  the  love  of  God  is  intimately 
connected  with  perfection,  and  the  more  perfect  a  man 
is  the  higher  the  love  of  God  ;  and,  moreover,  perfection 
in  both  systems  has  a  background  of  reality.  Again, 
according  to  both  of  them,  the  love  of  God  is  a  means 
to  obtain  immortality,  the  first  reaching  it  by  a  religious 

256    V,  p.  23.  "'   V,  p.  39.  258    p^   28.  "^    p.  39. 


15°  TELEOLOGY   AND    ETHICS 

ethical  yearning,  the  second  by  a  kind  of  thought 
absorption. 

Looking  upon  those  two  kinds  of  the  love  of  God  from 
an  ethical  point  of  view,  namely,  valuing  them  as  ethical 
factors  in  human  life,  the  preference  ought  to  be  given 
to  that  of  Crescas.  His  love  of  God  is  a  glowing  emotional 
force.  It  is  a  strong  desire  to  do  good  for  the  sake  of 
God,  for  this  is  the  way  to  perfection,  while  that  of  Spinoza, 
though  serene  and  sublime,  yet  breathes  cold  ;  there  is  the 
fate  of  necessity  hanging  over  it,  and  while  it  may  endow 
a  man  with  a  brave  stoicism  and  a  kind  of  asceticism,  yet 
it  can  hardly  arouse  emotions  of  altruism  and  self-sacrifice, 
for  it  is  more  of  a  negative  than  positive  character. 

That  there  is  no  purpose  in  nature  follows  from  the 
whole  system  of  Spinoza.  He  who  sees  everything  sub 
specie  necessitatis  and  eternal  law,  must  perforce  be  a 
stringent  antagonist  of  teleology.  Spinoza  accordingly 
expresses  himself  in  his  scholium  to  the  First  Book  of 
Ethics  deploringly  of  those  who  posit  final  causes  in  the 
world,  or  that  God  works  for  a  certain  end.  Such  a  con- 
ception, according  to  him,  is  a  lowering  of  the  notion  of 
God,  and  he  says  that  it  arose  merely  through  human 
imagination.  He  is,  therefore,  at  the  first  glance,  wholly 
contradictory  to  Crescas,  for  the  latter  speaks  of  a  purpose 
on  the  part  of  God  in  creating  the  world,  yet,  as  has  been 
already  pointed  out,  the  purpose  of  Crescas  is  merely  an 
ethical  one,  and  is  not  an  end  but  a  cause  of  beginning. 
As  such  all  Spinozistic  arguments  against  teleology  fall 
short  of  it.  Crescas,  strengthened  by  the  theory  of  purpose, 
makes  his  ethical  view,  the  will  to  do  good,  a  cosmic  prin- 
ciple. The  '  purpose '  of  Crescas,  if  examined  thoroughly, 
amounts  almost  to  the  necessity  of  Spinoza,  but  this  will 
be  brought  out  in  the  next  chapter. 


TELEOLOGY   AND    ETHICS  151 


CHAPTER  VII 
Divine  Will  and  Creation. 

Cresca.S,  in  basing  his  theory  of  creation,  begins  with 
a  long  polemical  essay  against  tliose  who  maintain  the 
eternity  of  the  world,  as  well  as  against  Maimonides  and 
Gersonides,  examining  the  physical  arguments  of  the  former, 
and  proving  the  insufficiency  of  the  defence  of  creation  by 
the  latter.  We  thought  it  necessary  to  omit  all  these 
arguments,  as  most  of  them  are  based  on  a  false  and 
antique  view  of  nature.  We  shall  limit  ourselves  to 
Crescas's  own  view,  and  select  those  points  which  have 
philosophical  value. 

In  introducing  his  view,  Crescas  produces  a  general 
argument  against  those  who  posited  the  co-eternity  of 
matter — the  Peripatetics  —  Gentile  as  well  as  Jewish, 
Gersonides  representing  the  latter.  If,  he  says,  as  we  have 
proved,  God  is  to  be  conceived  as  the  only  being  who  is 
necessary  of  existence,  it  follows  that  all  other  beings, 
whether  spiritual  or  material,  are  possible  of  existence  and 
related  to  God  as  a  fact  to  cause  in  some  way.  We  cannot 
speak,  therefore,  of  matter  as  co-existing,  but  as  sub-existing. 
It  is  brought  about  by  God,  and  it  does  not  matter  whether 
that  bringing  about  is  by  necessity  or  free  will.  Crescas 
here  makes  a  peculiar  use  of  the  term  creation.  He  does 
not  endeavour  to  prove  the  novelty  as  against  the  eternity 
of  the  world  in  the  Maimonidian  sense,  but  creatio  ex  nihilo 
to  him  means  that  everything  was  caused  by  God,  and 


152  TELEOLOGY   AND    ETHICS 

outside  Him  nothing  exists.^''''  There  is,  however,  a  great 
difference  whether  we  assume  the  world  eternal  or  novel, 
for  in  the  first  case  we  assume  the  potence  of  God  infinite, 
in  the  other  finite.  Moreover,  since  God's  potence  is  also 
eternal,  it  follows  that  existence  is  produced  by  God  always 
and  necessarily.^^^ 

However,  existence  may  be  caused  by  God  in  a  two-fold 
way,  either  through  emanation,  where  the  effect  flows  from 
the  cause  in  a  natural  way,  or  through  will.  Crescas 
assumes  that  although  the  existence  of  the  universe  may 
be  necessary,  yet  it  is  not  through  emanation  but  through 
will.  Since  we  conceive  God  as  a  thinking  being,  it  follows 
that  together  with  the  bringing  about  of  existing  things 
there  ought  to  be  a  conception  or  presentation  of  that 
existence.  Again,  a  thinking  principle  wills  what  it  desires, 
we  therefore  conceive  creation  as  through  will.  Moreover, 
the  theory  of  emanation  will  always  have  to  grapple  with 
the  problem  of  the  manifold  and  the  one.  Since  we  have 
established  that  God  is  the  sole  principle  of  existence,  the 
question  of  the  existence  of  the  composite  is  a  menacing 
one.  We  must  therefore  have  recourse  to  the  theory  of 
the  will.  Existence  as  a  whole  is  good,  and  from  this  side 
as  far  as  it  is  good  it  is  simple.  It  is  true  that  viewing 
it  from  a  different  angle  it  is  manifold,  but  the  goodness 
and  perfection  of  existence  consist  in  the  manifold  being 
one.  It  is  evident,  therefore,  that  since  reality  is  good  and 
one,  God  in  so  far  as  He  is  good  must  necessarily  create, 
hence  the  necessity  of  existence  through  will.^^^ 

'^«»  n^  ahm  mynn  nnN  r\^nr\:u  Nin  pNo  ^'^  moxa  njirjn  bin 

Dmp  NXJD:   NtriJ   1^,  OrAdonai,  p.  69  a. 
2«  Ibid. 
^«2  Further  -1S13D  ^Ct^'  liyi  .  .  .  mc^2  IRN  31t:  NIHC'  nD3  niUH  .THI 


TELEOLOGY    AND    ETHICS  I 53 

It  must  be  admitted  that  Crescas  has  not  made  philo- 
sophically clear  how  matter  was  created,  and  in  what 
relation  it  stands  to  God,  While  he  combats  vigorously 
the  co-existence  of  matter  and  makes  it  dependent  upon 
God,  he  does  not  point  out  in  what  way  it  was  brought 
about.  To  all  difficulties  arising  from  the  manifold  and 
one,  or  the  generation  of  matter  from  form,  he  answers 
that  the  fact  that  creation  was  through  will  meets  the 
difficulty.26'^  But  how  and  in  what  way  the  will  expressed 
itself  so  as  to  produce  a  world  of  matter  is  not  explained. 
To  one  form  of  the  problem  which  expresses  itself  in  the 
objection  that  since  like  produces  like,  how  then  could  God 
who  is  form  produce  matter  which  is  unlike,  he  answers 
that  since  existence  arose  through  the  goodness  of  God  the 
rule  holds  true  :  God  is  good,  reality  is  good,  so  the  like 
produced  a  like  result.  This,  however,  does  not  answer 
the  question,  for  the  difficulty  how  matter  arose  still 
remains.  He  seems  to  fall  back  evidently  on  the  religious 
conception  that  God  as  omnipotent  can  do  everything. 

A  stronger  relapse  from  his  strictly  logical  principles  into 
the  upholding  of  a  religious  doctrine,  which  is  absolutely 
contradictory  to  Crecas's  whole  trend  of  thought,  is  noticed 
in  his  asserting  the  novelty  of  the  world.  According  to  his 
remarks,  in  refuting  some  arguments,  it  follows,  since  God 
stands  in  no  relation  to  time,  and  all  tim.es  are  the  same 
to  Him  ;  and  the  more,  since  the  world  is  dependent  on  His 
will  and  that  will  is  eternal,  that  the  creation  is  eternal. 
Yet  he  seems  to  be  frightened  at  his  own  conclusions,  and 

^113  nnv  t<in  pvin  in^ys^ty^  ait:n  ^ys^c-^   nit^n  no^-c-'Lv  ^r^-avi 
pvnn  nv  bv  •TiTB'  a^nn'*  'jdo  nis'^von,  OrAdoiiai,p.6ga. 

263  Or  Adonai,  p.  70  a. 


154  TELEOLOGY   AND    ETHICS 

turns  around  and  says  :  '  After  all,  the  real  'truth  is  as  it  is 
handed  over  in  tradition,  that  the  world  was  created  at 
a  certain  time.'  He  hesitates,  however,  at  accepting  it 
at  its  surface  value,  and  attempts  to  say  that  it  is  possible 
that  there  are  series  of  worlds  continually  being  created 
and  destroyed,  and  that  the  novelty  expressed  in  tradition 
refers  only  to  the  present  world.  At  any  rate,  he  does  not 
consider  it  a  dogma  of  faith.  Crescas  here,  like  all  such 
theological  thinkers,  pays  the  price  of  stopping  short  of  his 
own  logical  conclusions  by  being  inconsistent.^^* 

In  comparing  Spinoza's  view  of  creation  with  that  of 
Crescas,  we  see,  as  usual,  points  of  likeness  and  disagree- 
ment. Spinoza  defines  creation  as  an  operation  in  which 
there  are  no  other  causes  but  the  efficient  one,  or  that 
created  things  are  such  to  whose  existence  nothing  is 
presupposed  but  God.^'"'*  What  Spinoza  intends  by  this 
definition  is  to  exclude  not  only  a  material  cause  but  also 
a  final,  as  he  himself  explains  in  the  same  chapter.^^^ 
It  is  exactly  in  the  same  spirit  that  Crescas  conceives 
creation,  as  has  been  shown.  Crescas's  whole  tractate, 
though  named  '  Concerning  the  Novelty  of  the  World ', 
tries  only  to  prove  that  the  world  was  created  ex  fiihilo, 
and,  as  has  been  shown,  in  the  sense  that  nothing 
exists  outside  God  and  that  matter  is  not  co-existing. 
Spinoza  says  that  he  omitted  the  words  ex  nihilo  because 
those  who  use  it  construe  it  as  if  the  nihil  is  a  subject  out 
of  which  things  were  created.^^^     In  the  same  strain  writes 

2-54  Ibid. 

266  t  Creationem  esse  operationem  in  qua  nullae  causae  praeter  efficientem 
concurrant,  sive  res  creata  est  ilia  quae  ad  existendum  nihil  praeter  Deum 
praesupponit,  dicimus  igitur'  Cogitata  Metaph.,  Pars  II,  X. 

2««  Ibid.,  p.  495- 

28'^  Ibid.,  p.  494  'Quin  illi  t,'.  nihil  non  ut  negationem  omnes  realitates 
consideraverunt,  sed  aliquid  reale  esse  finxerunt  aut  imaginale  fuerunt '. 


TELEOLOGY    AND    ETHICS  I55 

Crescas,  that  his  ex  nihilo  does  not  mean  that  nihil  is  a 
subject,  but  simply  that  there  was  no  other  outside  subject 
co-existing  with  God.  The  fact  that  Crescas  sees  an  end  in 
the  creation  of  the  world,  while  Spinoza's  definition  aims  to 
exclude  it,  does  not  destroy  the  similarity,  for  the  end  that 
Spinoza  combats  is  an  external  one,  but  that  of  Crescas 
is  in  the  essence  of  God,  as  has  been  shown,  and  differs  but 
little  from  Spinoza's  necessity  according  to  his  nature. 

Spinoza,  like  Crescas,  comes  to  the  conclusion  that  the 
basis  for  an  eternal  world  is  the  conception  of  the  infinite 
potence  of  God.^*'^  Spinoza,  in  his  first  attempts,  was  not 
so  eager  to  establish  the  eternity  of  the  world  as  much  as 
the  continuity  of  creation,  for  since  the  will  of  God  is 
eternal,  creation  is  eternal. -*^^  The  same  thought  is  found 
in  Crescas,  as  was  shown  above.  Again,  a  similarity  is 
also  found  in  the  conception  of  the  will  and  intelligence 
of  God  as  a  creative  power.  It  has  been  already  remarked 
above  2^0  ^-j^at  such  a  similarity  exists,  yet  to  reiterate  in 
passing,  Spinoza  as  well  as  Crescas  sees  in  creation  a  kind 
of  reasonable  act.  In  his  scholium  to  proposition  XXXII 
in  the  First  Book  of  Ethics,  Spinoza  definitely  says  that 
God  necessarily  understands  what  He  wishes,  and  so  things 
could  not  be  different  from  what  they  are,  for  then  God's 
understanding  ought  to  be  different. 

As  for  the  divergences,  very  little  ought  to  be  said,  for 
they  are  patent.  Spinoza's  term  of  creation  conveys  an  en- 
tirely different  meaning  from  that  of  Crescas.  It  is  only  a 
convenient  word,  but  in  reality  it  carries  with  it  a  necessity, 
such  a  necessity  as  Crescas  sought  to  escape,  namely,  an 

2««  '  Nos  illam  durationem  non  ex  sola  contemplatione  creatarum  rerum 
sed  ex  contemplatione  infinitae  Dei  potentiae  ad  creandum  intellegere.' 
■-«'  Epist.  LVIII.  "0  Chapter  IV. 


156  TELEOLOGY   AND    ETHICS 

immanent  one.  God  acts  according  to  His  nature,  but  what- 
ever that  nature  is  there  is  only  one  thing  clear,  that  there  is 
no  room  in  it  for  voluntary  actions  in  the  usual  sense.  It  is 
just  this  element  that  Crescas  introduces  by  his  voluntary 
creations.  It  is  true  that  Crescas  proves  the  necessity  of 
creation  by  asserting  that  God  is  essentially  good,  and  that  he 
does  not  conceive  of  the  will  of  God  in  the  way  that  we  speak 
of  that  of  man's,  but  there  is  the  personal  element  attached 
to  it,  from  which  Spinoza  tries  to  escape.  The  fact  is  that 
the  immutability  of  things,  which  forms  a  very  important 
part  in  Spinoza's  system,  for  it  is  intimately  connected 
with  his  principle  that  things  flow  from  God  in  the  same 
way  as  the  equality  of  the  three  angles  of  the  triangle  to 
two  right  angles,  was  wholly  missed  by  Crescas.  He,  like 
Spinoza,  speaks  of  continual  creation  but  with  an  entirely 
different  meaning,  for  he  makes  use  of  it  to  prove  the 
possibility  of  miracles.  Up  to  a  certain  poiJit  these  two 
thinkers  go  together,  but  later  they  part  company. 

It  is  difficult  to  describe  definitely  the  extent  of  influence 
an  earlier  thinker  may  exert  upon  a  latter,  especially  when 
the  latter  does  not  name  the  first,  but  comparing  the  ideas 
expressed  in  Cogitata  Metaphysica,  chapter  X,'De  Creatione', 
and  those  of  Crescas,  we  find  them  decidedly  similar,  and 
it  is  a  possibility  that  the  latter  took  his  cue  from  the 
former. 


157 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 


Aaron  ben  Elijah  Eis  Cliaynt,  ed.  Fianz  Delitzsch,  Leipzig,  1841. 

Abraham  Ibn  Daud  Ha-Emitmah  ha-Ramah,  Frankfurt  am  Main,  1852. 

Aristotle  Works,  ed.  Prantl  Greek  and  German,  Leipzig,  1854, 

Baeumker,  Clement         DiePhilosophie  desMittelaltcrs,  mAllgemeine  Geschiclile 
der  Pliilosophie,  Berlin,   1909,  quoted  as  All.  G. 
der  Ph. 
Bahya  ben  Pekuda  Hobot  ha-Lebbabot,  ed.  Wilna.  1858. 

Beer,  T.  de  History  of  Philosophy  in  Islam,  London,  1903. 

Brandis,  Christian  A.      Haudbnch    der  Geschichte  der   Griechisch-Romischen 

Philosophie,  Vols.  I,  II,  Berlin,  1835. 
Caird,  Edward  Evolution  of  Theology  in  Greek  Philosophers,  Glas- 

gow, 1904. 
Caird,  John  Spinoza,  Edinburgh,  1888. 

Delitzsch,  Franz  Introduction  to  Ets  Chayni. 

Dieterici,  Friedrich  H.     Philosophie  der  Araber,  Vol.  V,  Leipzig,  1876. 

,,  „  Die  Thcologie  des  Aristotelcs,  Leipzig,  1882. 

Fisher,  George  Park        History  of  Christian  Docinne,  New  York,  1896. 
Fischer,  Kuno  Geschichte  der  Neuern  Philosophie,  Vol.  II,  Heidel- 

berg, 190 1. 
Gersonides.  Levi  Mtlhaniot,  ed.  Leipzig,  1866. 

Goldziher,  Ignaz  Islamische  und  jiidtsche  Philosophie,  in  All.  Geschichte 

der  Philosophic. 
Griinfeld,  A.  IVtllensproblem  in  der  judischen  Philosophie. 

Joel,  Manuel  Don  Hasdae  Crcscas'    religionsphilosophische    Lehren 

in      ihrem    geschichtlichen     Einflusse     dargestellt, 
Breslau,  1866. 
Zur  Genesis  der  Lehre  Spinoeas,  Breslau,  187 1. 
Judah  ha-Levi  Kuzari,  ed.  Metz,  Hamburg,  1838. 

Kaufman,  David  Geschichte  der  Attributenlehre  in  der  judischen  Reli- 

gionsphilosophie    des   Mittelalters  von  Saadja    bis 
Maimuni,  Gotha,  1877. 
Lewes,  George  Henry    Aristotle,    A    Chapter  front  the  History    of  Science, 

London, 1864. 
Maimonides,  Moses  More  Nebitchini,    English   translation.   Guide  of  the 

Perplexed,  by  M.  Friedlander,  3  volumes,  London, 
1864. 
„  ,,  Code,  Part  I. 

,,  ,,  Eight  chapters. 

Munk,  Salomon  Melanges  de  Philosophie  juive  et  arabe,  Paris,  1859. 

Neumark,  David  Dogmas  {Ikanin  Heb.),  Odessa. 

Saadia,  Gaon  Emuiwt  ve  Death,  Jusefof,  1885. 

Simon,  Jules  Etude  de  la  Theodicee  de  Platon  et  Anstote. 


158 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 


Spinoza,  Benedict 
Stein,  Ludwig 


Taylor,  Thomas 


Wallace,  Edwin 


Zeller,  Eduard 


Works,  ed.  Van  Vloten  and  Land,  Hague,  1882-3. 
Die  Continuiidt  der  griechischen  Philosophic  in  der 

Gedankenwelt  det   Amber,   quoted  as  C.  der  Gr. 

Ph.  der  Ar. 
Die    Willensfreiheit    und    ihr   Verhdltniss  zur  gott- 

lichen  Prdsciem  und  Providenz  bet  den  jiidischen 

Philosophen  des  Mittelalters,  Berlin,  1862, 
Dissertation  on  the  Philosophy  of  Aristotle,  London, 

1812. 
Outlines  of  the  Philosophy  of  Aristotle,  Cambridge 

Univ.  Press,  1908. 
Greek  Philosophy,  Eng.  trans.,  New  York,  1890, 


INDEX 


Aaron    ben   Ilijah,   Karaite  philoso- 
pher, 97 
Abraham  Ibn  Daud,  16 

proofs  of  the  existence  of  God,  17 
view  of  divine  attributes,  17  sq. 
view  of  freedom  of  the  will,  92,93 
Albertus  Magnus,  10 
Alexandrian  school,  disciples  of,  21 
Alexander    of    Apliaodesias's    com- 
mentaries, translations  of,  4 
De  regimine,  book  of,  95 
view  on  Providence,  96 
Al-Farabi,  6 
Al-Gazali,  7 
Al-Kindi,  6 

Amor  Dei,  see  Love  of  God 
Anselm,  maxim  of,  6 
Aquinas.    Thomas,    view    on    God's 

knowledge  of  things,  22 
Arabic     philosophy,     influence     on 
Jewish  philosophy,  3 
birth  of,  4 
tendencies  of,  5  sq. 
Aristotle,     works     translated     into 
Arabic,  4 
objections  to  his  theories  in  early 

Arabic  philosophy,  5 
Arabic  followers  of,  6 
theology  of,  18  sq. 
Jewish  followers,  Saadia,  7  sq. 
Abraham  Ibn  Daud,  16  sq. 
Maimonides,  27  sq. 
view  on  place  of  elements,  30 
conception  of  the  accidental,  31 
proofs  of  the  twentj'-six  proposi- 
tions. 37  sq. 
refutation    of    Aristotelian    argu- 
ments by  Crescas,  40  sq. 
view  on  Providence,  97 
on    God's    knowledge   of  things, 

22,  98 
view  on  attributes,  20 
Asherites,  5 

Attributes  of  God,  Saadia's  view  of, 
12 
Bahyia's  view  of,  14 
Halevi's  view  of,  16 


Attributes  of  God — 

Abraham     Ibn     Baud's    view    of, 
17  sq. 

Maimonides'  view  of,  64  sq. 

Crescas's  view  of,  68  sq. 

Spinoza's  theory  of,  71 

relation    between    attributes    and 
essence,  72,  73  sq. 

emotional  attributes,  75  sq. 

Spinoza  on,  72,  112,  114 
Averroes,  6 


Baeumker,  Clement,  2,  note  2 

Bahya,  Jewish  philosopher,  13 
proofs  of  the  existence  of  God,  13 
proofs  of  the  unity  of  God,  14 
view  on  attributes,  14,  15 
on  freedom  and  prescience,  89 

Bereshith,  Rabba,  passage  of,  13 

Body,  definition  of,  37 
not  infinite,  37  sq. 
relation  of,  to  change  and  move- 
ment. 30 
relation  of,  to  force,  31 
relation  of,  to  number,  32 
composition  of,  32 


Caird,  E.,  view  on  Aristotle's  theo- 
logy, 22 
Calamitic  system,   in  Arabic    philo- 
sophy, 5 

theory  of  matter  of,  9 
Categories,  not  applicable  to  God,  12 

and  genera,  14,  note  23 

and  cliange,  39 
Cause,   first,  proof  for  existence  of, 
in  Bahya,  14 
in  Aristotle,  20 

Aristotle's  conception  of,  22 
Cause,  external  and  internal,  34 
Causes,  mediate,  90 

scale  of,  14 

natural,  91 
Causal  regresses,  not  infinite,  29 
Change,  nature  of,  30 

and  categories,  29 

and  divisibility',  30 


i6o 


Crescas,Hasdai, position  of,  in  Jewish 

philosophy,  7 
books  on  Jewish  philosophy,  25 
philosophical  aspect  of  Crescas's 

thinking,  24 
refutation  of  Aristotle,  arguments 

against  infinite,  40  sq. 
refutation   of  Maimonides'    proofs 

of  existence  of  God,  54  sq. 
own    proof   of    the    existence    of 

God,  59 
view   on    essence    and    existence, 

63  sq. 
on  attributes  and  unity,  67,  69 
on  emotional  attributes,  75 
relation   of  Crescas   to    Spinoza's 

proof  of  the  existence  of  God, 

60  sq. 
of  view  on  essence  and  existence, 

64 
of  view  of  attributes,  71  sq. 
view  of  love  of  God,  76  sq 
on  prescience,  98  sq. 
against     Maimonides'     view    on 

prescience,  100 
on  providence,  116 
on  potence,  121,  122  sq, 
on  freedom,  127 


Defence  of  religion,  cause  of  rise  of 

Jewish  philosophy,  2 
Democratus,  tlieory  of  atums  adopted 

in  Arabic  philosophj',  5 
Design,  argument    from,   in   Bahya, 

13 

in  Halevi,  15 
Dialogues  of  Plato,  translation  of,  4 
Divine  love,  moving  the  spheres,  21 

two  meanings  of,  76 

for  man,  77 


Emanation,  theory  of,  6 
Emotional  attributes,  sec  Attributes. 
Emunah  Ramali,  book  of,  18,  note. 
Essence,  relation  to  existence,  63 

Ibn  Roshd's  view  of,  63 

Ibn  Sina's  view  of,  63 

Ciescas's  view  on,  64 

Spinoza  on,  64 

and  attributes,  65  sq.,  71 
Eternity  of  the  world,  admitted  by 
Averroes,  6 

taught  by  Aristotle,  51 
Existence  of  God,  proof  of,  occupies 
important  place  in  Jewish  philo- 
sophy, 3 


Existence  of  God  — 

proved  by  Saadia,  8  sq. 
by  Bahya,  13  sq. 
by  Halevi,  15  sq. 
by  Ibn  Baud,  17 
by  Aristotle,  18,  19 
by  Maimonides,  29  sq. 
by  Crescas,  59 
by  Spinoza,  60 
relation   of  existence   of  God   to 
essence,  63  sq. 
Evil  in  the  world,  problem  of,  solved 
by  Ibn  Daud,  93 
by  Maimonides,  117 
by  Crescas,  120 
by  Spinoza,  135 
F 
Finitude,  of  time,  see  Time 
of  force  in  a  body,  32 
of  space,  see  Space 
Fisher  Kuno,   view  on  relation  be- 
tween   Crescas     and    Spinoza, 
60  sq.,  74 
interpretation  of  Spinoza's  mean- 
ing of  attributes,  73 
Form,  relation  to  matter,  33 

stay  of  body  according  to  Aristotle, 

Crescas's  view  of,  52 
Franz  Pico,  Italian  philosopher,  45 
Freedom    of  the  will,   problem    of, 
discussed  in  antiquity,  84  sq. 

by  Saadia,  86 

by  Bahya,  89 

by  Halevi,  90  sq. 

by  Abraham  Ibn  Daud,  92  sq. 

by  Maimonides,  94  sq. 

by  Crescas,  127  sq. 

by  Spinoza,  131  sq.,  133  sq.,  135 

G 

Gersonides,  criticism  of  Maimonides' 

theory  of  attributes,  60 
Giordano  Bruno,  45 
God,  place  of,  in  Jewish  philosophy,  2 
cause  of  being,  11 
relation  to  the  world  in  Aristotle,  21 
as  agent,  12 

His  existence  and  essence,  12 
Greek  speculation,   continuation  of, 

in  the  East,  4 
Greek  books,  translation  of,  4 
H 

Halevi,  see  Judah  Halevi 
Happiness,  divine,  essential  to  God, 76 

Herodotus,  84 
Homer,  on  fate,  84 


INDEX 


i6i 


I 

Ibn  Daud,  see  Abraham  Ibn  Daud 
Ibn  Gabiro],  Jewish  philosopher,  6 
Ibn   Roshd,  view  on  existence  and 
essence,  63 
on  composition  of  body,  52 
Ibn    Sina,    view   on    existence    and 

essence,  62 
Inertia,  law  of,  45 
Infinite,    Aristotle's   view    of   non- 
existence of — 
magnitude,  29 
causal  regresses,  29 
space,  41 

proofs  of  non-existence  of,  37  sq. 
Crescas's  proof  of  existence  of — 
magnitude,  44 
body,  46 
space,  48 
Injustice,    problem    of,    Maimonides 
on,  117 
Gersonides  on,  118 
Crescas  on,  120 
Spinoza  on,  135 


J 

Jehuda  Halevi,  proofs  for  the  exis- 
tence of  God,  15 
theory  of  attributes  of,  16 
Joel,  M.,  book  of,  23 

view  on   Crescas's    influence    on 
Spinoza,  60,  71,  76 


Kant,  Emanuel,  proof  of  finitude  of 

time  of,  9 
on  freedom  of  the  will,  133 
Knowledge,  an  attribute  of  God  in 

Ibn  Daud,  17 
Koran,  predestination  in,  85 
Kuzari,  book  of,  15 


Leibnitz,  cosmological  proof  of,  8 
Lewis    Meyer,    correspondent     of 

Spinoza,  62 
Life,  as  an  attribute  of  God,  20 
Logic,    place    of,    in   Jewish    philo- 

sophv,  3 
Love  of  God,  144 

basis  of  Crescas's  ethical  system, 

145  sq. 
Spinoza's  view  of,   148 
See  also  Divine  Love 

W. 


Maimonides,  follower  of  Aristotle,  22 
proofs  of  the   existence  of  God, 

29  sq. 
view  on  unity  of  God,  34,  36,  55 
proofs  of,  criticized  by  Crescas,  55 
view  of  unity  refuted  by  Crescas, 

57  sq. 
view  on  attributes,  60  sq. 
criticized  by  Gersonides,  66 
by  Crescas,  67  sq. 
on  freedom,  94 
on  prescience,  95,  96 
on  Providence,  97 
Matter,  element  of  body,  33 
Motion,  nature  of,  29 

rate  of,  42,  44 
Movement,  kinds  of,  30 

of  the  infinite  impossible,  39 
circular,  49 
Mutakallimin,       form       of    Arabic 
thought,  5 
in  Jewish  philosophy,  6 
Mutalzilites,  system    of.  in   Arabic 
philosophy,  5 

N 

Neo-platonism,  4 

in  Arabic  philosophy,  5  sqq. 
Nous,  discussed  in  Arabic    philoso- 

phy»  4 

'  Now  ',  the,  no  isolated  element  of 
time,  10 
no  movement  in,  possible,  39 


Omniscience  of  God,  Saadia  on,  87 

Bahya  on,  89 

Halevi  on,  91 

Ibn  Daud  on,  93 

Maimonides  on,  95  sq. 

Crescas  on,  99  sq. 

Gersonides  on,  loi,  102 

Spinoza  on,  112 
Once,  on  attribute  of  God  in  Bahya, 

15 
in  Halevi,  16 
in  Ibn  Daud,  17 
Or  Adonai,  book  of,  23,  and  in  many 

notes 


Place,  natural,  30 

infinite,  not  existent,  38 

definition  of,  38 
Plato,  dialogues  of,  4 


1 62 


Pleasure  and  pain,  Crescas's  defini- 
tion of,  75 
defined  by  Spinoza,  77 
Porphyry, 4 
Possible,  the,  existence  of,  102  sq., 

125 
Potence,  an  attribute  of  God,  Saadia 
on,  12 
Ibn  Daud  on,  17 
Maimonides  on,  6'' 
Crescas  on,  121-2  sq. 
Spinoza  on,  123 
Prescience,    divine,    and     freedom, 
Saadia  on,  87 
Bahia  on,  89 
Halevi  on,  91 
Ibn  Daud  on,  92  sq. 
Maimonides  on,  96 
Crescas  on,  98  sq.,  107,  129 
Gersonides  on,  loi 
Providence,    problem    of,    place    in 
Jewish  philosophy,  3 
Saadia  on,  88 
Bahia  on,  89 
Halevi  on,  90,  91 
Maimonides  on,  97 
Crescas  on,  1 10 
Psalms,  problem  of,  injustice  referred 

to  in,  85 
Psychology,  place  in  Jewish  philo- 
sophy, 3 
of  Crescas,  142 


Reward  and  punishment,  problem 
of,  in  Crescas,  136,  137 

Resistance,  determining  factor  in 
motion.  48,  53 


Saadia    ben    Joseph,   Jewish    philo- 
sopher, 7 
proofs  for  the  existence   of  God, 

8  sq. 
on  unity  of  God,  11 
on  attributes.  12 
on  freedom,  86 
on  prescience,  87 
Space,  movement  in,  Aristotle's  view 
of,  41  sq. 
infinite,  45 

definition  of,  by  Aristotle,  47 
Crescas's  definition,  48 
Spinoza,    Baruch,    commends    Cres 
cas's  proof  of  existence  of  God, 
59 


Spinoza,  Baruch — 

proof  of  existence  of  God,  60 
influence  of  Crescas  on,  61  sq. 
correspondence  with  Lewis  Meyer, 

62 
on  essence  and  existence,  64 
theory  of  attributes,  71,  73 
influenced  by  Crescas.  71,  73 
view  on  love  of  God,  77 
on  God's  omniscience,  ii2,  114 
on  potence,  123 
on  freedom,  130  sq..  133  sq. 
on  love  of  God,  148,  149  sq..  177 
on  divine  will  and  creation,  155 
Substance,  necessary  for  existence, 
view  of  Aristotle,  18-19 
of  Maimonides,  35 


Teleology,  discussion  of,  by  Crescas, 

139  sq. 
Thought,  activity  of  God,  21 

attribute  of,  73 
Time,    finitude     of.    according    to 
Saadia,  9 

division  of,  10 

Bahya  on,  13 

and  motion,  32 

eternity  of,  33 

Crescas's  definition  of,  254 
Truth,  a  divine  attribute,  i8 


Unitjr  of  God,  taught  by  Saadia,  11 

by  Bahya,  14 

by  Ibn  Daud,  17 

by  Aristotle,  20 

by  Maimonides,  35,  36 
criticism  of  Maimonides'  view,  b3' 

Crescas,  56,  57 
double  meaning  of,  70 


Vacuum,  not  existing,  according  to 
Aristotle,  41  sq. 
existence    of,  taught  by  Crescas, 
43  sq. 

W 

Will,  divine  attribute,  18 
Spinoza's  view  on,  112,  114 
definition  of,  by  Crescas,  147 
will  and  creation,  152 
Spinoza  on,  155 

Wisdom,  a  divine  attribute,  68 


X 

Xenophon,  book  of,  95 


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